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Abstract
The primary focus of this research is an examination of the issues involved in
the granting of access in an environment characterised by multiple users, multiple
resources and multiple levels of access permission. Increasing levels of complexity in
automoti\'e systems provides opportunities for improving the integration and efficiency
of the services provided to the operator.
The vehicle lease I hire environment provided a bas:s for evaluating conditional
access to distributed, mobile assets where the principal rJedium for operating in this
environment is the Smart Card. The application of Smart Cards to existing vehicle
management systems requires control of access to motor vehicles, control of vehicle
operating parameters and secure storage of operating information.
The issues addressed include examination of the characteristics of the operating
environment, development of a model and design, simulation and evaluation of a
multiple application Smart Card. The functions provided by the card include
identification and authentication, secure hash and encryption functions which may be
applied, in general, to a wide range of access problems.
Evaluation of the algorithms implemented indicate that the Smart Card design
may be provably secure under single use conditions and conditionally secure under
multiple use conditions. The simulation of the card design provided data to .support
further research and shows the design is practical and able to be implemented on
current Smart Card types.
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1.
1.1.

Glossary and Explanation of Terms.

Mathematical Terms.

A

Number of cells in on army

8

a binary number

C

number of unique combinations from sampling

D

a decimal number

d

the index generated by the selection algorithm

dn

average distance travelled by the drunk in Drunkard's Walk

E

encryption method

Ei

i'th bit of encryption method E

F

A User of a Resource administered by the proposed system

G

A Resource administered by the proposed system

H

Level of Access to a Resource administered by the proposed system

K

Key sequence

Ki

i'th bit of Key Sequence

k

an arbitrary constant

L

length of bit sequence necessary in Test T.

M

Movement of pixel Square in pixels

M

Message of arbitrary length

Mi

i'th bit in message

N

Number of steps taken in Drunkard's Walk

N

integer length of randomiser R

n

integer length of sample taken from randomiser R

0

number of bits specifying the composite sequence ordering, 9l

R

Randomiser. random data sequence from which samples are produced

R

binary random string of length L:= KT, publicly-accessible.

S

Set of integers specifying absolute of discard values for selection algorithm

S

number of selections taken from randomiser R

SP

Start Point, initial entry into randomiser

T

Test-T, method of specifying the output of a random sequence generator

u

number of possible rotations of a basic sequence

V

size of a pixel square side

W

Keystream of length N

X

Plain text of length N

x

number of bits per side of pixel square

xl

specification of x * x-1

Y

Cryptogram of length N obtained by adding X and W bitwise modulo 2
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* ... 3 * 2 * l.a factorial number

1

Development of a Model for Smart Card Based Access Control in Multi-User,
Multi-Resource, Multi-Level Access Systems
Z

Secret Key
rotution sequence

~

Composite Sequence

ffi

Addition Modulo 2

Ill

constant equal to 2rr

A

length of step in Drunkard's Walk calculations

-,)

I)

(\

,,

.''-.
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1.2.

Descriptive terms

Absolute Method : method of specifying bits in a mndomiser by the index of the bit.:-;.
(Sec Discnrd Method)
Access control: restricting access to resources to

privilt~ged

cntilics

Ancillary Systems: scpnrate systems which provide aid or functionality tn the operotor
of fl vehicle eg. Ail·-conditioning, central locking, power windows
Anonymity : concealing the identity of an entity involved in some process.
Authorisation : conveyance, to another entity, of official sanction to do or be something
Basic Sequence : a sequence of symbols used to create a larger sequence by rotation
and concatenation
Block Cipher: an encryption method that processes blocks of data, typically 64 bits,
according to a specific algorithm
CAN -Controller Area Network : a bus architecture using micro-controllers to
administer the control and reporting of information in a mobile environment.
Certification : endorsement of information by a trusted entity
Confirmation : acknowledgement that services have been provided
Complete Composite Sequence : a composite sequence that has one of each possible
rotation of the basic sequence.
Composite sequence : a sequence created by rotating and concatenating at least one
basic sequence where a rotated sequence may be used more than once.
Complete Ordered Composite Sequence : a Complete Composite Sequence that has,
ordered from 0 to n-1, each rotated Basic Sequence.
Complex Composite Sequence : a composite sequence created by rotating and
concatenating multiple basic sequences of differing lengths.
Complete Complex Composite Sequence : a complete complex composite sequence of all
the rotations of all the basic sequences.
Data Integrity :ensuring information has not been altered by unauthorised or unknown
means
DeBruijn Sequence: sequence such as '00011101' containing the set of overlapping
three bit sequences '000', '00 1', '0 11 ', '111 ', '110', '10 1', '01 0', '100' comprising a
complete binary representation from 0 to 23-1.
Derived data : data drawn from other types of data
DES- Data Encryption Standard :an iterative block cipher method.
Discard Method : method of specifying bits in a randomiser indirectly by specifying the
number of bits to discard between selections.
ECU- Engine Control Unit: used to control the running of an engine, generally includes
digital technology
EEPROM - Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory :
memory used in IC cards.

non~volatile

EMU- Engine Management Unit: same as ECU
Entity authentication or identification : corroboration of the identity of an entity (e.g. a
person, a computer terminal, a credit card etc.)
External Systems : systems external to the vehicle which interact with or provide
information to the vehicle. Eg Global Positioning Systems
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Function Generator: a mathematical concept, a block level clescriptiun of a process
where the input and output arc linked by the defined function.
!Cl~:

Internal Combustion Engi1w, where the cornhl1stion of the fuel is in enclosed
space to maximise fuel cfficit·ncy

ISO : International Standards Orgn.nisation
Law of Large Numbers : the characteristics. of a group of samples will be same as the
characteristics of the population
MD5: a secure hash function from R. Rivest that has been available since 1992.
Message authentication : corroborating the source of information; also known as data
origin authenticatiml
Non-Overlapping Sequences: taking bits from a sequence and using them once only.
For example, with sequence 1001 the non-overlapping sequences are 10 and 01
Non-repudiation : preventing the denial of previous commitments or actions
Overlapping Sequences: taking bits from a sequence and using them more than once.
For example, with sequence 1001 the overlappjng sequences would be 10, 00 and
01.
Ownership: a means to provide an entity with the legal right to use or transfer a
resource to others.
Privacy or Confidentiality : keeping information secret from all but those who are
authorised to see it.
'Random By Definition' : a term used to mean a sample that is considered to be random
within the canonical or generally accepted meaning. This implies that the sequence
is able to be tested to show a uniform random distribution but is in all senses ideal
and not practical.
Randomiser: a sequence of random or pseudo-random symbols
Raw Data : data taken from the sensors before processing
Revocation: retraction of certification or authorisation.
Round Off Error: A round-off error is where some number close to the exact value is
used instead of the actual number, for example, the use of 3.1416 instead of
3.141592654 or other representations of greater precision.
Run Length Encoding : a method of reducing storage space for information by encoding
the data for length. Suited to systems where the data does not change often.
Secure Hash Function : a method of reducing a larger block of data to a unique, shorter
sequence which is linked to the text by a function.
Selection : an unordered multiset with repetition
Selection Key : a set of integers that consist of a Start Point and a Selection Set
Selection Set : a sequence of integers used to specify symbols in the randomiser
Sensor data : data taken from the sensors after processing
Signature : a means to bind information to an entity
Start Point : the initial position of the pointer in a circular buffer
Stream Cipher : an encryption method that processes one bit at a time, usually by
addition modulo 2 with a key stream bit.
Timestamping : recording the time of creation or existence of information
Unique Sequence : any selection without rt.placement of bits from the randomiser
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Validation: a means to provide timeliness nf aulhorisnlion lo us1: or manipul<Jle
information or rcsoutTcs.
VMU -Vehicle Manngenwnt Unit :an electronic control sysh:m for a vehicle thnt
manages I he l'ngine and ancillary sysh~rns and rnay provide interaction with
external systems.

Witnessing: verifying the creation or existence of informntion by an entity other than
the creator

2.
2.1.

Introduction

Historical Perspective of Motor Vehicle Development

Motor vehicle development is dependent on component technologies such as
electricity and metal-working. The potential for powered vehicles was demonstrated by
Trevithick's steam carriage in 1801 though smaller, lighter and more efficient engines
for industrial and agricultural equipment provided the main impetus for development.
Increased efficiency results when the fuel is burnt inside a closed space to
reduce thermal losses. Internal combustion engines use liquid fuels which combine
substantial energy with reduced storage space. The 'Four Stroke' internal combustion
engine is most common where, in two revolutions of the crankshaft, fuel and air are
drawn into a cylinder, compressed, ignited and the combustion products expelled to
produce further rotation of the crankshaft.
Further improvement in perfonnance required increasingly complicated
mechanical and electrical engine control systems which are now being replaced by
electronic components that control multiple systems.

2.2.

Basic Structure of Internal Combustion Engines

The internal combustion engine requires a source of fuel and fuel ignition
coupled with a suitable mechanical environment for sustained operation. Petrol engine
ignition systems rely on mechanically driven components to generate and control the
intensity, timing and duration of a spark to initiate fuel combustion in the closed
cylinder.
The engine-driven distributor provides a means of initiating, adjusting and
distributing a spark to each cylinder in turn. The spark is created by altering the flow of
electric current through a 'step-up' transformer which converts a high current, low
voltage into a low current, high voltage which is discharged across an air gap to ignite
the vaporised fuel. Distributor mechanisms provide fine variation on the timing and
duration of the spark during different operating conditions.
The carburettor is a fuel metering device where the vaporising of the fuel for
delivery to the cylinders takes place. The vaporisation rate depends on the amount of
air drawn through the carburettor which is controlled by the position of the throttle and
the size and number of the metering jets. The air demand is produced by the rotation of
the crankshaft which uses the cylinders to pump air through the engine.
The basic components of the engine include a reliable electrical ignition system,
a carburettor for fuel and speed control and power delivery mechanisms such as the
crankshaft, gear box and differential. In recent y~ars, fuel control has developed to the
point where complex emission control and engine management systems are in use.

2.3.

Electrical and Electronic Developments

Electronics has provided means to improve the efficiency and performance of the
internal combustion engine. The weakest point of the distributor, the switch contacts
that interrupt the current flow, have been replaced with a transistor and the carburettor
has been replaced with electronically controlled fuel injection.
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Continuing automotive vehicle dt:vdopnwnt hw-; pnJdun:clthe I•:Jectronic Fuel
Injection (EFI} systt•m which uses n small computer lo control engine pc:rforrnanct:. One
of the major varinnts \\'HS developed by l~olwrt Bosch Gm hll. (Gregory, 1990, p8)
The Boseh syslt'm wws dectronit: control systems to provide efficient operation
from dnta provided by the engi1w sensor~;. The sensors me:1surc: air prcs:-.urc,
temperature and now, throttle position, t~ngine operating ternperatun., exhaust ga!i
o.xygen content and engine rotation. ((ircgory, 1990)

Contillllt'cl development has made the fuel-injected, electronically-controlled
engine very common in new cars. l~lectronic control of accessories such as airconditioning and access control has been added to the electronic suite in the vehicle.
External systems may also interact with the on-board systems.
Consequently, the controller is required to integrate functions such a~
authorising and monitoring vehicle usc and interaction \Vith electronic traffic control
and management systems. This integration of on-board s_vstemz with external systems
clearly sets the trend for integrated systems development.
A range of topics will be considered in developing the model for the system:
Access Control that identifies users and operating conditions; remote
authorisation; security against theft from the vehicle and unauthorised usc.
0

Event logging and short and long term data storage to report on vehicle operation.

o

Storage of abnormal conditions information such as oil or brake pressure failure.

0

Administrative functions such as servicing scheduling, fuel usage and other
functions.

It is considered that provision for some of these options can be effected by
setting limits and options within the software fitment to the Engine Management Unit.

2.4.

Research Justification

Initial research into computer security methods indicated the possibilities of
applying a developmental algorithm to a range of secure applications. Further
discussion with Professor VM Cordonnier and Professor AC Watson highlighted the
opportunities for research in multi-user, multi-resource, multi-level access systems
typified by the administration of a fleet of lease vehicles.
Many vehicles have integral electronic components and interaction with external
and ancillary systems is primarily managed by computers. It is noted that the major
issues in distributed, mobile computing are i·rlentif:c~tion and authentication of data
and participants in the system operations.
These issues are fundamental to the underlying legal and commercial structures
in administering vehicle lease and substantial opportunities for further research may be
determined. Additionally, management of the vehicle during operation, secure data
processing and transferring of permission to use a resource must be addressed.
Smart Cards provide computing facilities in a portable form with substantial
inbuilt security features.
The existing prototype environment is the result of continuing work on Smart
Card control of motor vehicles already being undertaken by Professor Watson. The
decision to implement the developmental algorithm on a Smart <~ard links this work
with the wider lease environment.
This research will support ongoing research in distributed computing and
electronic commerce and provide data about using Smart Cards in the administration
of mobile, distributed resources.
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2.5.

Research Methodology

The prototype environment is constrained by continuing work in Smart Card
control of motor vehicle performance being undertaken at l~dith Cowan University.
Consequently, the provision of a working Smart Cnrd environment reduces the need to
construction of prototypes.
Much broad spectrum research is already taking place in automotive,
communication and computer systems engineering. Exploration of the lease
environment will identify the key issues and provide a basis to develop a design for a
Smart Card application.
Determination of the particular requirements of the lease environment will tie
this research into the ongoing developments of Smart Cards in Electronic Commerce.
Owing to the choice of an unproved developmental algorithm and associated
processes a simulation of the design is necessary befnre beginning a prototype. The
prototype will be the basis for developing an application which may integrate all the
important characteristics of the design.
The goal is a Smart Card application to provide authentication, identification,
secure communications and data logging in a distributed, mobile computing
environment.

2.6.

Scope of Proposed Research.

2.6.1.

Introduction

The development of an integrated system to monitor and control access and use
is limited by the requirements of the owner and user.
The main avenue for research is the 'Multi-user, Multi~ Level, Multi-Resource'
aspect of administering a loan or hire arrangement. A hire company may require that
many people drive its vehicles under differing conditions. A cleaner must be able to
access a vehicle but not drive it, a mechanic must be able to drive and service a vehicle
and a customer must be able to operate the vehicle freely but not have complete control
over the vehicle and its information.
Starting from the relationships governing the granting of access and use of a
vehicle, investigation of the use of Smart Cards to pro\'ide access, data recording and
integration in a real-world environment will provide information for further development.
The Owner- User relationship may be complex and the methods used to transfer
all or part of the owner's privileges and administer the use of a mobile resource must be
effective. This will rely on secure recording of any data necessary to support the
administration of an agreement.
Existing protocols for authentication and identification deal with a substantial
part of the work necessary and need only be evaluated in the context of the research.
However, the granting of permissions from an owner to a user is within the scope of the
research. The Owner must be able to grant, modify or revoke access and usage
privileges as required.
Research will address using a Smart Card as an authenticating artefact, a
physical token that permits access and usage and is able to communicate details to any
authorised party. Additionally, the provision of a basis for further development of this
project may be useful in other areas.

2.6.2.

Smart Cards

Access control systems with security and flexibility to handle multiple users in a
distributed environment have become necessary due to the wide range of options
available to the owner of a number of vehicles. This environment is characterised by
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distributed, mobile assets with a wide range of owner cmd user expectHiions which
include safety, economy, reliability and security.
Smart Cards provide computing power scpuratc from the usual computer and
monitor combination. Though the banking and fimmce industries provided initif.lt
development of Smart Cards and defined the common format, rcf":ent developments
make Smart Card usc possible in a wide variety of activities.
Access control and vehicle management based on a Smart Card may provide
flexibility to the owner and user. A single card may be used to authorise usc, record
data, purchase needs and provide security for the Owner, User and vehicle. At present,
the use of access control systems incorporates burglar alarms and electronic keys that
broadcast the access code from outside a vehicle. A technique called 'sniffing' uses an
electronic device to detect and store the access control signals that enable an
unauthorised user to simulate an electronic key to the vehicle.
Current solutions to this problem include the use of 'Rolling Codes', a
cryptographic protection of the access code where each iteration is different and a
discernible pattern is difficult to d<:tect.
Contact-less Smart Cards with reduced broadcast radius may provide a measure
of security. Contact Smart Cards do not broadcast data and may provide greater
security than conventional broadcast technologies but require that the card is placed
into a card reading system before communication occurs. Reliability is a major
consideration in both systems and contact cards and readers must withstand physical
wear and tear.

2.6.3.

Data Logging

Management of a complex and demanding distributed environment will rely on
information from the operation of the resource for use in the resolution of a usage
agreement.
This data includes monitoring of vehicle operating parameters as well as time
and duration of operation, location of vehicle and name of driver. The availability of this
range of data may complicate the administration of the agreement, for example, a
dynamic chnrging structure where the actual usage determines the costing.
As an alternative to the 'unlimited kilometres' in some current agreements, the
charge can be varied where the use occurs in town or country or at high or low speed. If
the use occurs during excessive engine operating temperatures or low oil pressures
then the user may incur a surcharge on the agreement.

Consequently, secure logging of vehicle operating parameters to record usage is
important. Secure logging of data may include secure physical storage and the use of
cryptographic or information storage techniques such as compression.

2.7.

Summary

0

The identification of the characteristics of the agreement and the needs of the parties
to it is essential. Data must be verifiable at all stages of the usage period and
securely stored.

0

Smart Cards provide portable, secure computing power in a distributed environment
with the ability to store and process data on or off-line.

0

With ongoing broad spectrum development in automotive engineering, systems
integration is becoming more common. Integration enhances efficiency and sak(y
while providing opportunities for effective administration.

0

Secure operation without imposing arbitrary limits on a user is needed and
simulation must address the memory requirements and necessary data.

0

Identification or development of a suitable mode£ must address the requirements of
Smart Cards and distributed computing.
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3.
3.1.

Review of Literature

Introduction

The research topic is titled 'Development of a Model for Smart Card Based
Access Control in Multi-User, Multi-Resource, Multi-Level Access Systems'.
Smart Cards are used to provide an intelligent token. 'In access control the card
may be employed to open the door of a secure room or to obtain information from a
secure database.' (Longley and Shain, 1987, pl75)
Access control is defined as 'procedures to limit entry to ... or to limit use of a
computer/communication system or computer stored data, to authorised personnel.'
(Longley and Shain,l987, p2)
Multi-User indicates use or access by many different users consecutively or
concurrently. Multi-Resource describes varied resources available to users with
differing requirements. Multi-Level refers to different levels of permitted access or use of
a resource which may depend on user status or other qualifiers such as time of day.
A typical application would be the hire or lease of vehicles and the associated
management of information where identification, authentication and secure
transactions are important.
Identification of all parties to an agreement is necessary to reduce the
opportunities for fraud and ensure that any mandatory requirements are met. Identity
is the 'condition of being a specified person '(TCOD,1977, p533)
Authentication must address continued identification of the user of a resource,
the nature of the transactions and the data generated. Authentication is to 'establish
the truth or authorship or validity or genuineness of [something]'. (TCOD,1977, p63)
A transaction is considered as a business process carried through to completion,
for example, an agreement resulting in a lease I hire contract.
A transaction is '1. An event which results in a record being generated or
updated in a data proces:3ing system. 2. The record so generated. 3. A set of exchanges
between a terminal and a central processor.' (Chandor, 1981, p173) Additionally, a
transaction is the 'Management of business' or 'piece of especially commercial business
done.' (TCOD, 1977, p1231)
Secure storage of information and access details is essential to the operation of
the system. Secure means 'Safe against attack, .... reliable, certain not to fail or give
way' in a general sense (TCOD, 1977, p1027) More specifically 'assuring the secrecy,
integrity and availability of components of computing systems. The three principal
pieces are ... hardware, software and data.' {Pfleeger,l989, p19)
The basic automotive system being examined is the 4-stroke engine with a
proprietary electronic Engine Management Unit (EMU).
The conceptual supervisory controller will provide information to develop the
basis of a design for an integrated Vehicle Management Unit {VMU) using Smart Card
technology to administer system activities.

3.2.

Derivation of Automotive Control Systems.

Initial development of Internal Combustion Engines came from the need for
lighter, more efficient engines or power plants for mobile equipment and existing steam
technology. (Strandh,1979, p 139) A classification system of the various types of power
plant shows the characteristics and relationships of engine types. (Appendix 9.2)
The development of automatic engine control systems has produced identifiable
types of systems. Initial systems used basic mechanical devices with a human input to
provide feedback and control. Among the earliest examples of automatic devices were
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mechanical steam pressure regulators to reduce 1he need for human input.
(Strandh, 1979, p184)
Improved pcrformnncc required increased complexity of control systems. Purely
mechanical systems gave way to hybrid clcctro-mcchanical control systems for a more
complex array of ancillaries. Examples of this include 'Magneto'- (Motor56, 1956, p 1 18)
and conventional 'Contact Breaker'- based ignition(Motor63,1963, pSI) in petrol
engines, electrical lighting, fuel and performance monitoring equipment and accessories
such as the windscreen wipers and hydraulic bmkcs.
Many of these accessories arc electrical in nature and as early as 1921
specialised texts describing theory, operation and maintenance of these accessories
existed (Motor56, 1956). The increasing complexity of these systems provided
opportunities for electronics to perform the control functions. Current-switching
transistors increased the reliability and effectiveness of the ignition by increasing the
current through the coil while reducing current through the points.(Motor63, 1963, p6 1)
The increasing complexity of engines and associated electronics developed into
the computerised control systems typified by the range of fuel injection products cited in
Gregory. The development of Engine Management Units (Bosch93,1993, pp428-477)
shows an increasing use of electronic technology and an increasing integration of
vehicle systems to provide a safer, more economical vehicle. 'The development of the
automotive diesel engine is governed primarily by requirements for clean exhaust,
improved fuel economy, and the optimisation of driveability' (Bosch94, 1994, p186)
Compression-Ignition engines (diesels), which do not use spark ignition, may benefit
from 'Electronic Diesel Control' (Bosch93,1993, pp501-505).
Substantial on-board computing power is coupled with numerous, complex
sensing systems to provide control of vehicle characteristics. Security, safety and
comfort systems include theft deterrent systems, safety systems (air bag, seat belt
tighteners), navigation and communication systems, electrical locking and window
control. The development and adoption of the Controller Area Network (CAN) standard
for data communications throughout a vehicle emphasises the importance of digital
control systems in automotive use. (Bosch93,1993, p776-778)
The trend is clearly toward greater integration of systems. Computerised control
systems are expected to provide a whole Vehicle Management Unit (VMU). As future
trends may not be readily discernible it would be expected that such systems be flexible,
reliable and efficient to permit their widespread use.

3.3.
3.3.1.

Engine and Vehicle Management Units
Introduction

Engine Management Units (EMU) integrate the control functions of the disparate
components of a vehicle power unit. The development of solid-state electronics has
made it possible to provide rugged, reliable and versatile control mechanisms for the
engine, transmission and ancillary systems of a vehicle.
It is expected that the EMU will acquire additional functions and become an integrated
Vehicle Management Unit (VMU) which will provide a wide range of functions to the user
on demand or by configuration.

3.3.2.

Engine Types

Internal combustion engines can be divided into classes by cyclic or continuous
combustion, auto-ignition or external ignition, diesel, hybrid or Otto-cycle type and
heterogeneous or homogenous mixture type. (Appendix 9.2)
The main application is the cyclic combustion type which includes Diesel, hybrid
and Otto-cycle engines which are commonly used in motor vehicles. The most common
is the Otto·cycle (4-stroke), spark-ignition engine using petrol as a liquid fuel, followed
by the two or four stroke compression-ignition engine using diesel fuel.
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3.3.3.

Ancillary Systems

Ancillary systems range from instrumentation providing information and services
to complex interactive systems providing aiel to the operator. These systems include
cruise control, air-conditioning, power-steering, entertainment, sun-roof, window
\\'inding, central-locking, adjustments to scats and mirrors, adjustment to suspension
or transmission, navigntion information and others such as Closed Circuit TV for safety
,·_-and monitoring of opernting conditions.
The provision of these ancillary systems has increased the complexity of the
control and reporting task. The workload in monitoring these additional systems can
be lessened by integration of these systems into the vehicle control systems.

3.3.4.

External Systems

A major external system is the management system responsible for the day-today accounting of the vehicle operations by the owner I user.
Other external systems such as traffic management systems and toll systems
(Harrop, 1994, pp31-32), while essentially stationary, require information interchange
with the VMU. These systems may provide weather, road conditions and routing
information, electronic toll charging, theft and illegal use monitoring.
For example, the SafetyCam (OD97, 1997) system is in operation in New South
Wales where imaging technology is used to record vehicle details at locations along the
major highways. This information is used to monitor vehicle usage and traffic offences
where a vehicle that passes a control point too soon is deemed to be speeding. Excessive
hours on the road can be determined making log-book fraud difficult. Additionally,
traffic offences such as using a mobile phone while driving a vehicle can be monitored.
External systems that communicate with a vehicle exist for electronic logging of
vehicle movements and characteristics such as gross weight. Weigh bridges can be
used to provide control of vehicle loads and consequently minimise damage to roads.

3.3.5.

Trends in EMU development

The extra load placed on the driver to integrate the information from various
sources has provided impetus to the development of integrated Vehicle Management
systems that allow the user to select options and configurations.
The Cadec Systems 4000P has a proprietary 'Data Bridge' which 'is a
communications gateway designed to cost-effectively Hnk the engine, its subsystems,
the driver and the vehicle through an onboard computer to the company's home office
and its remote locations.' {Appendix 9.22)
The 'Safety Alert' system from Cobra Electronics Corporation is 'designed to
improve highway safety by automatically transmitting warning signals to the radar
detectors of motorists within 3/4 mile of the emergency or potentially hazardous site.''
(Appendix 10.22)
An On board Electronic Scale marketed by Dynacraft provides accuracy of 1%
and is used on vehicles with pneumatic suspension. The system can determine gross,
payload and axle group weights' (Appendix 9.22)

SCAN 'is an ultrasonic sensory device designed to assist drivers in safely
changing lanes, backing up or docking... The module visibly and audibly ialerts drivers
to obstacles within SCAN's detection zone'' (Appendix 9.22)
Satellite communications are catered for by Qualcomm's 'Enhanced Display
Unit for the OmniTRACS satellite mobile communications system .. Used to send and
receive text messages' it can be used with the on-board recorder and a smart card
readerjwriter to allow drivers to store or retrieve data. '(Appendix 9.22)
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Satellite navigation systems with on hoard computin~ to provide guidance to the
user and proposals have been made for stolen vehicle imrnobilisers which can be
activated by a mobile phone link to the vehicle. (,Jorws,l C)CJS)
Personalisation of the vehicle to suit individual prcfcrenct:s mny involve many
semi-automatic systems such as steering wheel height, seal position etc. Additionally,
off-the-shelf engine management units can be fitted to an cxistin& system which permit
dynamic alteration of the engine operating parameters which may he useful in
optimising engine performance under changmg conditions such as amhient air
temperature. (Wolf..JD, no date)

3.3.6.

Summary

Increasing use of electronics has lead to computerised equipment and systems
integration to reduce the workload on the driver and improve safety and efficiency.
Vehicle management systems routinely include interaction with ancillary and
external systems. Integration of the systems is occurring and the necessary standards
are being put in place.

o Programmability permits the user to select complex functions with simple actions,
for example, cruise control of a vehicle. Modularity is where similar functions are
grouped together for ease of maintenance and access.
0

Provision of safety, security and comfort functions in addition to the engine and
vehicle management functions is already well advanced. The practicality of such
systems may depend on clearly defined standards to permit inter-operability and
economic use of the systems.

3.4.
3.4.1.

Data Storage Requirements
Introduction

Administration of any system, hardware, software or paper-based, requires that
all relevant data is stored in a suitable form to permit analysis and verification.
Identification of the sources and types of data coupled with analysis of which data is
necessary for record keeping will permit an estimate of the data storage required.
Additional functions or uses of the data may become apparent leading to the
provision of efficient or novel facilities to the owner and user.
The need for secure transactions and data processing is evident in a distributed,
multi-level, multi-resource environment. 'Other applications where authentication [of
information! is important are alarm systems, satellite control systems, distributed
control systems and systems for access control.' {PRENA,1991, p2)

3.4.2.

Engine and VMU

The problems determining data storage requirements relate to the requirements
of the EMU, the ancillary and external systems. The most important consideration is
the amount of information required by external systems such as management systems
and depends on the amount of data required and the rate at which it is stored.
Data-transfer rate is defined as the number of bits per second where a bit is a
'Unit of information expressed as a choice between two possibilities' (TCOD,1977, p99)
and 'One ofthe two characters (0 and 1) used in binary notation. Also signifies the
smallest unit of data' (Chandor,1981, p25) A byte is taken to mean eight bits.
A sensor with 8 bit resolution can provide 256 different values. Reading this
sensor every second provides 3600 bytes per hour. Ten sensors would provide 36000
bytes of data for every hour of operation. During long-distance use of a vehicle with
multiple shifts over a week the data would be approximately 5. 77 Megabytes of
information where a Megabyte is 1048576 bytes.
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Additional data such as driver details, accommodation, meals, date and time of
operation, location, load and fuel usc mny ~;uhstanlially incre<Jsc this value.
The number of sensors used with a VMU would b1~ vastly incrcaHed with the
integration of ancillary mul external systt:ms sensors. J.cgnl requirements would also
place constraints on which data is stored for nudit, mandatory IJusinesH and t~Jxation
records and resolution of over-weight, over-speed find over-time complaints.
This information cannot be stored in the limited memory of existing smart cards
and some additional storage is necessary. Existing Smart Cards may have as much as
8 kilobytes of EEROM and 20 kilobytes of ROM. (Hendry, 1997, p106) To deal with the
data storage requirements data compression, large capacity memory storage and remote
reporting are considered.

3.4.3.

Data Compression

To conserve storage space and provide some coding of information various data
compression algorithms can be applied. 'Data compression refers to the storage of
data in as little space as possible. ' (Lew, 1985, p300)
Run-length encoding of data converts a string of symbols such as
'AAABBBAABBBBB' to '3A3B2A5B' where each consecutive occurrence of the symbol
more than twice is encoded as the count and the symbol. (Sedgwick,l990, p320) This is
a simple compression method and is suited to periodic recording of data that does not
change quickly. Periodic temperature monitoring can record duration and change of
temperature by the number an.:: value of the symbols.
More complex methods include 'Huffman Codes' which store data based on the
frequency of occurrence of each character where the most common character is stored
in the least bits. (Lew,l985, p355; Kruse, 1987, p453) Different series of data may be
encoded by different Huffman codes and unless the specific Huffmann coding is
recorded and used to decode the sequence the data may be unintelligible
(Sedgewick, 1990, pp325 ·330).
Additionally, an l~rroneous bit in a Huffman coded sequence may cause error
propagation and substantial delay may occur when the data has to be uncompressed or
corrected for evaluation.

3.4.4.

Remote Reporting

Remote Reporting could be achieved with a dedicated transmitter / receiver
providing periodic updates of the data to a home base during operation. (Qualcomm
Appendix 9-22) An alternative could be a mobile phone dedicated to vehicle use which
could be periodically used by a VMU to report to home base or even provide 'panic
button' or accident occurrence notification to emergency services.
The GSM - Global System for Mobile Telephony is an important standard for
mobile telephone systems. The individual phones are identified with a Smart Card
which functions as the Subscriber Identity Module {SIM) (Hendry,1997, pplS0-152)
External systems such as road toll collection may need to identify the vehicle
and driver to determine a payment method and a traffic monitoring system may impose
a speeding fine and notify the user with a message or tone inside the vehicle. A
consideration with the automatic assessing of charges is whether the User will dispute
the alleged event and use the system data for arbitration.

3,4.5.

Information available from EMU

Information available from the EMU is principally viewed as information derived
from sensor data after processing. Normally, the information is used to alter the engine
characteristics for efficient running under the current operating conditions and to
update information on the various displays.
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The semmrs for the EMU provide coolant temperature, oil pn!ssurc and
temperature, crankshaft position, engine rotation and r:1tc (l~t~volutions per Minute ·
RPM), exhaust gas oxygen content, fuel mass, air mass and !f:mpt!rHI.urc, throttle
position and transmission range selection. (Gregory, 1990; Bm;ch93, 1993)
The types of data arc:
Raw Data
data from the sensors before processing (Chundor, 1981, plSO)
Sensor Data
data from the sensors after processing
EMU Data
data generated by the EMU
Derived Data
data inferred from other types of dat'l

Raw Data is the actual output of a sensor. The sensor output may be
inadvertently modified by the characteristics of the sensor system and care must be
taken to ensure that monitoring this data does not alter the quality of the data provided
to the EMU.
Sensor Data is the data up to the input of the EMU processor and may include
on-board signal processing and conversion from analog to digital forms. The effects of
monitoring such data must be carefully considered as unintentional changes may affect
the smooth running of the vehicle.
EMU Data includes the output signals to the control and reporting devices, that
is, fuel injector signals and information to the display system for the driver.
Derived Data is all data that can be inferred from the previous data. It may be
deduced from engine rotation of 5000 RPM and a road speed of 0 Kilometres per hour
(kph) that the engine is being 'revved' in an unloaded state and this may be considered
an abuse of the vehicle.
It is noted that all of these information types may be used to provide diagnostic
and maintenance support.

3.4.6.

Information available from ancillary systems

Automated systems may use Sensor, EMU and Derived data to alter the settings
to account for temporary changes in the operation such as air conditioning, electrical
load (heater, blower, headlamps), power steering load, engine temperature, transmission
and clutch status. (Gregory, 1990, p24)
Air-conditioning system information includes whether the compressor is
activated or the fan is being used. The loading effects of compressor operation may
affect engine idle speed depending on the amount of cooling or heating required.
Variations in idle speed of the engine are sensed and controlled by the EMU.
(Bosch93,1993, p466)
For example, cooling the vehicle while the window is open could induce a
predetermined level of cooling until the window is shut. Derived data could be
generated from air-conditioning system, central locking and power window controller
data.
Information from the braking systems may be brake application, intensity and
duration which could provide important insight into vehicle operations. Air pressure
values for pneumatic brakes are important to the driver and brakes failing to release
correctly may cause inefficient operating conditions or possibly an accident.
(Bosch93,1993, p604)
Suspension systems provide data about the current load, usage and state of the
vehicle. Benefits include reduced energy consumption during braking and acceleration,
reduced fuel consumption by reducing vehicle height with increased speed and
enhanced stability during cornering. (Bosch93, 1993,p562)

Air bag suspension on heavy vehicles may provide data about vehicle load
distribution across each axle and whether the suspension becomes unsafe or
fails.(Dynacraft Appendix 9.22)
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Transmission systems provid1~ information about the current range selected and
road speed which is used to ndjust engine operating parameters. i\utornatic
transmission provides 'kick-down' and cfficit.·nt running mode!i. Kick-down is the
automatic selection of a lower transmission range to tlllotimiSI! acceleration during
overtaking. l~fl"icicnt running includes transmission modes where for long-term highspeed driving the lowest range is rendered inoperative to reduce the load on the engine.

Central locking systems may indicate whether the doors are correctly closed as
well as locked which may affect the performance of the vehicle under certain operating
conditions. (I3osch93, 1993, p725) For example, Transpcrth buses operating in Perth
cannot be driven with the rear passenger doo! open as the brakes arc automatically
applied until the door is closed.

3.4.7.

Information available from external systems

At present, external systems are not plentiful, though the range of systems is
increasing. For example, satellite navigation systems providing •lirectional guidance to
emergency vehicle operators can be used to relay the position of the vehicle to a control
system.
Identification of vehicles and loads may be automatically registered as the vehicle
passes a control point. Additionally, some information systems may not interact with
the vehicle, such as traffic monitoring systems that detennine speed directly (radar or
laser) or indirectly by video surveillance systems like SafetyCam. External systems
represent a growing aspect of the opportunities provided by technology to optimise the
operation of motor vehicles.

3.4.8.

Operational and Environmental Considerations

A complete specification of memory chip development would have to take into
account all the developments to date. However, a table provides an overview of the
principal semiconductor memory device types. (Appendix 9.3)
The principal considerations here are the ability of the chip to survive in hostile
environments where temperatures range from -40C for operation in an arctic
environment such as winter in northern Canada to + 130C (Bosch93, 1993, p 114) where
fluids from an overheated engine have leaked out. Environmental testing is already a
standardised procedure. The 'DIN IEC 68 - Environmental testing procedures for
electronic components and equipment' is an industry standard. {Bosch93, 1993, p350)
Exposure of system components to vibration, dirt, petrochemicals, hot liquids,
accelerations and tampering f abuse from the user mean that the components need to
be designed and selected for reliability, durability and maintainability. Additionally, if
information is used for the resolution of usage agreements, then the storage and data
must resist degradation, intentional or unintentional and from natural or unnatural
causes.
With the diverse electrical environment being subject to substantial changes, the
design and selection of the chips must allow for wide ranges of supply voltage and
current variation as loads are switched in or out. Additionally, very high voltages up to
30 kilovolts are available from the ignition components {Bosch93, 1993, p447) and very
high frequencies from communications devices such as mobile telephones and radios.
In Australia, Citizen Band (CB) radios transmit from 26.965 MegaHertz (MHz) to
27.405 MHz in the High Frequency (HF) band and 476.425 MHz to 477.400 MHz in the
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) band (Smith,l996, p238). Mobile phones and GPS
navigation systems the UHF Band which covers from 300 MHz to 3 GigaHertz (GHz)
(Young,l979, pl87).
To conclude, memory for use in the hostile and rapidly changing automotive
environment must be physically robust. The amount and type of memory needs to be
carefully considered in the light of ancillary and external systems and legal
requirements.
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3.4.9.

A sensor or 'Transducer' is part of the m<~asurcm1:nt syst1=m containing 'three
major elements: an input device, n signal conditionin~ or processing device and <m
output device.' (Cooper and l-lclfrick,J 'JBS, p348)
The sensor or transducer i!'l a 'Device to convert variations in one quantity into
those of another' (TCOD, 1977, p 123 I) and more specifically 'Any device that converts fJ
non electrical parameter, e.g. sound, pressure, or light, into electrical signals or vice
versa.' {Young, 1979, p540)
Interfacing of the varied sensor signals to the EMU occurs throughout the
system and different requirements exist. The range and capability of sensor systems is
improving and 'smart' systems usc sensors with built·in processing power coupled to a
serial bus Controller Area Network (CAN) (Bosch93, 1993, p776). Sensors with built·in
microprocessors providing independent signal processing are clearly described.
(BOSCH93, 1993, p 103)

3.4.10.

Data Storage Summary

o

Sensor development and integration is required because of the amount of
information n1~eded to dynamically alter the operation of the vehicle to meet
changing conditions.

0

Substantial broad spectrum development is already taking place.

0

Integration of systems is desired for safety, economy and ease of operation

o

Suitable standards and protocols for increasing the range and abilit.y of computers
have been considered in the development of the range of sensors which incorporate
facilities such as error detection and handling, fault confinement and fault
tolerance.

o

Memory chips must be selected to meet stringent environmental requirements and
implementation of the design will require a high level of engineering skill.

3.5.

Agreements and Contracts

3.5.1.
Introduction
A vehicle owner may permit the use of the vehicle without supervisiun in a hirejlease
agreement which is a 'contract legally binding on parties' (TCOD, 1977, p21). The
contract consists of 'an agreement which gives rise to legal rights and obligations
between parties to it and which will be enforced by the courts.' (Gibson & Fraser, 1995,

p826)
A contract transfers some of the Owner's rights over the vehicle to the User and
must address the potential usage. More information than the distance travelled or the
fuel used may be needed.
3.5.2.

3.5.2.1.

'·' o
o

Po..eaaion and Ownenhip

Possession in law primarily means physical control over a resource.
Ownership of a resource means the rights to exclusive enjoyment of the property.
(Gibson & Fraser, 1995, p642)

3.5.2.2.
0

Explanation of Terms

Identification and Authentication

Identification means 'Every subject must be uniquely and convincingly identified.
Identification is necessary so that subject/object access request(s] can be checked.'

(Pfleeger,1989, p283)
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0

Identification is based on something:

~·

Known

•:.

Possessed - artefact containing secret knowledge such
identity such as a uniform ~~r identification document

-:•

Inherent - physical characteristics such as finger prints

0

Identification protocols must be reciprocal, that is, able to be used to identify all
parties to the agreement by any one party. Computational efficiency is desirable.
(Menezes, Van Oorschot & Vanstone, 1997, pp387-388)

o

Authentication relates to entities and information. 'l;;ntity authentication is the
process whereby one party is assured (through acquisition of corroborative evidence)
of the identity of a second party involved in a protocol, and that the second has
actually participated (i.e., is active at, or immediately prior to, the time the evidence
is acquired.)' (Menezes et al., 1997, p386)

0

'Data origin authentication is a type of authentication whereby a party is
corroborated as the (original) source of specified data created at some (typically
unspecified) time in the past.' (Menezes et al.,1997, p361)

-PIN number, password or some secret knowledge

3.5.2.3.

<JS

a Smart Cflrtl or implying

Signatures and Authorisation

A signature links information to a particular entity and may he used to signify
assent or acceptance of an obligation. (Appendix 9.4)
Mitchell, Piper and Wild suggest that ~he crucial properties of a written
signature are that it is easy to produce, easy to recognise but difficult to forge' (IEEE92,
1992, p330)
Digital signatures must be easy to compute, easy to verify and have an
appropriate lifespan. (Menezes et al., 1997, p30) A digital signature must also meet the
requirements of a written signature.
Authorisation is the conveyance of permission to another person to do or be
something.
(Appendix 9.4) Authorisation to use a resource must be clearly traced from the
owner to the person with the right to use or possess it.

3.5.2.4.

Non-Repudiation

Non-repudiation means that neither party to an agreement can deny
accountability for an agreement. (Appendix 9.4) This means that an agreement cannot
be altered except with the consent of the parties concerned and the agreement with any
changes can be verified by an independent party. Consequently, recording of all
information applicable to the agreement including changes and identities is important.
The information must be stored in a manner that resists alteration yet is still readily
accessible.

3.5.3.

Electronic Commerce Considerations

In the past twenty years banks and other financial institutions have come to rely
on electronic methods of transferring funds. These methods, while efficient, must
engender confidence in the system by the users.
Computer crime is 'any illegal, unethical or unauthorised behaviour relating to
the automatic processing and for the transmission of di:tta' . {De Schutter, 1991, p3)
Electronic funds transfer has many benefits but problems fall into four
categories: 'issues of a legal and contractual nature, consumer information problems,
general economic problems and social problems.' (OECD, 1989, p13)
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Multi~Uscr,

Major concerns t•xist about the nature of the contract or agreement between the
issuer and user of the card as unilateral variations to contracts arc possible.
Information gathered to administer a contract may be used for purposes which mny
disadvantage the parties to the cuntmct. The continued possession and usc of the
information relating to the agreement raises questions about privacy and security.
Recommendations nddrcssing these issues have been formulated. (01~CD,l989, pp130136)
Usc of encryption technologies is subject to world wide scrutiny owing to the
possibility of crime remaining undetected. Major concerns exist in the usc of
encryption as an aid to confidentiality of personal data contrasted with the legitimate
concerns of the services tasked with main tenancc of law and order. {COA, 1996, p3)
Increased availability of electronic data processing equipment coupled with
development of strong cryptographic methods has provided data security for the large
amounts of data generated. The development of encryption. methods may be
summarised as 'stronger, faster, cheaper' (COA, 1996, p27)
Smart Cards have uses in identification and authentication of information and
transactions. Uses as part of a cryptographic system and in anonymous transactions
are considered. (Chaum,l991)

3.5.4.

Summary

Contracts and agreements which rely on the law for validation must be
meaningful in a legal sense,
a

Information used to administer the agreement must be suitable and verifiable.

D

0

Electronic commerce must meet stringent requirements relating to the gathering and
use of information.

3.6.

Smart Cards and their Capabilities

3.6.1.

Introduction

Rankl & Effing describe the first patent for an integrated circuit identification
card in 1968 by Dethloff and GrOtrupp (Rankl & Effing, 1997, p3), which preceded the
similar application by Arimura in Japan in 1970. (Zoreda & Oton, 1994, p 36) The
Smart Card concept, a portable computer with a reduced set of capabilities and
interfaces, has since overcome the technical problems and matured into a practical
technology,
'Smart Cards may have two forms; one for a set of banking operations and the
other, termed an intelligent token, can provide access control, perform encryption and
authentication operations, etc. A multipurpose Smart Card for banking and financial
transactions might perform one or more of the operations: (a) electronic chequebook; (b)
electronic wallet; (c) electronic purse; (d) electronic token; (e) telepayment; (f) internal
transfer; (g) access; (h) remote banking; and (i) portable file.'
(Longley and Shain, 1987, p317)
According to Guillou, Ugon and Quisquater. the Smart Card can perform only
five operations:

!. !. Input data

2. 2. Output data
3. 3. Read Data from Non-Volatile memory (NVM)

4. 4. Write or Erase in NVM
5. 5. Compute a cryptographic function
(IEEE92, 1992, p565)
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system for keeping data nbout vehicles on Smart Cards. 'Many of these applications arc
demanding more and more 'intelligence' in the embedded micro ... '(I<;A, 1997, p30) and
applications such as road tolling and parking arc readily availablc.(J-Icndry, 1997, p205)
The limits imposed on the card by the component technologies have hampered
the use of the card. For example, the average memory capacity of a Smart Card is
measured in kilobytes and the interface is serial in nature reducing the bandwidth of
the data transfer signals. (Zoreda & Oton,1994, p12) A common clock frequency of
3.5712 MegaHertz results in a maximum rate of446400 bits per second.{Rankl &
Effing,l997, p411)
Types of Cards

3.6.2.
3.6.2.1.

magnetic stripe cards

Data is encoded on a magnetic stripe on the rear of the card. The data is
formatted into tracks which are read when the card is 'swiped' through a card reader
and information can be written to or read from the card. {Hendry, 1997, pp35-40)

3.6.2.2.

optical cards

A 'Write-Once, Read-Many' storage device that permits a large amount of data to
be stored. Operations are performed by a low power laser which reads the data by
detecting the irregularities in the optical surface and writes by burning additional
irregularities into the surface. (Hendry,1997, p 41)

3.6.2.3.

Chip cards - memory only

Memory-Only Cards are analogous to a floppy disk in that any data stored on
them can only be manipulated by an external system attached to the card reader. As a
portable data storage device they can be used to transfer and store data. For example,
patient records in a hospital where large amounts of data for each patient are recorded.
(Zoreda & Oton,!994, p5)

3.6.2.4.

Chip Cards -with microprocessor

Chip Card with a programmable microprocessor for managing and access
control of data.(Zoreda & Oton,l994, p 233; Rank! & Effing, 1997, p13) Processor
cards are analogous to a small computer excepting that there is no internal power
supply or display. Memory includes Read-Only Memory (ROM) which is permanent,
Erasable Programmable ROM which is for long-term storage that may change only
under special conditions and Random-Access Memory (RAM) for short term storage of
working data.
3.6.2.5.

PCMCIA C&rda

The Personal Computer Memory Card Industry Association specifies standards
which allow small memory cards and peripheral devices to be incorporated into a card
format. Any type of semiconductor memory may be used and the storage capacity may
be in MegaBytes. PCMCIA cards are used to transfer data between computers.
(Hendry ,1997, p46)

3.6.3.

Standards

The International Standards Organisation (IS0-081) publishes standards relating
to the design and use of Smart Cards such as :

ISO 7810

Identification Cards - physical characteristics

ISO 7811

Identification Cards- recording technique (magnetic stripe cards)
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ISO 7816

Identification Cards- integrated circuit canis with contacts

ISO 9564

Banking- PIN management and security

ISO 10202

Integrated Circuit Canis - Security Architecture for financial transactions

ISO 10536

Identification Cards -contact-less intcgmtcd circuit cards

The Centre EuropCen pour Ia Normalisation (CI*:N) publish standards such as:
EN726

Identification Card Systems- multi-function cards

EN 1038

Identification Card Systems - payphones

EN1546

Identification Card Systems- lntcrsector electronic purse.

3.6.4.

Uses

Smart Cards may be used in many areas : identification and electronic cash for
electronic commerce (Chaum,l991) Password authentication (Chang, Hw.mg and
Buehrer,1993) Personal Communications security (Cooke and Brewster,1994) Multifunction cards (Cordonnier,l991) and Cryptography (Vedder,1992; Konigs,1991) among
others.
Use of a Smart Card in the development of the proposal may require all these
activities. Additional uses may be determined but the principal area of development is
the multi-level, multi-resource, multi-access environment for vehicle hire or lease.

3.6.5.

Summary

Consequently, the basis for the Smart Card based identification, authentication,
authorisation and recording system is defined. Smart Cards will function as a key for
user access to any permitted function while recording the actions and providing
information to administer a usage contract. Additionally, Smart Cards will provide
secure access to stored data and a basis for the development of an integrated VMU.

3. 7.

Existing Protocols for Information Transfer

3. 7 .1.

Introduction

The development of the proposed research relies on using either existing
_, protocols or developing a new ones to ensure that the information used is handled
correctly. Fraud and other unwanted outcomes may result from a poorly implemented
protocol.

To counter this problem it is essential to use existing protocols which have been
exposed to critical analysis and appear to have well-described characteristics. Due to
the limited time available existing protocols will be used wherever possible as
development and validation of a new protocol wuuld require substantial resources.
Consequently, only the relationships between the User, Smart Card and
Resource will be discussed.
Existing Protocols and Algorithms

3.7.2.

This list identifies some of the existing methods. Identification of suitable
protocols is needed.

3.7.2.1.
IJ

Feige-Fiat-Shamir

lJ

Fiat-Shamir

Identification

o Guillou-Quisquater

Edith Cowan University

20

I
Development of a Model for Smart Card Based Access Control in Multi-User,
Multi-Resource, Multi-Level Access Systems
a

Schnorr

{Schneier, 1996)

3.7.2.2.

o

Signatures

RSA

'

i,
'.I

D Rabin
0

Merkle (Menezes et al., 1997

3.7.2.3.
o

l

Eh:ctronic Fund•

Trana~fer

Secure Electronic Transfer {Whyte, 1997)

3.7.2.4.

Encryption

o

Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA)

D

Data Encryption Standard (DES)

0

Public Key

D Stream Cipher

3.7.2.5.

Haoblng

o
o

MD4

0

Snefru

o

RIPE-MD (Schneier, !996)

MDS

3.7.3.

Summary

As far as practical, existing protocols will be used to minimise the amount of
developmental work needed.

3.8.
3.8.1.

Cryptography and Data Security
Introduction

Cryptography is a generally available and applicable method of securing data
and granting or restricting access to a system. Confidentiality, Data Integrity,
Authentication and Non-repudiation are the goals of cryptography. (Menezes et al.,1997,
p4)
Cryptographic protection must take into account the likely threat to the
'Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability' (PRENB, 1991, p 6) of the data. A 'CostBenefit' analysis should be made to determine the costs of providing protection and the
risks and costs of any losses. (Pfleeger, 1989, p 466)
The requirements of secure transactions in an electronic and computing
environment are important and many texts exist addressing the requirements.
(Schneier, 1996; Sebeny and Pieprzyk, 1989; Denning,1982)
The design requires the use of Smart Cards to provide the User with services to
permit the operation of vehicles in a 'multi-user, multi-level, multi-resource'
environment. This environment must include accurate and reliable information about
the hire f lease agreement and the actual use of the vehicle for the resolution of the
agreement.
Any assessment of cryptographic functions requires an understanding of
randomness and the means of quantifying it. (Knuth, 1973, pp1-170; Lew,1985, pp266267) This is a complex field and will only be addressed in a manner commensurate with
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the complexity of the design. Any assessment of the efficiency or practicality of the
proposed system must address the operation of the system und cryptographic protection

provided.

3.8.2.

Hardware

Hardware systems to provide cryptologic activities arc split between dedicated
hardware or computers and microprocessors that can be configured to perform
cryptographic functions. The hardware systems range from small add-on items which
apply a form of stream cipher on a data stream to dedicated, purpose-built electromechanical and electronic machines.
Configuration of a general PC to perform cryptographic functions requires
suitable software though this may include specific add-on cards or systems. Hardware
based Data Encryption Standard (DES) systems (Kahn, 1996, p981) are available and
one of the main reasons for dedicated hardware is higher processing speed. Schneier
cites a Digital Equipment Corporation prototype chip processing 1 gigabit per second
compared with 'a software implementation of DES on an IBM 3090 mainframe can
perform 32,000 DES encryptions per second' where each block is 64 bits and this
equates to approximately 2.05 megabits per second. (Schneier, 1996, p278).

3.8.3.

Smart Cards

Applications of Smart Cards to commercial enterprises such as banking employ
a cryptographic environment readily implementable on the card itself.(Rankl &
Effing, 1997, p66) Smart Card Standards include ISO 8372 describing cryptographic
modes of operation, ISO 10202 describing security architecture for chip cards and ANSI
3.92 Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA) {Menezes et al., 1997, pp645- 656) This applies
cryptographic security to transactions that can be performed off-line and remotely.
Smart Cards exist incorporating adthmetic co-processors and algorithms for
solving common cryptographic problems coupled with a full range of security devices.

(Hendcy,1997, p84)

3.8.4.

Application Specific Integrated Circuits tASICs)

Application Specific Integrated Circuits are purpose-built chips to provide
specific complex functions. Cryptographic applications, which are by nature complex
transformations of data, are available as ASICs.
The United States has developed two chips to implement a national secure
communications standard. The 'Clipper' chip is an NSA-designed, tamper-resistant
VLSI-cl1ip designed for encrypting voice conversations; ' {Schneier, 1996, p591)
The 'Capstone' chip includes the Skipjack algorithm in four modes, a publickey Key Exchange algorithm, the digital signature algorithm, the Secure Hash Algorithm
a general purpose exponentiation algorithm and a general purpose, random-number
generator that uses a pure noise source. (Schneier, 1996, p594)
Additionally, ASICs provide many implementations of special purpose

controllers. (EA 1997, p 10 I )

3.8.5.

Software

Software for cryptographic applications can range from the simple, 'home-made'
variety to the complex systems employed by government and big business. In the last
20 years public debate and awareness of cryptography and the necessary techniques
has increased. It has ceased to be the province of the military and government agencies
and become a wide-spread adjunct to the use of modern communications devices.
(Schneier,1996; Denning, 1982)
Software exists to provide encryption & decryption, hashing, identification and
authentication and other methods to carry out secure electronic transactions. A
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selection of cryptographic software is readily available (Schneier, 1996, pp623-673) and
may be purchased in floppy disk format quite cheaply.
Schneier provides 30 symmetric algorithms, 3 public key algorithms, 8 one-way
hash functions and 4 complete cryptographic systems as well as various software and
references. Th~ references include 'Defence Trade Hcgulations', the 'DoD Orange Book'
and the 'European Computer Security Green Book'. (Schneier, 1996, p760)
The legal position of these methods depends wholly on the use to which they arc
put and the country in which the activity takes place. The Aus1ralian position is set
out in the 'Review of Policy relating to encryption technologies' published by the
Commonwealth of Australia Attorney General's Department. (COA,J996)

3.8.6.
3.8.6.1.

Algorithms
Introduction

Algorithms need to be selected to provide for secure data storage, data transfer
and other functions as needed. Hashing and encryption algorithms need to be
assessed in the context of the proposed method.

3.8.6.2.

Secure Hashing

The hashing algorithm, MDS, is a readily available method and the availability of
the source code complete with test data means that it can be tested in any
implementation. (RFC1321, 1992) Rankl & Effing suggest that the minimum needed for
an Assembly language version of a hash function would be 4 kilobytes.(Rankl &
Effing, 1997, p84 I

Additionally, usable MD5 software can be down-loaded from the Internet.
(Gnomeworks, 1998)

3.8.6.3.

Electronic Funds Transfer

The purpose of Secure Electronic Transfer (SET) is to provide confidentiality of
information, ensure payment integrity and authenticate both merchants and
cardholders. (SET96, 1996 p3) SET uses the RSA algorithm.
A computationally more efficient implementation called 'LITESET' is being
developed.
(Hanaoka, Zheng & Imai, 1998)

3.8.6.4.

Lease Agreemea.t

This is to be developed to implement the proposed simulation project. It is a
simple exchange of authentication, identification and transaction details coupled with
an electronic signature or validation.

3.8.7.

Summary

IJ

Cl)'ptography is a readily available and cost effective method of securing
information.

IJ

Cryptographic functions can be implemented on Smart Cards. Smart Cards can be
used as a component of a cryptographic system.

IJ

Legal restrictions may apply on the use of cryptography and associated materials.

IJ

Verification of algorithms is essential to the ongoing development of the
developmental algorithm

:- i
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3.9.

Summary of Literature Search

o

Substantial broad spectrum development is already taking place.

o

The trend is toward greater safety and efficiency of vehicle usc by increasing the
number and capabilities of the microcomputers in a vehicle.

o

Safety and security arc of great importance. Safety in operations and security in the
data transfer and administration of the vehicle requirements.

o

Integration of the desired and necessary systems is proceeding but appears to be
piecemeal. A clear integration and development regime is needed and currently
standards are being put in place to ensure inter-operability

o

Multiple function Smart Cards are being developed.

o

Any algorithm used in the proposed environment will need to be verified before use.
Verification may lead to certification.

0

A single card implementing all the necessary functions to control a vehicle in a
distributed environment is not currently available.

3.10.

Research Questions

3.10.1.

Introduction

As a result of the literature search it is apparent that there is a need for an
integration of some of the themes inherent in Smart Card based access to vehicles.
Broadly speaking, the opportunity for a secure, multi-function card to control all access
is evident. These questions are quite broad in their scope and the subsidiary issues
and conclusions are covered in Section 7.3 of the thesis.

3.10.2.

Questions

1. What are the characteristics of aM Users, N Resources, P level access environment
and which authentication model, if any, could effectively represent this relationship
in a real-time, distributed computing environment?
2. Investigation into the requirements of authentication and digital signatures to
determine the technical considerations that may have a bearing on the security of
the proposed model?
3. What requirements are necessary for untamperable electronic data storage for short
and long term storage to assist in resolution of disputes in the transaction cycle?
4. What data from the operation of a prototype is of importance in effecting the
proposal and which security issues need to be addressed?

4.

Overview of System Design
4.1.

Introduction

Developing a practical design requires an understanding of the Smart Card
development process coupled with electronic, automotive and software engineering,
systems design and analysis of the information transactions. The most immediate
limitations are memory storage requirements and the rate at which information can be
stored and transferred through the system.
An estimate of memory storage requirements depends on the actual hardware
configuration. Listing all the sources of information that a system might use and the
information transfer rates can be used to estimate the system characteristics.
Transactions are any operations involving the transfer of data within the design
and characterise the uses of the system.
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4.2.

Initial Hardware Design Of Complete System

In figure 4-1, the Engine Management Unit (EMU) uses microcomputer
technology to control the engine and transmission. The EMU processes information
from the sensors on the engine and transmission to determine the necessary fuel
quantities and ignition timing to achieve efficient usc while responding to changing user
needs.
The proposed Supervisor Unit (SU) is required to supervise the EMU and process
the additional information necessary to administer the use of the vehicle. It is
expected that the roles of the EMU and SU will merge and all activities affecting vehicle
usa e will be controlled bv the Vehicle Mana ement Unit VMU .
Ancillary
Systems +-->

1 EMu

Supervisor Unit
Authentication
ldcntilication
Constraints
Secure Data-logging

r/ '

/I

LEngine

___,

Smart
Card
Reader

4--ol

Smart
Card

External
Systems

Trans. /

Figure 4-1 Schematic of Complete System
A secure environment is needed to store user identification and associated
constraints, vehicle usage and authentication of transactions to assist in administering
the usage agreement.

Ancillary systems are part of the vehicle controlled by the VMU and include
comfort, safety, security and convenience systems. External systems which interact
with the VMU may include traffic management systems, toll collecting systems, satellite
navigation and emergency vehicle systems.
The detailed design of the VMU will not be addressed within this project as the
design of a Smart Card system addresses many of the main requirements which include
secure access to the VMU and its information.
Smart Cards for use in the design may have as little as 2 kilobytes and as much
as 20 kilobytes of data storage. (Hendry,l997, p106) The data transfer rate with a
Smart Card is limited by the implementation and this can be as low as 9600 Baud,
where one Baud is equal to one data bit per second.
A fundamental clock frequency of
up to 5 Megahertz is expected but this is modified by the Elementary Time Unit and
other time units defined in the applicable standard. (Zoreda & Oton, 1994, p 78)

A complex VMU will have multiple data flows and the data transfer rates are
limited by component technologies and external implementations.
Memory on the VMU can store substantial amounts of data but the data must be
communicated to some user system. An alternative to the slow rate of transfer in the
Smart Card is to use the greater transfer rate of a mobile phone and modem to
communicate between the VMU and a remote base station. The use of the Mobile phone
and Modem will not be addressed in this design.

4.2.1.

~ennory

Storage

Alternatives to the use of custom made components to implement the proposed
system include a Motorola 68hcll microcontroller with up to lMbyte of external flash
memory which has excellent power-off memory retention. (Hands, 1997) Articles in
commercially available magazines also address the issue of adding memory to microcontrollers.(Sibigtroth, 1997)
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4.2.2.

Prototype Hardware Basis

A prototype system can be developed on a Personal Computer (PC). A card~sizcd
PC provides a 50 megahertz 486 processor and all the facilities to perform the on-board
supervisory functions and administer the ancillary and external systems. This option
allows software to be written in a high level language and permits rapid development of
the system on standard computers and compilers. (OK! DATA, 1997)
The initial prototype configuration would be a PC without peripherals such as a
hard disk drive, floppy disk drive or even a monitor. The initialisation of the system will
be from the onboard Basic Input Output System (BIOS) and a program stored in nonvolatile memory. The data storage requirements would be a non-volatile, re-writablc
memory component such as flash memory.
Alternatively, solid-state disc drives are available to permit almost normal
operation of a PC based prototype for the VMU (Circuit Cellar , 1997, p36).
The data handling can be simplified by using a serial data bus which will reduce
the amount of wiring necessary to install the system. Flash memory with serial
Input/Output (I/0) is available (Cantrell, 1997) from Nexcom and offers 4 or 8 Megabit
Chips with substantial write protection to prevent data errors.

4.2.3.

Prototype Software Basis

A software simulation of the design will help determine the necessary data to be
processed to meet design objectives. The principal component of the system is the
Smart Card which is expected to provide a User with secure access to the system.
Additionally, the Smart Card may be used to provide additional functions relating to the
operation of the Vehicle in a distributed, Multi-user, Multi-resource, Multi-level
environment.

4.3.
4.3.1.

Analysis of a Transaction
Limitations

Identification of the parties to an agreement is outside the scope of the research.
It is, however, covered by existing protocols. The most common method used to
identify a person requires documentary evidence such as a Driver's Licence with some
form of picture and address details, a birth certificate or official document such as a
passport.
Transfer of funds in a distributed environment is covered by existing protocols
such as Secure Electronic Transactions (Whyte, 1997).
Consequently, identification of the Smart Card and storage of its details together
with the transactions necessary will be covered.
The Entity Relationship diagrams describing the relationships are included in
the Appendix 10.6.

4.3.2.

Description of a Possible Agreement Structure

Generally, Person A and Person B negotiate some type of agreement which may
be informal or formal. An informal agreement may be a short-term loan and a formal
agreement may need a written contract to make it valid or enforceable.
Any agreement may need to be evaluated to ensure that it is complete, binding
and meaningful The agreement may need to be authenticated to a third party,
Authentication must ensure that the agreement record is not changed except by mutual
consent of all the parties and the changes cannot be concealed from an auditor. The
assumption is that any or all of the parties to the agreement may not be honest and an
observer may not be well-intentioned or accurate.
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In figure 4.2, Person A and Person B intend to agree about the usc: of a resource
in the custody of Person A and an agreement listing the permitted options and
obligations is drmvn up.
Should B attempt to ~vade responsibility for usc of the resource hy claiming that
A has unilaterally altered the contract then A relics on a copy of the contmct signed by
8, and an independent witness, C, who is acceptable to both A and 13.
Authentication of the agreement between A and 13 involves examining the
signatures of both parties and the credentials and identity of C who is expected to give
.
an un b.mse d report on t I·,~ va rd·
1 1tY o f t I1e agreement an d stgnaturcs.

( 0 /'-.....
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Figure 4-2 Agreement and False Agreement Schematic
Should A or 8 conspire with C to act against the other party, C relies on an
unblemished reputation to support the acceptance of an 'unbiased' opinion. The
malpractice is effected by claiming to D, an arbiter, that if Cis reliable then so is the
person supported by C. Person Dis defined as an independent arbiter, such as a court
of law.
A problem exists if either party has a means of substituting a different hash
value during the signing of the agreement. If a hash value from a different agreement is
substituted then fraud is possible. If it can be demonstrated that the agreement has
been falsified it may be possible to seek compensation or void the agreement.
One method of addressing this issue is to take a secure hash value of the
agreement and store it as a witness when the validity of the agreement is doubted.
Should A and 8 separately keep this information it can be used to prove that the
agreement has not been altered by either party.
A secure hash function takes a digital representation of a document and
subjects it to an algorithmic process to produce a much shorter digital representation,
typically 128 bits. Desirable properties of the secure hash algorithm are 'one to one',
'one-way' and simple processing. The process is 'one-to-one' if any two different
documents will never produce the same hash sequence. The output sequence is a 'oneway' function of the input sequence when, while easy to compute, it is computationally
infeasible to reverse the algorithm to determine the input sequence.

An electronic signature is a binary sequence that is legally accepted as
representing the assent and identity of a person in a transaction. Methods of obtaining
an electronic identification sequence exist but rely on the initial identification being
performed subject to meeting certain conditions. Methods of initially determining the
identity rely on existing documents such as a Driver's Licence with a recent picture or
birth certificate.
In figure 4.3, an acceptable agreement is hashed to provide a hash sequence.
This hash sequence is used to stimulate the individual Smart Cards to obtain an output
sequence which is used as a signature. These signatures and the serial numbers of the
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Sysl~c~m~s_ _ _ _ _ _ __

Smart Cards arc appe~ded to the agreement and it is hashed again.
value generated is retained by the parties to the agrccmcnl.

The final hash

If the signatures are incorporated into the agreement and hashed without a
copy of the signature being kept then it becomes harder to alter the agreement and still
find an acceptable hash value. Comparing the agreement hash value and the signed
agreement hash value may reveal some information about the agreement and the
hashing process when the change (signature) is known.

A party may be able to re-create the agreement hash value, personal signature
value and the final hash value and usc this information to determine the signature of
the other party. This information may be used to reconstruct the signature algorithm
use doy
bth
e oth er partv to permtt a fl
a se stgnature to be generate d .

I
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Figure 4-3 Signature Proce••
All parties to the agreement must be able to verify the hash value produced. A
standard hash method can be chosen in the terms of the agreement and all parties can
then obtain their own copy from different certified sources. Each party can then use it
to verify the agreement before signing and this can detect the substitution of misleading
hash values in the transaction.
When a copy of the digital signature of each party to the agreement, including
the witnesses, is included in the agreement and hashed, the hash value should show if
even a single character of the agreement had been altered. A commonly available
method might be MDS, a secure hash function from R Rivest that has been available
since 1992. (RFC1321, 1992)

4.3.3.

Validation of a Communication between Parties

Communication between remote parties requires identification which can be
achieved by possession of some specific piece of information. A password is a subjective
identity check where its possession implies approval. Unauthorised possession of the
password confers access to the system and security requires a series of different
passwords that can be used once and discarded.
Bilateral identity checks using a symmetric cryptographic method requires that
each party has the same key information and algorithm to successfully decrypt a
message to prove their subjective identity. 'Symmetric algorithms ... are algorithms
where the encryption key and the decryption key are the same ..... As long as the
communication needs to remain secret, the key must remain secret.' (Schneier,1996,
p4) Distribution of the key information is a substantial problem in managing a
symmetric cipher system. (Schneier ,1996, p 177)
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to answer questions about the secret information.

Identity validation could result from the interrogator asking a question about the
secret information at random without knowing the answer beforehand. The respondent
must supply the answer to the question and the interrogator then generates the correct
answer from the secret information and compares the two answers.
If the interrogator docs not know the answer beforehand it is more difficult to
detect the answer by illegal or unauthorised means. The process must be secure
against guessing the answer to a question from knowing previous questions and
answers. Ir the questions are generated by a random sequence it may be very difficult
to predict the questions and answer them.
Continuous validation of the communication can be made by periodically
interrogating the respondent about the secret information to detect substitution. For
example, after a remote logwin to a computer system is made the legitimate user is
disconnected and access is assumed by an unauthorised user. The legitimate user may
accept this event as a normal system error and not report the problem for some time.

4.3.4.

Design Requirements

A design is proposed in figure 4A where the Smart Card is configured as a 'anew
towone' function generator which provides a unique binary sequence in response to any
unique sequence being supplied to it. This would permit each Smart Card to be used
as a signature generator after being assigned to a person or corporation by any
acce table means.

[X

Function Generator
f(X)

X'

I

Figure 4-4 Schematic of Propo•ed Function Generator
To enable a transaction to be remotely validated a copy of the randomiser details
on the Smart Card must be kept. A company that issues a Smart Card must keep a
copy of the randomiser and selection algorithms for each unique card. Families of cards
using the same selection algorithms and f or randomisers can be created to reduce
storage requirements.
External storage requirements may be as little as two kilobytes per card which
would require approximately 2 Gigabytes for a population of one million cards.
However, supporting data may raise this value substantially.

4.4.
Proposed Implementation of a Smart Card Function
Generator
4.4.1.

Introduction

The Smart Card function generator must generate a binary sequence output in
response to a binary sequence input. The function must be complex and difficult to
predict to provide a measure of security to the information processed.
There is no requirement for an input sequence and output sequence to be of the
same length. The function must be 'onewtowone' where each unique input sequence
produces a unique output sequence.
This requires that the output sequence is equal to or greater than the length of
the input sequence and the algorithm is thoroughly validated wherever possible. An
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exhaustive search is likely to be computationally infeasible and certification must rely
on mathematical proof.

4.4.2.

Description of method.

The Randomiser is a random binary sequence stored in a circular buffer able to
be accessed at any point and traversed in either direction.
In figure 4.5 the Selection Method specifies a Start Point in the circular buffer to
select the first bit and a Selection Set of integers to specify the number of bits to move
or discard between each subsequent selection.
A positive value for the move or discard number specifies movement in one
direction and a ne ative values ecifies the o osite direction.

l1. Start Poind

{I"SCicct I bit

I

3. Discard 2 bits
or move 3 bits

4. Select I

Figure 4-5 Schematic of Selection Method
A Start Point value greater than the size of the buffer bits will be constrained by
the modulo division of the Start Point by the size of the buffer. Consequently, there
are many ways of specifying the same starting bit. The move or discard values in the
Selection Set are also constrained by the length of the buffer.
While permitting an infinite number of ways of specifying the selection of the
next bit, there is a limit on the number of unique sequences that may be chosen. With
the constraint that no bit in the buffer is ever used twice in each sequence, the size of
the problem reduces to the number of combinations of bits taken from the buffer
without replacement.
This is achieved by ensuring that the total number of bits selected or discarded
is less than the length of the buffer and the direction of buffer traversal is never
reversed. Under these conditions no bit is used twice but the option exists as desired.
With these conditions, the maximum number of Sequences, C, is a simple
combination of n bits taken from N Randomiser bits and is specified by

C ~

N!
n!(N- n)!
Equation 4·1

A combination is defined as an unordered multiset without repetition
(LEW,l985, p46)

If it is intended that any bit may be reused by the Selection Method then the
number of sequences is much larger as this amounts to selection with repetition. The
number of selections, S, of n bits from N bits is specified by
S ~ (N +n-1)!

n!(N -I)!
Equation 4-2
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A selection is defined as an unordered multiset with repetition. (I..ew,l985,
p264)
Localised non-randomness in a sequence is defined as any sub-sequence that is
strongly patterned. For example, taken in isolation, the sequence '0101010101010'
appears predictable and the sequence '101101000000000000101' appears to have an
atypical sequence of zeros in the centre while the other sub-sequences appear to he
'101'.
It is expected that while each sample taken from a population may exhibit
localised non-randomnes:;; the characteristics of a large number of samples will exhibit
the characteristics, as a group, of the population. For example, taking samples of 4
bits from a random population, the sequence '0000' should occur approximately once
every 16 samples.
The statistical concept of the 'Law of Large Numbers' describes where the
characteristics of a group of samples will tend to be similar to the characteristics of the
population as the number of samples increases.
Briefly, the Law of Large Numbers can be described as

"For example, the act may be flipping a symmetrical coin, A may be the
event "heads", and it is assumed that the probability of heads, 1/2, is the same
from one flip to next. It is also assumed that every trial is independent of(in no
way affected by) every other trial. Now after n trials of the act, the proportion of
times A has occu"ed is p. It can be proved (the proof is so difficult there is no
point presenting it here) that p gets closer and closer to P(A) as n becomes larger
and larger. We can make the proportion of times A occurs as close as we want to
P(A), the probability calculated from the sample space, by performing the act
enough times. So P{A) tells what will happen in the long run if we actually
performed the actions under the conditions laid down above." (Glass &
Stan1ey,1979, p202)
To ensure a thorough distribution of the samples, the Start Points should be
uniformly distributed across the randomiser interval and the Selection Sets should vary
in size and content to ensure that all bits are usable.

4.4.3.

Constraint on Generating All Possible Sequences

Analysis shows that the largest number of unique samples from the population
is a simple combination of Sample bits from Peculation bits.
Combinations of Size n taken from population of N
Uniaue Seos
Sample
N10000
2000
N
4000
N
2"
1.3986 * 10205
3.857 * 10244
8.1243 * 10295 3.4028 * 1038
n- 128
3.734 * 10411
3.0654 * 10515 5.2468 k 1077
5.2468 * 10330
n• 256

Table 4-1 Number of Combinations compared against unique sequences
In Table 4.1, the number of combinations of n bits from N is substantially
greater than the numb~r of unique n bit sequences specified in binary, which is given by
the limit, 2n.
Consequently, the total number of bits, T, to be examined would be the number
of combinations, C, multiplied by the number of bits, n, in the sample.

T=Cxn
Equation 4-3
The composition of the population may mean that repetitions of some binary
sequences occur and it is considered computationally infeasible to enumerate all the
samples or calculate simple statistics such as a frequency distribution for any
reasonable size population.
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4.4.4.

Brcmcrmann 's Limit

Enumeration of all the possible samples from any reasonable size population
becomes infeasible owing to the amount of bits to be examined. McNeil and Freiberger
cite 'Bremcrmann's Limit' which can be used as an approximation of the magnitude of
the task.
Relying on quantum theory, he JBremermann] first determined how much
information the most efficient computer imaginable could process each second. He
found that, for each gram of mass, no data processing system - brain, machine,
anything- could handle more than twice ton bits per '-.~cond.

He tl1en asked, "What if a computer were as big as the earth, and it had
laboured on a single problem since the earth was born? How many bits could it
processr His answer was 10 9 J , usually called Bremermann 's Limit It is a
huge figure 1.~~~~~~~~~~~~~ooa~~~

000,000,000, 000,000,000, 001), 000,000,000,000,000,000,000.
Freiberger, 1993, p166J

(McNeil and

Representing this number in a binary form:
lo~

(Bremermann's Limit) =

log 10 (1 * 10 93)

lo~

{Bremermann 's Limit) =

93

log 2 (Bremermann 's Limit)

=

J log 10 (2)

1 0.301029995

308.9393128

Consequently, enumeration of all possible binary sequences is infeasible as
Bremermann's limit of 1Q93 can be approximated by 2309 .

4.4.5.

Distribution of Samples.

Every unique combination froin a population can be enumerated by the decimal
equivalent of the symbols selected.
In Table 4.2 showing a three bit sequence !A,B,C) there is one way of taking no
symbols, three ways of taking one symbol, three ways of tal<
t\\'0 symbols and one
way of taking three symbols. Each sample can be indexed by the three bit binary
sequence from 0 to 7 where each '1' in the sequence identifies the bit selected.
j

Tallying each sample by its decimal value to determine the dis\:·ibution of the
combinations will characterise a population. Using a population of six bits with a
sample of three bits yields 20 different three bit sequences (from equation 4.1) and these
samples can be tallied by their binary values from 0 to 7.
In Table 4-3, the resulting totals of each sequence characterise the population.
To specify all the possible randomisers (26) and the possible sequences (20) would mean
that 1280 possible 3 bit sequences must be enumerated. This can be specified by the
pair (I,J) where I is the decimal value of the population and J is the decimal value of the
sample. The range and domain of these pairs can be arranged in an array where the
Index
0
1

Binary
000
001

2
3

0 I 0
0 I 1

-8-

4

100
I 0 1
I 10
I I I

A--

5
6
7

Sample

--C

-BC
A-C
ASABC

Table 4·2 Enumeration of Samples
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elemf!nts are the tally of each sample.
A-population of '000000' would produce 20 sequences of '000' and could be described as
(0,0) = 20. A mixed sequence of 1'sand O's would produce a different distribution.
There is an apparent symmetry about the horizontal and vertical axes which
would reduce the amount of work in characterising the array.
Decimal
Value
0
I
2
3
4

Value
Binary
000000
000001
000010
000011
000100

".

...

".

".

61
62
63

111101
111110
111111

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
000
20
10
10
4
10

I
001
0
10
6
12
3

5
101
0
0
0
0
0

7
Ill
0
0
0
0
0

.. .

3
0 II
0
0
0
4
0

...

4
100
0
0
0
0
I
".

".

...

".

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

4
0
0

6
10
0

10

2
010
0
0
4
0
6

6
110
0
0
0
0
0

10
20

Table 4-3 Characterisation of a Sample Space (64,8)
The number of cells in the array is calculated by :
A= Columns X Rows= 2 N ~ n
Equation 4-4
where N "' number of possible unique sequences and n
sampled.

=

number of bits

In equation 4.4, the number of all possible sequences, A, is increases
exponentially for linear increase in the size of the population or sample. Consequently,
analysis of large sequences becomes impractical for any reasonable value of N.

4.4.6.

Summary

a

The proposed method offers ease of use and space efficiency as advantages
compared to the existing methods. Additionally, the running speed of the
application is considered to be faster than existing block cipher methods and
comparable to existing stream cipher methods.

a

Starting with the theoretical 'Provably-Secure Strongly Randomised Cipher'
(Maurer90) and developmental work (Shaw, 1993). The implementation of the
proposed method addresses the recommendations (Maurer,l990, p372) relating to
broadcasting the randomiser and the difficulty of selecting the bits.

a

While the theoretical method is provably secure under certain constraints, the
proposed method is provably secure under one constraint only. The constraint is
single use of the randomiser which ensures that the proposed method meets the
requirements of a 'One-Time Pad'. However, multiple use of the proposed method
may be conditionally secure and evaluation of this is beyond the scope of the
research.

a

Additionally, the theoretical method requires a very large randomiser which is
difficult to store and transport.(Menezes et al., 1997, p170)

a

The precise description of both methods is covered in the next chapter.
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4.5.

Construction of Randomisers.

4.5.1.

Introduction

The size of randomiscr required by the theoretical method is of the order of I *
IQH bits and algorithmic generation from a smaller sequence may, under certain
conditions, be indistinguishable from a complete randomiser produced by a random

process.
Non-deterministic sequences cannot be generated a second time even with
identical generator setup conditions. Generally, the sequence must be retained and
copied as needed which imposes storage and transport constraints on the user. Nondeterministic methods are generally based on physical phenomena.
Deterministic sequences are able to be repeated with the same initial setup
conditions.
Consequently they can be reproduced by specifying the algorithm and the setup
conditions and are economical to transport and store.
Generation of deterministic sequences include hardware, software and biometric
methods.

4.5.2.

Non-Deterministic Construction

Methods of generating random binary squences in a non-deterministic fashion
are generally based on physical phenomena.
Examples include:

1. elapsed time between emission of particles during radioactive decay;
2. thermal noise from a semiconductor diode or resistor;
3. frequency instability of a free running oscillator;
4. the amount a metal insulator semiconductor is charged during a flXed period of
time;

5. air turbulence within a sealed disk drive which causes random fluctuations in disk
drive sector read latency times; and
6. sound from a microphone or video input from a camera

(Menezes et al.,l997, pl72)
Thermal noise is a form of white noise that is caused by the random thermal
agitation of electrons in resistive components.(Young, 1979, p 342) Bassein describes
an electron noise amplifier that is economical and simple to construct. (Bassein, 1996,
p489) Another noise generator can be made by configuring a serial port on a PC and
connecting to it a simple circuit that samples the noise input from a radio. (Appendix
9.7) Additionally, a circuit to sample 256 values through a PC parallel port is readily
implementable when connected to a suitable random source. (EA, 1997, pSI)
'Sampling diode shot noise' and time between decay of radioactive particles can
be used as well as the Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) implementation of a Metal
Insulator Semiconductor Capacitor. Comparison of the charge between two capacitors
can produce a random result. (Agnew ,1987, pp77 -81)
However, small random sequences up to 1000 bits can be produced by methods
such as Keystroke timings, hardware functions and cryptographic conversion.

(Roberts,l995, pi OS)

4.5.3.

Deterministic Construction

Deterministic methods include hardware, software and hybrid systems.
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Hardware methods include the Linear Feedback Shift Hcgi:-;ters (LFSRs) which
are described (Schneier, 1996, pp369-379) and analy!>cd. (Barker, 1984) Variations on
the theme nrc described by Schneier (Schneier, 1996, pp380-388 ; Zcng <!l al., 1991, p816)

Softwan• Methods include Linear Congruence Generators and implementations
of a LFSR. (Knuth,1973, pp9-25; Schncicr,l996, pp369-362)
Processes upon which software random bit generators may be based include:
1.

the system clock;

2. elapsed time between keystrokes or mouse movement;
3. content of input/output buffers;

4. user input; and

5. operating system values such as system load and network statistics.
{Menezes et al.,1997, p 172)
Many deterministic methods are cyclic in that the output sequence is likely to
repeat during a long run. The length of the cycle is an important characteristic in
measuring the performance of a pseudo-random sequence generator.
Methods of 'De-Skewing' the sequence can include applying a secure hash
function to pseudo-random sequences to 'distil the (true) random bits from the sampled
sequences.' (Menezes et al.,1997, p172)

4.5.4.

Hybrid Construction

The proposed method is a hybrid which is not as space efficient as deterministic
methods but has the advantage of being able to generate and store very large sequences.
The use of random sequences rotated according to some simple algorithm may be
indistinguishable from a sequence generated from a random process under some
circumstances.
An operation, ROT{), rotates a sequence of symbols without loss of data and is
used to generate deterministic changes. With a Basic Sequence of '123', ROT(l) gives
'231', ROT{-1) on '231' gives '123' and ROT{3) on '123' gives '123'which is identical to
ROT( D).

The three unique sequences, 123-231-312 (enumerated from 0 to 2), are
concatenated into a Complete Composite Sequence containing one example of every
rotation. Concatenation of these sequences can be performed 3! or six ways and each
Complete Composite Sequence can be concatenated to produce a much larger sequence.
The rotation operation preserves some characteristics of the Basic Sequence. If
P(O) denotes the probability of obtaining a zero for any one bit sample of the Basic
Sequence then P(O) is the same for the Rotated Basic and Composite Sequence.
A concern would be whether it is practical to determine the Basic Sequence and
rotation order to permit the reconstruction of the complete randomiser. Two methods
are practical : inspection and analysis.
Inspection detects obvious similarities by simple observation and is limited by
the characteristics of the observer. It may be impractical to monitor 1000 bit
subsequences in a larger sequence. Analysis is any method that applies an algorithm
which produces a result for evaluation. For example, statistical analysis of sequence
characteristics or a specific algorithm that halts on a valid solution.
If a contiguous sequence of bits is selected from the Composite Sequence then
there may be enough information to determine the Basic Sequence, however, selecting
individual bits widely dispersed throughout the Complete Composite Sequence may
make this difficult.

Edith Cowan University

35

Development of a Model for Smart Card Based Access Control in Multi-User,
________,~_,l_,u-"lt,_i-_,R_,e:.os.,a.,u,r.ce, Mu Iti- Level Access Sysl::e::m::H:_'- - - - - - If an incomplete Composite Sequence is analysed, the JJH.sic Sequence and
rotation sequence may not be readily determined and it may be impractical to
determine by inspection or analysis \\'hethcr the sequence is Handom or Composite
The randomiscr may be constructed for complexity with more than one Basic
Sequence, rotated according to a predetermined selection of values to make analysis
more complex. For example, using sequences of different length denoted by A,B,C ... ,z
a Complex Composite Sequence can be described as Al7, Zl:l3, B6 ... Y19.
A Complete Composite Sequence created with this method could meet Maurer's
stated requirements \Vith a Basic Sequence of 1 • 10 11 bits or 1.25 • ww bytes. The
information necessary to construct this randomiser is the Basic Sequence and the
sequence of numbers identifying the order and rotation of the concatenation operation
and this information is much smaller than the Complete Composite Sequence.
A concise description of the method is covered in chapter 5.

4.5.5.

Summary

0

Randomisers may be of deterministic, non-deterministic or hybrid construction.

0

Construction of very large randomisers raises difficult generation, storage, search
and transport issues.

a A deterministic generator must produce output sequences that are

indistinguishable

from non-deterministic sequences.

4.6.
4.6.1.

Calculation of Large Factorials and Exponentials
Introduction

Initially, the generation of large exponential and factorial numbers provided an
understanding of the accuracy achievable when dealing with very large numbers of the
order of 1Q30o, However, being able to specify and generate a large sequence of digits
was of some use in implementing the developmental algorithm. For example, in
appendix 11.8, 21000 =

107150860718626732094842504906000181056140481170553360744375038837035
105112493612249319837881569585812759467291755314682518714528569231404
359845775746985748039345677748242309854210746050623711418779541821530
464749835819412673987675591655439460770629145711964776865421676604298
31652624386837205668069376.
These sequences provide long but easily specified sequences of digits for use in
selection algorithms
The calculation of factorial numbers constitutes some challenges due to the
exponential nature of the numbers produced and the errors occurring due to the nature
of the calculations.
Operations using logarithms may underestimate the number due to truncation
caused by the method of generating the logarithms. For example, log 10 10 is 1 exactly,
but, logiO n is irrational as n is irrational and any representation of n will incompletely
estimate it. However, where n is the basic unit in which all other quantities are
expressed any gain in accuracy may be lost in converting to other units. For example,
ro = 21t is more precise than the decimal notation w = 6.28318.

4.6.2.

Methods Used

Three methods of calculating large factorial numbers were considered.
Calculations use Stirling's Approximation to Large Factorials, computer based
sequential addition of logarithms and integer methods.
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Calculation using Stirling's Approximation :

Stirling's Method of calculating large factorials is a well known method in usc for
many years. (Spiegel, 1972, p 114)

Nlz ../2 llN*N"•e-"
Equation 4-5

log

N!~

1/2 log(2 N)+ 1/2 log(ll)+ N log N - N loge
Equation 4-6

A logarithm of an irrational number is a source of round-off errors. All
logarithms are real numbers excepting the comparatively few integer logarithms. Unless
the exact logarithmic value for a number is calculated and used, any calculation relying
on logarithms may not estimate the correct result owing to 'rounding errors' or
truncation.

4.6.2.2.

Calculation using Sequential Addition of Logarithms:

Sequential addition of logarithms uses the additive properties of logarithms to
perform the multiplications. The calculation model is

log N!~

N

L log i
i=l

Equation 4-7
Addition of logarithms avoids the problems of multiplying real numbers and is
relatively fast. The largest number able to be calculated is limited by the integer
component of the logarithmic sum. For example, the logarithm 1234.56 evaluates to
3.6307 * 1Qil3 4 and in 32 bit numbers, the largest exponent would be 232 -1 and
consequently, the largest number that can be calculated by this method is
approximately 9.9 * 1Q42949&7295
Logarithms generated by software methods are subject to errors and to extend
the accuracy of the calculations more accurate logarithmic values are needed.
Generation of logarithms requires the use of the geometric mean which needs a square
root function and may give results with limited precision due to the nature of
calculating the square root.

4.6.2.3.

Calculation of Logarithms

The algorithm for generating a logarithm of a number (McLeish, 1991,

ppl71~

173) is

\\

D

Start with any two numbers and their known logarithms

D

For a new and unknown logarithm, work out the arithmetic mean of the two earlier
logarithms

D

For the unknown number work out the geometric mean of the numbers

'

The arithmetic mean is calculated by summing the two numbers and dividing by

2.
The geometric mean is calculated by multiplying the two numbers together and
taking the square root.
For example: GM = geometric mean, AM = arithmetic mean
Numbers
100
1000
GM = 316.22766

2

Logarithms

100
316.22766
GM = 177.827941

2
2.5
AM= 2.25

3

AM= 2.5

#I
\\,,'
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100

177.827941

GM = 133.3521432

2
2.25
AM= 2.125

(McLeish, 1991, p 173)

The logarithm of 133.35214432 is 2.125.
Munro gives an algorithm for calculating Square roots:
Algorithm 2.8 to calculate to some given accuracy the positive square root of a
positive real number.
Input: k, real; k > 0.
(we wish to find the square root of k)
e, real; e > 0.
Output:
y, real.
(y is the final approximation to ..Jk)
method:
give x a value; any positive number will do.
i ~ 0 (give i the initial value 0)
repeat
( x is the current approximation to ..Jk)
x <- (x + k/x)/2
io(-i+1
until x is close to ..Jk
Y<-X

What does close mean?
x is close to ..Jk may be refined to
(1x2-kJ ::;e) is true
or (I x- the previous xI :::; e) is true
(Munro, 1992, p36)

It can be seen that calculating square roots requires addition and division with
the root being a real number.

4.6.2.4.

Calculation by Integer Methods

Large factorials can be obtained by performing iterative integer operations on
numbers and storing the results. These numbers are considered to be more accurate
than either of the preceding methods.
Integer calculation of large exponentials and factorials requires substantial
computer time and memory. Using a repref.entation of integers that requires one byte
per digit, at least 4N bytes of storage and working space are needed to calculate and
store Xo =Xi * X2. For example, Xi = 1234 and X2 = 1001 gives Xo = 1235234 which
shows that two four digit numbers multiplied together produce a seven digit number
totalling 15 digits in all.
Digits are represented as one byte short integers though only values of 0 to 9 are
used and the numbers are stored in reverse order in a sequential file. Multiplication
occurs from the least significant digit at the beginning of the file by sequential file
access and any 'carry' digits are appended to a file. This uses conventional file access
routines. More space efficient methods such as Binary, Binary Coded Decimal (BCD),
Octal or Hexadecimal may be time consuming to process.
A typical hard drive may contain 2.1 Gigabytes of data and consequently limits
the size of the largest number processed with it to approximately 525 MegaBytes or x.xx
1r

10525000000 •

4.6.2.5. Calculation of Large Exponential• of the Form 2"
Large exponentials are easily calculated using the same iterative integer methods. An
approximate check on the accuracy of the numbers generated was performed by
comparing the value given by logarithms and the value given by direct calculation. For
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example, in Appendix 11. calculating 2wnn by logarithms gives 1000 • log 2 which is
301.029995664 or 1.0715 • 10 :w1

Summary

4.6.3.
0

The methods listed have differing characteristics which may ind·;cate uses.

0

The fastest but least accurate method is Stirling's Approximation.

0

Sequential summation of logarithms is slower but much more accurate. It is
limited by the representations of real numbers on the computer being used.
Additionally, different data types may alter the precision and accuracy of the
numbers generated.

0

Direct Calculation is the most accurate method but is very slow. The major
requirements are memory and this limits the speed by requiring the operating
system to swap large amounts of data between files and RAM. Use of a RAMDlSK
to speed up the process is limited by the amount of usable RAM.

0

Calculation of large factorials and exponentials files can be expedited by use of
stored pre-calculated numbers. For example, to calculate 1001!, the file 1000! Is
multiplied by 1001 and the results stored. The results are included in the Appendix
10.8.

4. 7.

Test 'T' for Randomness

4.7 .1.

Introduction

A method called the 'Test-T' was implemented as an aid to estimating
'randomness' in a binary sequence generator. The test uses the established idea of
measuring the relative probability of the occurrence of bit patterns of varying lengths
and comparing them against a theoretical value {Bassein, 1996, p483). Implementation
is relatively easy however, interpretation of the results may rely on substantial
statistical knowledge.

This test is similar in construction to the 'Universal Test' (Maurer,l990) that
calculates the average logarithm of the time interval between successive occurrences of
the same subsequence.
The results of both tests can then be used to assess the performance of the
Randon 1 Sequence Generator.
1.:1 Test-T the theoretical value for each bit pattern is the probability that each
sequenct: would appear assuming a random sequence of almost infinite length is
examined.

The decision to take overlapping or non-overlapping samples of the sequence is
important. Overlapping sequences simulat~ a binary source with memory, where the
output bit is dependent on the preceding bits. Non-overlapping sequences simulate a
random number generator where each group of bits represents an integer in binary
form.
The concept of the 1'est-T' leads to the establishment of a classification system
which can identify important characteristics of random or pseudo-random sequence
generators.

4.7.2.
4.7.2.1.

Methods Used
Univenal Teat

An implementation of the Universal Test is available in the Crypt-X package and
a simple implementation in Pascal is provided in the appendices.
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The Universal Test (Maurer, 1991, p89) is implemented <lS an array of integers
where the index to the array is the binary value of the! scquenc1: tested. The array is
cleared and a selection of samples from the generator is taken and the array is preloaded with the time each binary value appeared. The time unit is defined as one
sample and consequently the number of samples taken denotes the elapsed tirnc.
The pre-loading for a number of samples ensures that there is a reasonable
chance that all the array components are non-zero. The test proper uses the decimal
value of the sample as an index to the array which stores the previous time of
occurrence of the value. Comparison of the time of the sample with the previous time in
the array permits the logarithm of the difference between them to be stored in an
accumulator. The logarithm is summed until the end of the test when it is averaged by
the number of samples taken. This average logarithm is generally close to n-1 bits for a
random source.
In figure 4.6, the count prompts the generator to produce a binary sequence.
The value of the binary sequence is used to index the array to store the count until the
pre-loading is complete.
When the test starts, the number records the amount of samples tested. Each
binary sample value points to the array where the count of the previous occurrence is
stored. The previous count is subtracted from the current count and the logarithm of
the result is stored in an accumulator. On completion of the test, the value in the
accumulator is divided by the number of samples tested to produce the average
lo~arithm.

Count

Generator

Index

T

l

I

May (Index] of Count

I
4j Number

I
I

1
Logarithm Sum

l

I

Average Logarithm

Figure 4-6 Schematic of Universal Test
The average logarithm is the average 'distance' between occurrences of a
particular binary sequence. If the generator is random and the samples are uniformly
distributed then the average logarithm approximates n -1.
For example, using 8 bit samples the array will be indexed between 0 to 255.
Eight bit samples from the generator are used to index the array to store the count. In
a uniformly distributed sample from a generator a sample value of '0' is equally likely to
followed by '0' or any value to '255'.
The average distance between these two equally likely values is 128. Log 2 (128)
1. Any persistent or substantial difference between the actual and
predicted logarithms can be used to characterise a generator.

= 7 which is n -

4.7.2.2.

Teot·T

In Figure 4-7, a simple model to permit a basic description of randomness was
developed. Instances of each bit pattern are recorded by dedicated counters. The
assumption is that random sequences of binary digits of extreme length are available.
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Figur.e 4-7 Schematic of Theoretical Test-T for Raadomneas
In this population of nearly infinite size each pattern of binary digits will be well
distributed throughout the population and the probability, P, of each pattern will be
specific. (Peterson, 1998, p 179)
While a sequence may produce a probability P(O) = P{l) ""0.5 for single bit
samples it may not produce a probability result of 0.25 for each two bit pattern.
Using non-overlapping samples:

=> P(OI = P(l) = 0.5
S => (10) 101){10} 1011 => P(011 = P(10)
S = 1100110011

= 0.5, P(OO) = P(11) = 0

These results can be described as, 'the sequence passes Tl, a test for one bit
patterns, but fails Tl, a test for 2 bit patterns' and there are insufficient bits to evaluate
TJ, a test for three bit patterns.
Using the Test-Tit is not possible to perform a complete range of tests and
consequently no sequence can be considered truly random as it is possible for a
sequence to pass test Tk but fail test Tk<~.
In Table 4-4, an indication of the resources necessary is the total number of
accumulators needed.
Accumulators R uired
n
Sum 2n+l 2n+l-2
2"
I
2
2
4
2
2
3
4
5

4
8
16
32

6
14
30
62

8
16
32
64

6
14
30
62

Table 4-4 Accumulators needed for Test T
Table 4.4 shows that for each number of bits, n, the number of individual
accnmulators needed is 2n . For five bit tests the number of accumulators needed is the
sum of the powers of2, which equates to 2n+l- 2. The exponential increase in the
number of accumulators needed limits the amount of testing that may be performed.

N
2
32
64
128

N * 2n
2 * 22
32 * 232
64 * 264
128 * 2128

Bits Re uired
8

1.374 * 1011
1.1805 * 1021
4.3556 * 1Q40

Table 4·5 Number of Bits required to perform Test T"
Additionally, in Table 4-5, a limitation on the Test-T is the amount of bits
necessary to perform the test with any confidence.
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Using non-overlapping samples, the minimum number of hils to test is n * 2" to
obtain a valid measurement. For example, using 2 bit sf:quences we need to test at
least 2 * 21 or eight bits. This will be the minimum possible to obl<tin a probability of
0.25 for each two bit sequence though testing a million bits may improve the precision
of the result. The exponential increase in the number of bits needed ensures that it is
not practical to perform the Test~T for large values of n.
Using the Test·T, a classilication system based on the size of the sequence tested
and the number of unique symbols available is possible.
A proposed standard notation is described below. The superscript, a, defines the

largest test evaluated, the subscript, b, the number of unique sequences available from
the generator, X is the enumeration of a specific output sequence and m is the number
of symbols of generator memory :

mTb' X
A 1T 2 1 generator is a binary source with memory of 1 bit, that is, the output bit
is dependent on the previous bit. Further discussion of the classification scheme is
Section 4~8.

Results from testing a fair coin can be listed as: T 21 H = 0.497 and a fair die, Tr, 1
3 as 0.1659.
For example, a single, fair, six-sided die would be classified as a Tr,l generator as
it produces only 6 unique symbols, one at a time. Additionally, two fair dice, a Tr, 2
generator passes a test for two symbols, that is, every pair of symbols is equally likely.
It is noted that the two six~sided dice produce 6 2 or 36 different sequences as they are
independent of each other and would pass TJ6 1 , a test for individual symbols from an
alphabet of 36.
A fair coin tossed in conjunction with a fair die to obtain 12 unique pairs of
symbols would meet the requirement ofT121, implying that the product of the notation
subscripts can be summed. For example T61 * T21 = T 12 1 giving 12 1 or twelve unique
symbols.

4.7.2.3.

Results

An implementation of the Test-T produced the following results for runs of
various length. In Table 4-6, four runs were processed of 1000, 10000, 100000 &
1000000 bits. The one bit and two bit patterns were generated and the results
tabulated. The generator appears to prefer 1 's slightly more frequently than O's during
shorterruns. VI
eow th e expec td
e va Iue are un d erI'd
me .
a ues bl
Bits
I
Averae:e
0
1000
0.49200000 0.50800000 0.50000000
10000
0.49870000 0.50130000 0.50000000
100000
0.49948000 0.50052000 0.50000000
1000000
0.50016100 0.49983900 0.50000000

Table 4·6 SingiP Bit Results
In Table 4-7, the two bit patterns show similar preferences, however, the long runs seem
. h s h ort.er runs wh'tc h ~avour ones.
to ~avour '00' compared Wit
00
01
10
Bits
11
Average
0.2380000
0.25400000
0.25400000
1000
0.25400000
0.25000000
0.2478000 0.25090000 0.25090000 0.25040000
10000
0.25000000
0.2495900 0.24989000 0.24988000 0.25064000
100000
0.25000000
0.2502500 0.24991100 0.24991100 0.24992800
1000000
0.25000000

Table 4·7 Two Bit Results
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A major concern with this simplistic test is the setting of limits for the values
and interpretation of the results. These must be determined carefully to permit a
classification to be made.

4.7.3.
Q

Summary

The Universal and Test-Tare easily implemented in software, however,
interpretation of the results may require additional information and testing.

D A classification which is able to clearly identify a random sequence generator by its
output characteristics may make specification and selection of a random sequence
generator efficient.
0

Methods of assessing random generators for classification are not dealt with in
detail.

4.8.

Classification Scheme

4.8.1.

Introduction

A method of specifying clearly the characteristics of random symbol generators is
proposed as an aid to selection and classification of generators. The classification
method must simply identify important characteristics for random generators to permit
a specification to be made that does not rely on often misunderstood statistics.
Ideally, a system designer should be able to specify a type of random sequence
generator and permit the final selection to be made during implementation.
An introduction to the concept of 'Combinational Calculus' using the proposed
classification system is provided to describe the common practice of combining random
generators into a composite generator. This work is to be developed further and
validated and consequently is neither complete nor rigorous.

It can be shown that generators can be combined using logical operations and
the description can provide an operator with a summary of the composite generator's
characteristics. It is possible that this concept can be extended and used to describe
aspects of complex systems which contain random sequence generators.

4.8.2.

Explanation of Classification Method

Two fair six-sided dice 01 and 02 arc defined as D1 = {a,b,c,d,e,f} and 02 =
{g,h,ij,k,l}, both of which are classified T6 1 and two fair coins are defined as C1= {m,nl
and C2 = {o,p} both of which arc classified T2 1. The Vf' specification means that the
sequences produced by each artefact are random.
For example, the sequence '01011010', while obviously patterned has the
probabilities of P(O) = P{1) = 0.5. This does not necessarily mean the generator of the
sequence is random but it passes test T21. However, the probabilities for T2 2 are P(OO)
= 0, P(01) = 0.5, P(10) = 0.5 and P(11) = 0 and this means that the generator 'fails' test
T22 . Passing test T21 is implicit in passing test T22 and failing T22 may mean that the
sequence examined is insufficient to determine the result.
Consequently, no test can be certain that a sequence is random.
Logical operations may be used to describe the use of more than one generator
to produce specific results. Being able to describe clearly the effects of combining two or
more generators makes it easy for decisions to be made without substantial statistical
knowledge.

4.8.3.
{ 0} = the empty set.

Classification Relationships
A

means logical and, v means logical or

Logical NOT negation
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Multi~Uscr,

Cl={mvn) ifCl=m thcnNOTCl=n ifCl=nthcnNOTCI=m
D 1 = { a v b v c v d v e v f I If D 1 = a then NOT D 1 = b v c v d v e v f
Logical AND*
Dl 11. 02 = {aAg v aAh ... v bAg.... vftd! => T1,l A T,l = Tt,l ~ T11 1 =T.1r,1
ClA Dl = 1 mAa v mAb .. v nAa., .. vnAf} => T£,' A T21 = Tr,l • T 11 = T 12 1
where aAg is considered to be one symbol.
D 1 AND NOT 01 = I (a11.(b v c v d v e v f)) v ... v (fA(a v b v c v d v c)) I => I e I
= {a-a" b-b A ... A f- 0 = Tr, 1 - T6 1 = To 1 = {0 I

D!/Dl = {aja,bjb ... eje,f/n = i!,l,!,l,l,ll =ill= Identity set.
Dl

A

(02- 02) = {a+g-g, ... ,f+g-gl = {a,b,c,d,e,f} T 12 l

Dl • 02 / 02 =

'f62

/

T6 1 = T6' =

-

Tr,l

= Tr,t

{ag,ah,ai, .... fj,fk,fll / {g,h,i,j,k,l} = {a,b,c,d,e,f}

D2/(Dl/Dli = D2/ I= D2
Logical OR
DlvD2={avbv .. vl{

=>(DIACI)v(D2AN0TCI)=>(To 1 Am) v (To 1 An) =

'f61 AT21 ='f61 +T21 =T]21

equivalent to using a fair coin, Cl, to specify either Dl or 02 in each throw.
Cl v Dl = {m v n I v {a v ... v f}
=> (DlA C2) v (CIA NOT C2) => (T6'" m) v {T2'
An)= T8t
equivalent to using a fair coin, C2, to specify either Dl or Cl in each throw.
x' means that this term is NOT x, that is, not included. In any set of two symbol terms,
one symbol terms are not part of the set.
each term can be considered expanded, a=> [a,b',c',d',e',f] and b => [a',b c' d' e' f]
then ag => [ag,b'g,c'g,d'g,e'g,fg] = ag
agfg => [ag, b'g, c'g, d'g, e'g, fgj / g
=> [a,b',c',d',e',f] :::> [a]
(Dl A D2 )/D2 = (ag,ah,ai, .... fj,fk,fll j {g,h,ij,k,li = (a,b,c,d,e,n
Ta6 1 /T6 1

= T6 1

4.8.4.
0

Summary

Classification schemes for random symbol generators permit a standard
classification of the output of either single or composite generators.

D

o

Construction of a composite generator can be specified from two or more different
generators according to simple rules.

4.9.
4.9.1.

Visual Testing of Binary Sequences
Introduction

Assessment of the characteristics of a random bit generator may require
substantial test preparation and assessment of substantial amounts of data. An
effective method of detecting faulty generators is required which should be easy and
efficient to apply.
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After preliminary assessment specific statistical methods can he us1:d.
A generator may have a 'memory'. This means that the output is clcpcndent on
a number of previous output symbols. For example, a 'binctry memory less source'
produces statistically independent bits and a source with a memory of one will produce
bits dependent on the previous bit. Memory in a generator means that overlapping
samples are taken.
Non-overlapping samples mean the generator output is being tested for
statistical independence. For example, a three bit generator with overlapping samples is
a binary source with memOl)' of two bits and non-overlapping samples means it
implements test T 11 l for three bit sequences.
This simple graphical method may show some characteristics of the generator
but any test for randomuess must meet stringent requirements. The graphical
methods were confined to whole pixel values used to eliminate the need to perform
geometric calculations such as Sine and Cosine with the attendant floating point
calculations and round-off errors.

4.9.2.
4.9.2.1.

Methods Used
Single Bit Sequences.

This test applies to binary memoryless sources, defining an array of 2k + 1
integers to plot the output characteristics of a single bit generator. All array values are
initialised to zero and the array index is set to the central position, k + 1. From this
position, the array index is incremented if the randomiser bit is a '1' and decremented if
the bit is a '0'. After modifying the index, the integer in the array position is
incremented and the run is terminated when the index is moved outside the anay.
In figure S-8, an individual trace represents a single test run on the same
generator and the cumulative totals for each array position are kept. The cumulative
values describe a line which encloses an area between the horizontal axis and the trace.
While some traces appear to follow an approximate bell cutve distribution, the center of
the area under the line may be to one side of the centre line.

Flpre 4-8 BIDCie Bit Sequence Trace
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Randomly distributed symbols should he evenly, if not syrnrm:trically, distributed
about the centre of the army. A center line consistently to one side of the central axis
may be considered evidence of a preference hy the gencn.tor for a particular value.
Additionally, should the trace lack symmetry then this may be considered a
chamctcristic of the generator.
Example for

mcntory-J,~ss

single bit generators.

ForK "' 3, an array is defined where X denotes the central position. Starting
from this position lllO\'C to the right if the bit is a '1' and left if the bit is a '0' and
increment the count in each array position on entry.

A.

Random sequence = 1:

0000000
123X321

B.

Random sequence = 101011

0022000
123X321

c.

Random sequence = 1010100110011

0263000
123X321

D.

Random sequence

3431000
123X321

=

10100011001001

In example D the final 0 moves the trace outside of the array and stops the
process. It is noted in examples C and D that the digit '0' is slightly more numerous
than '1' and the trace shows a preference for that side.
If the values were graphed it would show an approximate bell-curve with the
centre of the curve being displaced in the direction of the pref~rred digit. Results can
be seen in Appendix 9-20.

4.9.2.2.

Mapping considerations o£ Multi-bit generators

The mapping of multiple bit sequences to pixel values can be made without
trigonometric values such as the sine and cosine of an angle. The method encodes the
directions in binary format to ensure that no data is lost when converting the random
sequence to the graphical environmt!nt.
In figure 4.9 each of the directions from the origin '+'is the decimal
representation of the b"ma y se uence f rom 0 to 2 "- 1

28 29 30 31 0
I
27
26
14 IS 0
I
I
2S
13 7
0
24
12 6
+
2
23
II 5
4
3
22
10 9
8
7
21
20 19 18 17 16 IS
Figure 4-9 2,3,4 and S bit direction encoding

2

3

2
3
4

5
6

i 14 13

4

s
6
7
8
9
10
11

12

The center is defined by the '+'symbol and the 2 bit sequence directions by
0,2,4,6 adjacent to the '+'. Three bit sequences are enumerated by 0 - 7 adjacent to the
'+'sign.
In Table 4-8, the size of the square of pixels increases by a binary exponential
factor. It can be seen that the difference between 3 bit and 4 bit pixel squares is 2.
Between 4 bit and 5 bit pixel squares the difference is 4 and so on.
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Index

No. Of Bits

I
2
3

2
3

4

5
6
7

5
6

4

direction
s
4
8
16
32

64

pixel
square

difference

2
3
5

I
2

9

8
16
32

17
33

128

4

Table 4-8 Differences in Pixel squares
It is possible to calculate the size of the pixel square side, V, necessary for n bit
resolution by the following formula.

v = z + L"

zn-3

i=3

Equation 4-8
For ann= 8 bit sequence, the pixel square size= 2 + 1 + 2 + 4 + 8 + 16 +32 =
65 pixels. This pixel square would have two sides of 65 pixels and two sides of 63 pixels
totalling 256 pD.:els. The line representing the direction of the trace can be drawn as a
line segment 33 pixels long starting from the origin to the periphery.
Algebraic methods using the known relationship of the numbers of pixels in the
sides of the pixel square can be used where two sides are X pixels long and two sides
are X - 2 pixels long. The required number of pixels in the pixel square will be two to
the power of the number of bits examined.
2n
= 2x + 2(x-2)
2n /2
=x+x- 2
2n /2 + 2
= 2x
2nj4+1
=x
Equation 4-9
For example, 8 bit samples give
256 = 2x + 2{x-2)

65 =X
Limitations include the size and resolution of the screen, for example, a screen of 480 *
640 pixels would be able to support a target of a maximum of 480 * 480 pixels and
starting from the origin only 7 * 33 pixel line segments would be needed to reach the rim
of the target set at a radius of 231 pixels.
Movement size is the integer value of the square size divided by 2.

M=Jx12L
Eq'.:.ation 4-10
For example, a screen of 640 by 480 pixels would be able to support a square
target of a maximum of 479 * 479 pixels. Using a '9 by 9' square, and starting from the
origin, only 27 steps are needed in a specific direction to cross the rim of the target set
at a radius of 231 pixels.
This method of graphing the output of the Generator is commonly described as
the 'Drunkard's Walk', where the notional inebriate takes a step away from a point in a
random direction as often as required. The trace produced represents the path taken
and characterises the randomness of the directions chosen. The largest binary
sequence that can be plotted is limited by the size of the target and the size of the steps.
For much larger binary sequences, the inebriate takes one step away from the
origin and is then magically transported back to the origin to take a second step. After
a number of iterations, the steps of the inebriate are plotted by making lines to map
direction to the screen. This display of the rays traced would characterise the
generator.
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Summary

4.9.3.
0

Visual testing methods permit rapid characterisation of a variety of sequence
generators.

a

Evaluation is limited by the amount of information generated by the test.

a

Very large numbers of bits may be tested very quickly.

a

Results are listed in appendix 9-20

4.10.

Simulation of Drunkard's Walka

4.10.1.

Introduction

A 'Drunkard's Walk' is a mathematical paradigm to explain the output of a
random sequence generator with the behaviour of a mythical inebriate. The steps
taken by the inebriate, where direction is defined by the random sequence, are traced
for analysis.
A simulation of a Drunkard's Walk was used as a method of detecting the
characteristics of random sequence generators by observing the trace produced from
plotting the output of the generator as steps in a Drunkard's Walk. Initially, the
directions were encoded for 2 bit, 3 bit and 4 bit sequences and the behaviour
observed. Directional preferences in the sequences may be observed, that is, the graph
may show a preference for a particular side of an axis through the origin.
In the 'Drunkard's Walk' paradigm the drunk walks away from the origin taking
each step in a random direction. The average distance da travelled by the drunk after a
number of steps, N, of length, /~, is given by
"" =

;Jfi

Equation 4-11
(KAYE,l993, p54)
Solving for N, the number of steps needed to travel the average distance,

N=(';)'
Equation 4-12
The average number of steps needed to travel a particular distance is the square
of the average distance divided by the length of step. For example, with da = 200, and I~
= 1, N is 40000. If the average number of steps differs substantially from this value
it may indicate that the generator is biased or not random though this may take many
runs of the generator to establish. Kaye mentions 'Many random walks are required
before the measured average distance converges on the theoretically predicted value'
(Kaye,1993, p55)

4.10.2.

Concerns in Simulation of Drunkard's Walks

4.10.2.1. Direction
The selection of direction not magnitude of the steps poses problems when
simulating the trace on a computer. Digitisation of direction would introduce
quantisation error when using real values. For example, in the real world, an itinerant
inebriate would have an infinite choice of directions. However, most simulations limit
the directions and apply probabilities to each one.
With pixels selected as the dimensional unit each peripheral pixel is the same
'distance' away from the origin regardless of the size of the direction-encoding square,
that is one 'step'.
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4.10.2.2. Overlapping venu• Non-overlapping Sample•
Multiple bit generators which produce overlapping samples behave as a binary
source with a memory, where the direction depends on the previous bits. For example,
a two bit overlapping sample is the output of a single-bit generator with a memory of
one bit.
Non-overlapping samples arc the equivalent of a multiple symbol generator. For
example, a four bit generator will produce 16 unique output sequences and these can be
encoded as hexadecimal characters.

4.10.2.3. Squue venu• Round Target•
With a circular real-world target, the size of the step docs not alter with the
direction. Most simulations use a single step size and define the number of directions
to permit the exercise to work. Using a very large number of directions with specific
probabilities may make the solution of the problem very difficult.
In Ph:el Space, it does not matter if the pixel is not square, as long as each step
in a particular direction is always the same length in pixels. This can be visualised as a
non-Euclidean space where the magnitude of a standard length varies depending on
absolute direction and I or location. If all entities within this space comply with the
same conditions then, subjectively, a unit step in any direction has the same length
while to an observer outside of the space, objectively, it can be observed that step
lengths differ depending on direction.
Figure 4.10 shows the periphery of the targets is the same number of steps from
the origin in any permitted direction and consequently, within the definitions given, the
square in pixel space behaves as a circle for the purposes of the proposed tests.

real

pixel

Ff&ure 4-10 Compari•on of Real and Pixel Baud Walb
4.10.2.4. Errors in Repre•entation.
A major concern is that the use of a circular target may introduce an error when
a square target is necessary due to the underlying data structure of pixel squares.
Using a round target may underestimate the generator characteristics due to the
target area being irregular. While the target looks like a circle to the observer in real
space, using pixels as the basic unit means that it is not a circle.
In the real world, if the actual target is a square and a circle is inscribed inside
the square then the relationship of the respective areas is given by the area of the circle
divided by the area of the square.
1tr2 I (2r) 2 • nj 4

Equatlon4-13
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31415.92 and the square area is 40000. The relationship between them is 0.78539 or
approximately 79% which is equal to 1t /4 of the area of the square.
The circular ·.argct, in pixel space, is then smaller than required and the trace
terminating at the periphery is actually terminating earlier than if a square target is
used.
I
if the square target is the equivalent of a circle in pixel terms

~~==

]·

.

The picture on the left expresses the relationship between the Square target and
the circular target in the real world. The picture on the right expresses the circular
target, the white area, as it would be seen in pixel space where the square actually is a
circle in pixel space.
The relationship is between the two areas in pixel space is approximately 78%.

4.10.3.

Summary

o Drunkard's Walk Simulations are easily implemented.
o Multibit representations of direction may require substantial resources and a very
large test display area.
0

Apart from some simple statistics generated evaluation of the results requires
further research.

0

Results are included in the Appendix 9-19.

4.11.

Ordering Paradigm

4.11.1.

Introduction

As testing a complex function with a large range of inputs may be infeasible it is
important to develop a simpler test that will give some assurance that the function
generator is not flawed. Comparison of the function input and output sequences is to
provide some assessment of whether the function is one-to-one.

4.11.2.

Methods Used

The concept of a randomness in a binary sequence implies that for each bit in
the sequence, the probability of the next bit being either the same or different is equal,
that is, there is no preference for one value or the other and no dependency on previous
bits.
It is considered that comparison of the similar length input and output binary
sequences of a function generator would show if any relationship exists between them.
Hamming 'weight' and 'distance' are concepts covered in Error-Detecting Codes
where 'the Hamming Distance between two words is defined to be the number of
positions in which the words differ' (Peterson,l960, p 7) and the 'Hamming Weight' of a
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sequences 'is defined to be the number of non~zcro compuncnts' (Peterson, 1960, P30)
For example, for the words 11010 and 10001, their Hamming Weights arc three and two
respectively and the Hamming Distance between them is three.
It is proposed that the average Hamming Weight and Distanr.e may he a useful
indicators of the transfer function describing a particular process and specifically where
an input sequence is processed into an output sequence according to some unknown
function.
~

An arbitrary binary sequence of n bits is defined as ~ , and X; is an instance of
. An operation f() can then be performed on X; an yielding f(X; ) or X'i
X';= f(X;

I

Equation 4·14
For example, with X; of 0101 processed by f() to obtain 1010 as the sequence X';.
The Hamming Distance of these two sequences is 4 and the Hamming Weight of both
the sequences is 2.
It is suggested that the Average Hamming Distance between input and output
sequences may provide a measurable characteristic off() when each unique value of x;,
thatisfrom 0 to 21
· p rocesse d sequentla:Jy.
·n
"· , IS
F(x)Left shift + 1
Reference
F(x)Rotate
output
Wt.
Distance
Inout Wt.
Output Wt.
Distance
1
1
1 000
0
0
0
001
000
2
2
2
001
1
1
2
011
010
101
2
3
3
010
1
1
2
100
111
3
1
4
011
2
110
2
2
2
100
1
001
1
2
5
001
1
2
2
101
2
011
2
6
011
2
2
2
7
110
2
101
2
2
101
111
3
0
111
3
111
3
0
8
Total 12
12
Total
16
13
Total
12
Avg.
Avg.
1.5
1.5
Avg
2
1.75
1.5

Table 4·9 Comparison of Input and Output Sequences
For example, using a complete set of 3 bit binal)· sequences in order from 000 to
111, that is from 0 to 23-1 or 7 and defining f() as a rotation without loss of data of one
bit such that the sequence 010 becomes 100, then all other sequences of 3 bit length
are processed.
In Table 4-9, comparing the bitwise similarities between input sequences and
output sequences for complete range of inputs gives an average value for all 8 sequences
of 1.5 which is half the number of bits. Additionally it is noted that the function f(x) is
'one~to~one' in that there is a unique output sequence for each unique input sequence.
Using a function that shifts the sequence left by one position and increments the
result by one it is noted that the function is not 'one-to~one' and the average value of
matches is 1.25 which may indicate that for functions that are not 'one~ to-one' some
change in the bitwise matches may be detected.
This characteristic may be of value in determining if a function is likely to be
'one-to-one' for functions of much greater complexity and length, especially when it is
impractical to generate and test all possible unique sequences.
Considering a function generator that applies an algorithm such as the block
cipher Data Encryption Standard (DES) which uses a 64 bit key to encrypt a multiple
sequences of 64 bit blocks. It is noted that the number of unique input sequences and
key sequences are both 264 or 1.844 * 1019 and that generating and comparing all the
unique sequences may be infeasible.
For an individual message, X*, with all possible unique key sequences, K to the
encryption process, the output from the encryption process may be determined.
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X';

==

f(X• , K, )

Equation 4-15
In an encryption the relationship between the input and the output must he
'one-to-one' and 'one-way', that is each unique input must produce a unique output and
it must not be practical to determine the input from knowing the output.
4.11.2.1. Example of Average Hamming Distance
For sequences of n bits the Average Hamming Distance will be approximately
equal to half the number of bits if the process f(x) is uniformly distributed.
AHD • n/2

Equation 4-16
To explain the concept further, Table 1 shows two separate messages, X1 = 1010
and X 2 = 1011, arbitrarily encrypted by function K where K; is an instance of K and the
resultant encryptions, K;X 1 and K;X 2 compared with the message for matching bits in
each position.
In Table 4-10, the first sequence the average Hamming Distance per bit is 17/32
or 53.127% and in the second sequence that is 13/32 or 40.625%. It is considered that
any substantial or persistent deviation from the 50% nominal value is indicative of some
type of flaw in the process.
For example, an encryption, K11 , is defined such that each bit in the message, X 11
, is inverted, then for all ~ , the average Hamming Distance is n, the number of bits in
the message Xa. Conversely, an encryption, Kb , such that no bit in the message, Xa ,
is ever inverted and no change is .nade to the message, means for all~ the average
Ham mm
.
D'1st ance 1s
. 0
Bits
1011
Bits
X1- 1010
X2
HD;
Function
HDi
Function
Wt.
k;X2
Wt.
i
kiXl
llOI
2
3
0101
4
2
kr
I
kr
1001
I
2
llOI
3
3
kr
kr
2
2
0010
2
I
!Ill
kr
4
kr
3
2
1110
2
3
4
0000
0
kr
kr
0101
3
0111
3
3
2
5
kr
kr
2
1010
I
2
0011
kr
2
6
kr
1010 0
lOll
0
3
7
2
kr
kr
1011
I
3
0001
2
I
8
kr
kr
No. Of bits 32
17
No. of bits 32
13
17
19
Avg.
Avg
4.25 4.75
3.25 4.25

Table 4-10 Simulation of Ordering Paradigm
The long term behaviour of a particular encryption method may be examined
with this method. In Table 4-10 the average values show that the function may not be
one-to-one and further testing may be needed.
For example, after 1 * 106 iterations of an encryption method, 1{.;, on a message
Xc , the Average Hamming Distance per bit may be of 0.65 and this characteristic may
be significant to the user.
4.11.2.2. One to One Function
A simple example of a one-to-one function occurs when the bits of the input are
transposed.
If a bit in the input goes to more than one bit in the output then it is no longer a
one-to-one function. By summing the number of similarities between the input and
output the average Hamming Distance can be calculated.
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Figure 4·12 Transposilion diagram for a One-to-one Function
For functions where the number of bits is much larger, for example, n = 1 * 1or,
the amount of work to tabulate the comparisons of outputs and inputs increases
exponentially according to 2 11 and it may not be feasible to generate all inputs and
outputs for analysis. Consequently, some kind of sampling or testing regime needs to
be developed. Figure 4.12 shows a diagrammatic representation of a one-to-one
function.

4.12.

Summary

4.12. 1.
0

Hardware Design

The initial design is practical but will require substantial prototyping.

4.12.2.

Analysis of a Transaction

0

Electronic transactions present opportunities for fraud.

0

The proposed implementation specifies a procedure to follow to minimise the
opportunities for fraud.

4.12.3.

Proposed Implementation of Function Generator

0

The proposed method is simple to implement

0

Limitations are the size of the randomiser and the amount of memory needed to
manipulate the bits

4.12.4.

Randomiser Construction

0

NonMDeterministic Randomiser:;! must be very large to be used in the implementation

0

Deterministic Randomisers may not have sufficient length or complexity to provide
security to the proposed method

0

A hybrid method of constructing Deterministic Randomisers may address the length
and complexity issues

4.12.5.

Large Numbers in Calculations

0

Calculation of Large Factorials and Exponentials is constrained by accuracy and
speed. The more significant digits used the slower the calculation and the greater
the precision.

0

Expansions of large factorials and exponentials provides long sequences of integers
for use within the implementation

4.12.6.
0

TestT

The TestMT is practical and easy to implement but needs to be validated before use.

Edith Cowan University

53

I

Development of a Model for Smart Card Based Access Control in Multi-User,
Multi-Resource, Multi~Lcvcl _Access Systems,·_--------

4. 12.7.

Classification Scheme

CJ

The classilication scheme proposed provides a means of characterising random
sequence generators by their outputs.

CJ

The scheme may also provide means of specifying the combination of random
sequence generators

4. 12.8.
CJ

Visual Testing

Visual testing can be implemented easily and used to look for flaws in a wide range
of random sequence generators.

o Target size and shape need to be considered in running the tests.
CJ

Using Overlapping or Non-overlapping samples depends on the nature of the tests
desired.

4.12.9.

Ordering Paradigm

!J

Bitwise comparison of the input and output sequences of a function generator can
be used to estimate function characteristics.

t:J

The Average Hamming Weight and Average Hamming Distance of a process can be
used to characterise a function.

5.

User Identification Based On A One Way Function

5.1.
5.LL

Specification of Design Objectives
Introduction

It may be practical to legally assign a particular Smart Card to a person by
recording the unique aspects of the card and the identity of the responsible person.
Once this is achieved the person can use that card as the equivalent of their personal
'seal' or signature.
These signatures may be valid because the User and the card are positively
identified and the User has to initiate the card at the correct part of the transaction
cycle and record the results. The actuation of the card signifies the User's assent to the
transaction. Each generated signature must be unique to guard against misuse yet
still be attributable to the specific User to prevent fraud.

5.1.2.

Method Used

This can be achieved by programming into the permanent memory of the Smart
Card an array of random bits and a selection algorithm_ For a long random sequence
there is a very small probability of another sequence being close to it in content. Smart
Cards using this concept can be unique even when many millions of them are created.
Groups of cards with identical randomisers may differ in the selection algorithm or vice
versa.
The number of unique randomisers available to fit the allocated memory space is
very large. For example, a randomiser of 2000 bits is one of a set of 22ooo or 1.148 * 10
602 possible randomisers. Smart Cards may contain up to 20 kilobytes or 163840 bits
of permanent storage (Rankl & Effing,l997, p430) which will contain the program and
randomiser as well as any additional applications.
The Smart Card must store a copy of all input sequences with the output
sequence generated so that the user can automatically keep the summary of the
agreements for future reference.
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Additional activities such as validation of agreements and secure
communications with this method arc desirable.

5.1.3.

Summary

0

Each Smart Card must be unique in some way to identify the card and must
possess unique properties that can be used to provide a unique signature or
validation of transactions.

a

The Smart Card must be associated with an individual by means of a photograph
and personal details or other method.

a

The Smart Card must use some form of personal actuation such as a pin number or
biometric identification.

a

Sequences produced by the card must be unique and repeatable.

a

A Smart Card must be physically secure against illicit operations to discover its
contents.

a

Additional functions may include hash and cryptographic algorithms.

5.2.

Description of a Smart Card Design

5.2.1.

Introduction

It is practical to specify the characteristics of a Smart Card to meet these
requirements. The card must be physically secure and legally assignable to a person or
company. It must implement the algorithm and store transaction details.
Additionally, it must implement secure hash and data encryption methods and produce
a serial number to identify the card uniquely.
The major requirement is memory rather than processing speed, as many hash
values are 128-256 bits and may take less than a second to transfer even at Smart Card
serial speeds. The memory must be divided physically into Read Only Memory (ROM)
which cannot be determined without destroying the chip and Random Access Memory
{RAM) to store the working data and summary information. It may be necessary to store
the summary data in a 'write-once, read-many' (WORM) memory or Electrically Erasable
Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM) so the card can act as a receipt by storing
the input sequence used to stimulate it.
An encryption algorithm is used to encrypt digital data for storage and
transmission.
A symmetric cipher requires that a copy of the key is available at both ends of
the system. The sender and receiver must share this information which is as
confidential as any message it is used to encrypt.
Figure 5·1 describes the proposed design for a Smart Card. The control
functions are indicated by dotted lines; the data flows by solid lines.
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Figure 5-1 Schematic of Proposed Smart Card Design
The Smart Card input sequence may be used to generate a key for a Block

Cipher such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES). As the output sequence is unique
to each Smart Card, the input sequence can be transmitted as the message header with
the encrypted message.
A 'Block Cipher' is an algorithmic method of processing ftxed-length blocks from
a message. (Schneier, 1996, p270) The DES algorithm performs a substitution and
shuffling of the bits according to a preset algorithm for 32 iterations and then selects
and processes the next block. A typical block is 64 bits and a typical key could be as
short as 64 bits or as large as 196 bits in a DES variant such as 'Triple-DES'.
A 'Stream Cipher' (Schneier,1996, p197) is an algorithmic method of processing
a message one bit at a time by performing 'addition modulo-2' with the key sequence.
The security of the Stream Cipher rests solely on the characteristics of the key sequence
which must be at least as long as the message being encrypted.
The Smart Card output sequence can be prolonged to provide a key sequence
and this implies the ability to produce sequences of varying lengths or the ability to use
selected portions from the output sequence.
Where provision exists for Smart Cards to be used on public phone terminals it
is considered possible but not immediately practical to encrypt messages with the Smart
Card. Personally encrypted secure communications on public carriers may be
implemented separately with the data on a lap-top or a digital voice message being
encrypted before being transmitted. Limitations in the Smart Card data transfer rates
may make real-time voice encryption difficult to implement.
For example, a standard sound file format on many PCs is the Wave' file
identified by a '.WAV' suffix to the file name. Software is readily available to capture a
sound sample and off-line processing is relatively straight forward. Sampling at the
minimum rate of 11025 eight bit samples per second (monophonic) produces a file of
661500 bytes per minute of sound. Speech is able to be compressed substantially
with proprietary compression software such as 'PKZIP'. Research shows that
approximately 300 seconds (5 minutes) of speech can be compressed and stored on a
single 1.44 Megabyte floppy disk. Off-line encryption of this compressed data file is
readily achieved.
The card should produce a digital serial number which can be compared against
the markings on the card. Additionally, a second serial number can be generated from
the randomiser which will identify the randomiser on the card.
Access control to the card may use a password or biometric identification.
Biometric identification is difficult at present to implement but advances in technology
may produce fingerprint recognition or some other method that is able to be
implemented on a Smart Card.
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The card must be able to usc at least one publicly available hash function or
produce a hash value of an input sequence.
All transactions must be able to be securely stored and if necessary securely
transmitted on public carriers.
Memory size and access speed arc the major criteria in selecting a Smart Card to
produce this application.
The current state of development of the Smart Card with the memory available
and the low rate of data transfer may mean that some of these functions are impractical
though changes in the available technology may alter this.

5.2.2.

Summary

0

A method of generating validation sequences or electronic signatures is necessary for
some forms of electronic commerce.

1:1

The method must minimise opportunities to commit fraud and provide security
against misuse

1:1

The proposed design addresses the following issues:

•!• Card identification
-!•

Card User identification and secure access

-!• generation of hash, validation and signature sequences
-!• key distribution in a symmetric cipher system
-!• record keeping
1:1

Implementation requires

(<.

The users of the method must be able to confirm the results of the process at any
time.

-!-

The transaction must be recorded and any changes must be detectable.

•!- Restriction of the opportunities for misuse
1:1

A practical specification for a Smart Card design incorporating multiple functions
depends on the software simulation to provide information for a prototype hardware
implementation.

1:1

Implementation of some functions may be impractical due to

1:1

Development time and capabilities of the Smart Card

5.3.
5.3.1.

Description of the Theoretical Method
Introduction

The theoretical method 'A Provably Secure, Strongly-Randomised Cipher'
{Maurer,1990, p361) proposes 'provable security .... based on the availability of a very
large publicly accessible string of random bits'. The criteria for provable security are
that the randomiser is substantially larger than all the plain text encrypted with it and
that the key information is the starting point within the array of randomised strings
blocks used to produce the key string.
Maurer concludes with two recommendations and a conjecture. One
recommendation relates to developing the randomiser in time, requiring an opponent to
process a substantial part of the randomiser to be reasonably certain that the
decryption of the message is correct. The second recommendation is that the selection of
bits from the randomiser is made more difficult thereby permitting the shortening of the
Randomiser and rendering an application more feasible. Furthermore, Maurer states:
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~Finally, we would like to point out that ntndomization ledwiques similar to
those presented in this paper may be useful for tlw construction of pntctical ciphers,
even when the randomizcr is not sufficiently long to guarantf:e H n~asonahle lower
bound on the enemy's computational effort rcquin~d to hreak the ciplwr or when tile
randomizer is replaced by a pseudo-random sequence" (Maurer, 19fJO, p372)

5.3.2.

Description of the Theoretical Method

This section makes substantial reference to the original paper by Maurer.
(Maurer,l990)

Random variables are denoted by capital letters, whereas the corresponding
small letters denote values taken on by these random variables.
A binary additive stream cipher
B=
publicly accessible binary random string consisting of K blocks of length T and
total length of L= KT bits. The blocks are denoted by R[k,O], ... ,Rfk,T-1] for 1 $ k $ K.
(length approximately 10 10 ) See Table 6-1.
W =
[W1, ... , WN I binary Keystream of length N
~ =
[X1, ... , XN] binary Plain text of length N
Y=
(Y 1 , ••• , YN I binary Cryptogram of length N
~=
[Z1, ... , Z" J a secret key where Zk E ]0, ... , T·ll for 1 $ k 5 K specifies a
position within each block of B. Chosen to be uniformly distributed over the key space
S~ = 10, ... ,T-1}" The number of bits to represent the key is K log 2T.
The cryptogram y is obtained by adding

~

and W bitwise modulo 2:

Yn=Xn$Wn forlSnSN

Equation 5-1
R 1,0
R[2,0

...

R[l,ll
R[2,11

...

...

.. .

...

...

R l,T-1
R[2,T-1[

...

.. .

...
.. .
Rl_K,I]
R(K,T-1]
R[K,O]
...
Table 5-1 Description of Randomizer ~as a two dimensional array
of Length= K * T
Keystream W, a function of key~ and randomiser B is the bitwise modulo 2 sum

of K subsequences of length N within the randomizer starting at positions specified by

the secret key. Each block (row) of R is extended cyclically, that is, each rO\~' is reduced
moduloT:
X

WN =

L E9R[k,(n ~I+ Z.)mod 1]
k=l

Equation 5·2
for 1 < n <
Zl
Z2
~

~

N

where

LEB

' R(I,ZI+OJ
R(2,Z2+0]

...
...

...

ZK

RiKZK+OJ

:EE9
Plain
Y=WEilX

wo
xo
YO

denotes summation modulo 2
R(I,ZI+IJ
...
R(I,ZI+N-1]
R(2,Z2+1]
...
R(2,Z2+N-I]

...

R.IKZK+IJ
WI
XI
Yl

...

...
...
...
...
...

.. .
...

R[K,ZK+N-1]
WN-1
XN-1
YN-1

Table 5·2 Description of Cryptogram Y = W E9 X from Randomizer R with Secret
Key~
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The keystrcam, W, described by equation 5.2, is the bitwise modulo 2 surn of K
sub-sequences of R which arc of length N, that is, WI is I he sum modulo 2 of U[J ,Z 1[ ,
R[2,Z2[ .... , R[K,ZK[ where ~<D indicates sum modulo 2. (See Table 5-2)
For example, where K = 50 and T = 1om and N = 2 10 {approximately 1• I 0'1)
gives a keysize of only 3320 bits, that is 50 JogJ JOJ' 1 • The legitimate user must only
examine 50 randomizcr bits per plain text bit while an enemy has to examine, even \Vith
an optimal strategy, perhaps 1/4 of all the bits per plain text bit. This giw:s M = KT/4 =
1.25*1021 bits in total or 1.16 • 10u bits per plaintext bit. The chance of gaining more
information about the plaintext is not greater than tom • (l/4P0 which is less than 10
n .(Maurer, 1990, p368)

Implementation of Theoretical Method

5.3.3.

A trial implementation with a randomiser of 1 * 1or. bits demonstrates the case of
the theoretical method but ignores the requirement for a randomiser of much greater
size. A method of meeting this requirement with deterministic construction is discussed
later.
The arrangement of the randomisers in an array of K sub sequences of length T
is easy to simulate in software. The secret key, ~. indicates the start of the sequence of
bits selected from each block of the randomiser.
The index within each block, reduced modulo T, is shO\vn by a dotted line in
each block which permits the randomiser block to be viewed as a circular buffer. If the
blocks are rotated to line up each bit indexed by the secret key ~ then the bits in each
block can be read vertically and summed modulo 2 to generate key string W.
The implementation divides a randomiser file into blocks of equal length and
then fills a two dimensional array with contiguous bits from each block. Each column
within the array is summed modulo 2 to produce a key bit which is used to encrypt a
message bit. The security of the method relies on the qualities of the randomiser and
the secret key. The use of numerous randomiser blocks to provide multiple bits for the
creation of a ke ' bit serves to hide the structure ,)f the randomiser from anal\' sis.
I

I

I

'

:<--' <--'

........

:4---

Rl
R2
R3
Rk

•<---

I

'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'

Figure 5·2 Schematic of Theoretical Randomiser Construction Method
Repeating Maurer's analysis, where K = 10 and T = 1os and N = 210
(approximately 1024 bits) gives a keysize of approximately 166 bits, that is 10 log 2 10s
. The legitimate user must only examine 10 randomizer bits per plain text bit while an
enemy has to examine, even with an optimal strategy, perhaps 1/4 of all the bits per
plain text bit. This gives M = KT /4 = 2.5 *1 0 5 bits in total or 244 bits per plaintext bit.
The chance of gaining more information about the plaintext is not greater than 1os *
(1/4)10 which is less than 10-2.

5.3.4.
1:1

Summary

Implementation with a small randomiser is practical but the ease of implementation
is offset by the loss of security.
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!J

A small randomiser compromises the security of the method by reducing the
analytical workload and increasing the likelihood of randomiser bits being reused.

!J

The effective working life of the cipher would depend on how much information
about the randomiser is released with t.•ach decrypted message.

D

A much larger randomiser is constrained by the amount of time and resources

needed to store and search the array for the relevant bits.
between size and practicality is needed.

5.4.

Consequently a trade-off

Description of the Proposed Method

5.4.1.

Introduction

The theoretical method is limited in implementation by the size of the
randomiser required and the key information is proportional to the number and size of
the blocks used. Speed and memory constraints may make the implementation
impractical.
The proposed method is developed from original research for an undergraduate
project where a circular buffer of binary data of length 5 * 1O'J bits is traversed and bits
are selected or discarded according to a simple algorithm. The algorithm needs to
specify a Start Point in the Buffer and a method of selecting the necessary number of
bits.
The benefits of the proposal include use of a smaller randomiser, key size is not
directly related to the size of the randomiser and the speed is comparable to Maurer's
method.

5.4.2.

Description of Proposed Method

A random binary sequence B = [Ro. R1, ... , R;-;.!] is generated and stored in a
randomly accessible medium. A constraint of g is that it is substantially larger than
any message it is used to encrypt, that is N >> n. lt may help in understanding the
proposal by imagining the randomiser as a circular buffer able to be entered at any
point and traversed in either direction.
Given a binary message, M = [Mo. M1, ... , Mn·2, Mn.i], a key, K = [Ko. K1 .... , Kn·l,
Kn·l J, the encrypted binary message,~= [Eo. E,, ... , En·l, En.!], is generated by bitwise
addition modulo 2 of M and K (where$ is addition modulo 2).
En=MnEBKn for1 $.n:5N

Equation 5-3
To produce the binary keystream, K, the indices of the selected bits in the
Randomiser, g, are specified by the Index Sequence,! = [1 0 , h, ... , In·l, 10 . 1].
If an arbitrary integer starting point in R denoted by SP and a sequence of
integers.§ = [So ,s,, ... , 8;.2, S;.J) are defined then the Index Sequence,!, to Randomiser,
R. can be generated where Io = SP, l1 = SP +So, ... ,IN= SP +so ... + sx. The values inS
are either part of the absolute index of a bit in R or indicate the number of bits to
discard between bits which are selected.
The key generation algorithm is defined as
Ki =

R.1 mod N

Equation 5~4
where dis the index of the bit in R reduced modulo N, that is lx

=

d:

1. Absolute Mode
n

d

=

SP+LSti·lmodil

i= 1

Equation 5-S
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or

2. Discard Mode
n
d

= SP +

L Sli-1 mmlil • i

i= 1
Equation 5·6
The selection mechanisms employed in this method arc easily implemented and
it is submitted that they meet the requirement or making the bit selection method more
difficult and so permit a shorter randomiser to be used. (Maurer,l990, p372)

5.4.3.
5.4.3.1.

Implementation Example of Proposed Method
Definitions
R~o

Random binary sequence

B

(Ro,

Plain binary message

M

(Mo, Mt, ... , Mn-1]

Encrypted binary message

]:;

=

[Eo, Et, ... , En·l ]

Key binary sequence

=

[Ko, K1. ... , K,.i[

Integer Index sequence

.K
!

=

[Io. It, ... , In-tl

Integer Selection sequence

§

=

[So ,St , ... , Si .I]

Integer Starting Point

SP

... , RN.i]

where N is the size of the randomiser E, n is the size of the message M to be
processed and N >> n . An arbitrary integer, J, indicates the number of values used in
the selection set.§. SP and S.~ are constrained modulo N.

To produce the binary Key Sequence K = [Ko. , K~, ... , Kn-1, Kn-l ] from the
Randomiser, R, the indices of the bits to be selected are specified. This is accomplished
by using the Index Sequence, ! ""[Io. It, ... , In-dAn arbitrary starting point in R is defined by the integer SP and a sequence of
integers§
= [So ,8 1 , ••• , Si .t] can then be used to generate the Index Sequence,!,
where Io = SP, It= SP +So, h = SP +So + St, ... In= SP +So+, ... ,+ Sx.

The index for each bit in R, denoted by Ii , is defined as h = d mod N where
1. Absolute
The seier.tion method where the absolute index of the bit in R is specified. (Using
equation 5.5)
n-1
d = SP + L S!i·t mrnlil
i=l
Given N = 60, n = 6, j = 3, SP = 10, .§.= (5, 7, 2] then
! = (SP, SP + So, SP +So+ St , SP + So + 81 + 82 , SP + So + St + S2 +So , SP + So +
8 1 + 8 2 +So + s, [ = [10, 15, 22, 24, 29, 36[

and
K = [Rio, R It, R h, R h, R 14, R Is]

= [Rw,

R1s, R22, R24, R29, R36].

As an example: (hyphens inserted for readability, selected bits underlined)
R = {101001010l-0100110101-0Q1Q1011Q0-10111l0101-1010100110-1010101001)
K = {110001}

2. Discard
The selection method where the relative index of the bit in R is specified, that is
the number of bits to be discarded between selections. (Using equation 5.6}
n-1
d= SP+LS!i-tmollj)+t
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i=l
Given N = 60, n = 6, j = 3, SP = 10, .§. = [5, 7, 2[ then ! = [SP, SP + Su + 1, SP + So + 1
+ S1 + l, SP +So + 1 + St + 1 + S1 + 1, SP +So + 1 + St + 1 + S1 + 1 + Su + 1, SP +So +
I + St + 1 + S1 + 1 + Sn + 1 + St + 1]
! = [10, 16, 24, 27, 33, 41) and .IS= [Rw, R11,, RH. Rn, R:1,1, Rn]
As an example: {hyphens inserted for readability and selected bits underlined )
R = jiO I 00 10101-0 I 00110 I 0 1-00 I QI 01100-1011110 I 01-10 I 0 I 00 II 0-101 0 I 0 I 00 II
J:;=jiiOIIIj
It can be seen that the same selection regime can produce two different Key
sequences depending on the mode selected.
If the Randomiser is considered to be generated by a non-deterministic or
random source then any reasonable sample of the Randomiser is itself random. An
unreasonable sample would be choosing bits to meet a predefined objective such as
selecting l's half as frequently as D's. This biased method is generally not suitable for
statistical sampling.
It may help in understanding this process if it is considered to be another
sampling regime to be compared with the traditional cluster, strata and other types of
statistical sampling, i.e. a pseudo-random sampling.

5.4.4.

Summary

0

The proposed method is easy to implement and uses only one bit to encrypt each
plain text bit.

0

Key size is constant regardless of the size of the randomiser.
randomiser is easily stored and traversed.

IJ

The security of the proposed method depends on the qualities of the randomiser and
the minimisation of the reuse of the bits. This can be achieved by limiting the uses
and by varying the startpoint and selection algorithms.

The smaller

5.5.
Simulation of Theoretical Method Using Proposed
Method
5.5.1.

Introduction

The theoretical method can be implemented by the proposed method with the
simple modification of choosing a sequence of bits and summing them modulo 2 to
generate a single key bit. The secret key z; in the theoretical method is a set of integers
used as Start Points. The number of bits used to generate a key bit, V, and§= [1] are
used to select consecutive bits in absolute mode.
Each key bit in .K = [Ko. ,

K~o

... , Kn. 2 , Kn. 1 ] is the sum modulo 2 of V bits in R :
1'-l

K, =

I

E!lR[Z,. + i]

1'"0

Equation 5-7

5.5.2.

Description

The simulation in the Absolute Mode entails a set of Start Points, H = jSPo , SP 1 ,
··- , SPk J equivalent to the vector Z and Selection Set, S, = {1}. However, if the K
segments of the randomiser are connected linearly into a ring buffer of length KL the
indices of the chosen bits are determined with the proposed Method. See Table 5-3.
The theoretical method is considered to be a simple implementation of the
proposed method which meets the requirements of a stream cipher application. Proof
of security does not necessarily follow from Maurer's paper as the proposed method
encapsulates the theoretical method.
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SPu
SP,

...

R[ I ,SP,+O[
R[2,SP,+OI

Rj 1,SPu + lJ
R[2,SP, +II

...

...

...

...

SPn

RJK,SP, +OJ
WI
XI
Yl

~w

plain
WffiX

RiK,SP,., +II
W2
X2
Y2

...
...

ll[I,SPu+N·II
R[2,SP, +N-Il

.. .

...
...

...

R,IK,S,+ N-Il
WN
XN
YN

...
...

...

Table 5-3 Specifying Start Points

Zl

ZJ

Z2

R2

Rl

R3

R5

R4

13

12

z5]

Z4

Figure 5·3 Maurer's Randomiser As Part

R6

15

14

Z6

16

Or A Ring Buffer

In figure 5.3, theoretical randomiser segments are concatenated to produce a
ring buffer. The Z flags show the bit specified by the Key Z in each Randomiser
segment. The I flags show that each value in Z can be described by an index calculated
from the start of R 1.
Table 5.4 shows that each Index flag can be calculated from the start of the B
and S shows Start Point and Selection Set in the Absolute Method
4
5
6
I
2
3
Rl
R2
R3
R4
RS
R6
Randomise
r
Key
I=

Zl
Zl

Z2
Rl+Z2

Z3
RI+R2+Z3

s-

SP

SP+SI

SP+Sl +S2

Z4
Rl+R2+R3+
Z4
SP+Sl+S2+
S3

zs
Rl+R2+R3+
R4++ZS
SP+Sl+S2+
S3+S4

Z6
Rl+R2+R3+
R4+RS+Z6
SP+Sl+S2+
S3+S4+S5

Table 5-4 Calculation of Indices
Figure 5-4 Schematic or Randomiser Construction
Each block of E is numbered in sequence from 1 to K, that is, E = (Rl + R2 + , ... , RK]

'
'
'

I'

..;,

Rio

''
'
'
'
'
...__.'
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In figure 5.4, the same randomiscr block is copied and concatenated to produce
the randomiser. Tht• rota lion of each block by the secret key value aligns the repeated
blocks to permit bit selection. This method is equivalent to using each secret key value
as a start point in the randomiscr.

5.5.3.
0

The proposed method can easily reproduce the theoretical method and provides
more opportunity for varying the key generation algorithm. However, the selection of
contiguous bits is considered to be detrimental to the security of the method and
should be avoided where practical.

D

While the User may encrypt a message many times using different Selection
Algorithms and sum them modulo 2 there may be little benefit in this.

5.6.
• ;.
1

Summary

Commentary on Security of the Proposed Method

The only provably secure method in general use is the One-Time-Pad, (Schneier
PlS) which whilst secure needs to transmit as much randomiser as the message to
enable a message to be processed. The randomiser must be random and secret, that is,
known only to the authorised users. The main criterion is that the randomising data is
only used once ever.
Maurer addresses the secure randomiser by specifying a large publicly available
randomiser that provides the basis for part of the security of the method. The main
consideration is that using multiple bits to encrypt each message bit obscures the
actual structure of the randomiser and makes the reconstruction of the key generation
method from a known message much harder.
The proposed method is provably secure, if and only if the selected randomiser
bits are used once. Multiple use of the randomiser makes the method conditionally
secure and the main mechanism for ensuring security is to limit the number of uses per
randomiser. The use of different randomisers, selection sets and start pnints add to the
method's security as it is practical to vary the components easily.
The key size of the Theoretical method is proportional to the number and size of
the blocks. The key size of the Proposed method is constant and not proportional to
the size of the randomiser.

5.6.1.

Implementation on a Smart Card

Implementation on a Smart Card is practical and the limited use of a small
randomiser with a complex selection method permits conditionally secure usage. The
card can be changed rapidly if it is considered to be compromised or life-expired. The
costs of implementation may be reduced if a standard card can be configured by the
user. Randomisers on cards can be produced and publicly distributed so the users
need to share Selection Sets and Start Points.

5. 7.

Smart Card Fraud

If a Smart Card is used repeatedly then it may be possible to collate all the
outputs for analysis to reconstruct the algorithms and randomiser. Fraud or
unauthorised access may not be easily limited if the reconstruction compromises the
system. A substantial break in the system may not be detected until after a major
fraud has been discovered. The loss of business reputation and the costs of repairing
the damage may make the continued viability of the system impractical.

Estimations of the costs of fraud are proportional to both the number of cards in
circulation and the number of uses of each card and a simple model is proposed to
explain this.
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The model uses estimations of the costs of the Smart Card and the costs of the
implementation.

l

Fraud and Costing Model.

5.7.1.

The estimation starts with a Hardware Cost which covers all the hardware
needed to set up a system of readers and cards The Hardware Cost includes Card
Costs, Reader Costs, Installation and Support costs.
Card Costs include a discount for quantity. The price per card reduces to 50% of
the nominal card cost for bulk purchases.
Nominal Card Cost= $5.00
Card Cost= Nominal Cost* 0.5 +(Nominal Cost* 0.5)/sqrt(number of cards)
Total Card Cost = Card Cost * Number of Cards
Equipment Costs cover the number of readers needed and include a discount for
quantity. The price per reader reduces to 50% of the nominal cost for bulk purchases.
Nominal Reader Cost = $50
Number of Readers =roundup (sqrt(number of cards/ 3)
Reader Costs= Nominal Cost* 0.5 +(Nominal Cost • 0.5jsqrt(number of readers)
Equipment Costs= Reader Costs* Number of Readers
InstaHation Costs include the costs of cabling and accessories.
Nominal installation Cost = $5.00
Installation Costs= Number of Readers* Nominal Cost+ 0.10 * (Number of Cards*
Number of Readers)
Support Costs include ongoing costs of supporting a system.
Nominal Support Cost = $0. 10
Support Cost= Number of Readers* Nominal Cost+ sqrt{number of cards* number of
readers)
Total Hardware Cost includes all costs in setting up and running the system.
Total Hardware Cost= Card Cost + Equipment Cost + Installation Cost + Support Cost
Hardware Cost Per Card= Total Hardware Cost

Number of Cards.

Hardware Costs Per Card

14.00 - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ;

:~:: -~\
t1
8

8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00
0.00

t\ - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . , j
/1

-t-+-+-H-t-t-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--t-t-IH-t-t~

- 0

0
0

0
0

0
0
00

"'

0

8

Cards

Figure

5~5

Hardware Costa Per Card

Using this model, the initial setup of the system is expensive but the costs per card
drop quickly.
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5,7,2,

The Cost Per Usc for a Smart Card

Nominal Cost Per Usc"' 0.05 + (0.05/sqrt(numbcr of uses))
The Cost Per Card Per Usc includes all the costs associated with multiple cards in
regular usc.

Cost Per Card Per Use = (Hardware Cost Per Card/ number of uses) + Cost Per Usc +
0.01 * sqrt(Sqrt(number of Cards* number of Uses))
The usage costs increase with the number of uses and the number of cards in
circulation.
Fraud Cost Per Card per Use is proportional to the number of cards and the number of
uses.
Nominal Fraud Cost of 0. 90
Fraud Cost per Card Per Use =nominal cost* sqrt(sqrt(uses) * sqrt(cards))
These equations estimates are graphed in figure 6-6 to estimate the fraud costs
er card er use.
Fraud Cost Per Card Per Use

700
Uses

8N
Cards

0
0

100

"'

Figure 5·6 Fraud Coat Per Card Per Use
The costs of fraud increase with the number of cards in circulation, which
permits an adversary to learn more about a system and also with the increase in uses
which permit greater opportunities for fraud or errors.
Fraud Costs for a small number of cards used only once rise steeply as the
possibility of fraud using inside information is likely.
With a large number of cards in circulation and many uses per card, the number
of people who may commit fraud increases proportionally. Off-line transactions would
be susceptible to small-scale frauds due to the lack of validation during the
transaction.
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5.7.3.

Summary

0

Using the estimations of the model approximately 500 uses per card is acceptable in
keeping the costs of fraud per card usc down. l;or example, given a transaction limit
of $500 per day, it would take only one fraudulent transaction to give an average
fraud of $1.00 per usc on one card.

0

A card may be used infrequently and 500 uses is considered to give about two years
of use to the private user. This is estimated at once per working day, which is 5 * 48
* 2 or 480 uses.

5.8.

Construction of Randomisers.

5.8.1.

Introduction

A limiting condition of the Theoretical Method is the substantial length of the
randomiser needed. A small modification is proposed which addresses this issue and
hence allows a practical implementation of a large randomiser.
The size of the readily accessible randomiser is of the order of 1 * 10 21 bits (1.25

* 101:2 Gigabytes) and the constraints on storing and searching this sequence are
substantial. HO\vever, a large randomiser can be produced deterministically from a
smaller sequence and under certain conditions it may be indistinguishable from bits
selected from a sequence produced by a random process.
If the randomiser is developed over time, that is broadcast publicly, the
legitimate user need only listen when the necessary component is being broadcast \Vhile
the unlawful user must copy and process all the randomiser incurring a substantial
penalty in time and space terms.
For example, the randomiser could be widely distributed on a sequential set of
Compact Discs and the legitimate user could collect only the necessary portions.
However, the unlawful user must collect all the disks and be prepared to process all of
them to decrypt the message. For example, CO's are commonly used to distribute
software with magazines. Additionally, random sequences are also available.

(Peterson, 1998, pl79)

5.8.2.

Deterministic Construction of Randomisers

An operation, ROT{u), rotates a binary sequence of n bits by u bits without loss
of data. For example ROT(1) on '101' gives '011 ', ROT(·l) on '011' gives '101' and ROT(3)
on '10 1' gives '1 01' which is identical to ROT(O). If x is an integer rotation value then u
= x mod n and n unique sequences can be generated by rotating the Basic Sequence by
u from 0 to n·l.
A Complete Ordered Composite Sequence of n 2 bits can be produced by
concatenating the n rotated sequences in order from 0 to n·l. However, concatenation
can be performed in n factorial ways giving many possible Complete Composite
Sequences.
For example, an 4 bit Basic Sequence produces four different rotated sequences
and concatenation produces a 16 bit Complete Composite Sequence as one of 4
factorial or 24 possible 16 bit sequences. This process can be repeated with the 24
possible Complete Composite Sequences being concatenated, giving 24 factorial or 6.2 *
10 23 possible sequences of 384 bits and so yielding a sequence of any desired length.

It is noted that the ROT() operation preserves some of the characteristics of the
initial sequence. If P(O) denotes the probability of obtaining a zero for any bit in the
Basic Sequence then ROT() does not alter P(O) in any of the rotated sequences,
consequently, a Complete Composite Sequence or sequence comprising complete rotated
sequences retains this characteristic.
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A DeBruijn sequence has the characteristic of containing the complete set of
overlapping binary sequences for some integer value. A simple example of a De Bruijn
sequence of n = 3 is '00011101' (Jobnsonbaugh, 1984, p127) which contains the set of
overlapping three bit sequences '000', '001 ', '011 ','Ill', '110', '101', '010', '100' that are
a complete binary representation from 0 to 2:1-1.
It is noted that performing HOT() on the DeDruijn sequence docs not alter this
characteristic and the De Oruijn sequence can be considered as a circular bit buffer.
Usc of a De Bruijn Sequence for large n may be limited by the costs of generation and
storage.

For example, using the eight bit DcBruijn sequence '00011101 ',the operation
ROT(i) for values 0 to 7 can be performed and concatenated sequentially to get a
Complete Ordered Composite Sequence with ordering= [0,1 ,2,3,4,5,6,7! (hyphens arc
inserted for ease of reading) :
00011101-00111010-01110100-11 101000-11010001-1010001!-010001 11-10001110
Obvious subsequences such as '000' and '111' occur frequently though this may
not be readily apparent in some of the possible factorial orderings. For example, a
Complete Composite Sequence with Ordering= [6,3,0,1,2,4,5,7]
01000111-11101000-00011101-00111010-01110100-11010001-10100011-10001110

Given a Complete Composite Sequence, to\, generated by the rotating and
concatenating the Basic DeBruijn sequence, a sub-sequence X' is extracted containing
at least 5 complete Basic Sequences. Extraction of a smaller sub-sequences to\" and to\"'
from N is made to demonstrate the difficulty in determining the Basic Sequence with a
reduced sample. (Note the hyphens '-'indicate boundaries of rotated Basic Sequences
for ease of understanding)
~ = 01000111-11101000-00011101-0011 1010-01110100-11010001-10100011·
10001110

W

= 111-11101000-00011101-00111010-01110100-11010001-101

~"

=

N"'

= OorN'"=01

1000-00Q111Ql-0011

There is not enough information in N" to readily determine the Bask Sequence
and a number of short, separate subsequences such as N"' provide little information
about the Basic Sequence.
While structural similarities in the Composite Sequence exist due to the well
ordered nature of the Basic Sequence, a random Basic Sequence with a randomly
ordered set of rotations may make it more difficult to determine the Basic Sequence and
ordering.
For example, a random integer, D, is converted into binal)' notation to get a
Basic Sequence, B of length n. By choosing a random sequence of Rotations, IJt, a
Composite Sequence, N, can be constructed by rotating and concatenating B by IJL
Given D = 179, B = 10110011, n = 8 and ~H = [04618975] where IJli is
constrained modulo n, a Composite Sequence, N, is generated such that : {hyphens
used for ease of reading)
For reference, a Complete Ordered Composite Sequence using IJI =
[0, 1,2,3,4,5,6, 7]
IOIIOOII-01100111-IIOOIII0-10011 101-0011 1011-01110110-11101100-1101100!
then a Composite Sequence N using ordering IJt = [0,4,6, 1,0, 1,7,5]
N = 10110011-00111011-11101100-01100111-10110011-01100111-11011001-01110110
N = 10110011-00111011-11101100-01100111-10110011-01100111-11011001-01110110
N * =111011-11101100-01100111-1011
N * = 11101111101100011001111011

The sub-sequence '101' appears 8 times, the sub-sequence '1001' appears 6
times and determining if any binary sequence is composite may involve more than a
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cursory inspection. Determination of the Basic and l~otation Sequences to describe the
incomplete Composite Sequence, !'{ * may be difficult.

If a substantial but undetermined number of small sequences arc selected
consecutively there may be enough data to identify the Basic Sequence (at least n bits
and preferably much more) though determining the rotation details of the Composite
Sequence is still difficult. Usc of single widely separated bits may make it difficult to
obtain any information about the 13asic Sequence and it may be a non-trivial exercise to
reconstruct the Composite Sequence.

5.8.3.

Testing to Determine a Basic Sequence

To determine the length of the Basic Sequence, n, it is necessary to examine all
the bits in the Randomiser repeatedly to find the largest value for n that is acceptable.
For a Complete Composite Sequence the number will be the square root of length,
however, for an incomplete Composite Sequence this number will be greater than the
square root of the length of the sequence.

5.8.4.

Determination of Basic Sequence

A Composite sequence is constructed from sub-sequences and a Complete
Composite Sequence contains every possible rotated sequence in some order. A
Random sequence is non-deterministic.

Given a randomiser of length 1 * 106 bits, \Vhich may be composite and
complete it is examined to determine if it is Composite. Starting with the smallest
reasonable Basic Sequence of 2 bits, determine if the 2 bit pattern is repeated in the
randomiser and after a number of iterations of the test, as yet undetermined, make a
decision to stop and try another sequence. Testing blocks of bits for similar numbers of
zeros and ones may become time consuming even with an optimal testing strategy.
One possible method could be: for each n, select at random a number, k, of n bit
samples from the sequence. Analysis of these k s('quences of n bits should indicate
similar values for P(O) where P(O) is the probability of obtaining a zero for any bit in the
sequence.
For example, using a portion of a randomiser treated as a circular buffer, N', and
k = 2", and random vector [6, 35, 23, 28] tests can select four two bit samples.
~·
• 111-11101000-00011101-00111010-0 Ill 0 I 00-110 I 0001-10 I
Counting from the left, the sequences selected 10,11,01,01 produce a value for
P(O) of 0.375 and P(l) of 0.625. It is noted that '00' is not represented.
This test may be very difficult to implement due to the necessity of determining
when to stop testing and what should be the acceptable limits on the calculated values.
Additionally, whether the results of the test are conclusive or should further tests be
implemented to determine the rotation sequence.
Alternatively, starting from the beginning of the sequence, select overlapping
sequences of n bits. For every integer value between 1 and k discard a bit and repeat
the selection. Determine the number of 'ones' in each sub-sequence and look for a
match at intervals of n. If there is a match, generate every non~overlapping n bit
sequence from the start and count the number of bits until the value changes. The
value will be repeated for every rotated sequence of the Basic Sequence.
For example, using a sequence N' and the number of blocks, k = 2 * n
note: matching numbers that are n values apart are a possible basic sequence size.
W
• 111-11101000-00011101-00111010-0!!IOI00-11010001-101
n=B
11111101,11111010,11110100,11101000,11010000,10100000,01000000,10000001,
00000011, 00000111, 00001110, 00011101, 00111010, 01110100, 11101001, 11010011

7,6,5,1:,3,2,1 ,2,
2,3,3,1:,4,4,5,5 4 matches at intervalS then try each 8 bit sequence.
1111110100000011101001110100111010011010001101
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6,3,
11110100 00001110 10011101 00111010 01101000 I 101
5,3,
11101000 00011101 00111010 01110100 11010001 101
•
444 44
11010000 00111010 011 10100 11101001 10100011 01
•
3,4,
10100000 01110100 11101001 11010011 01000110 1
2,4,
01000000 11101001 11010011 10100110 10001101
•
1,5,
10000001 11010011 10100111 01001101 0001101
•
2,5,
The Basic Sequence length is apparently 8 as the value 4 is repeated for each block in
the sequence. It is also shown that the partial block size at the beginning :s three bits.
Appendix 9-20 contains the worked example.

5.8.5.
0

0

Summary of Test

This test identifies the correct Basic Sequence size which produces~ sequence of
matching values for each n bit block. Additionally, it determines the partial block
size at the beginning of the sequence.
The Basic Sequence is relatively easily determined for small values of n. The
alternatives to make this more difficult are large sequence sizes or increased
complexity. Large sequences will only increase the work load in a linear fashion
and an optimal strategy may quickly determine the Basic Sequence size and rotation
ordering.

o The work load for a Basic Sequence is approximately equal to the number of
sequences generated, A, plus the number of additions, 8, plus the number of
comparisons, C, plus generating further n bit sequences, D, +further comparisons,
E.
Work load = A + B + C + D + E
Equation 5-7
0

For n = 8 the values are A= 2 • n, B = 2 • n, C = n, D = c1(2 • n) and E = c2(2 * n)
where C1 and C2 are some arbitrary value. Work load= A+ B + C + D + E = Sn +
c1(2n) + c2(2n) where a linear increase inn produces a linear increase in the Work
Load.

5.8.6.

Increased Complexity

A Composite Sequence can be constructed for increased complexity with multiple
random Basic Sequences of varying length rotated by a random selection of values. This
will break up the relationships between consecutive blocks and the solution may
become non-trivial.

For example, a Composite Sequence constructed from Basic Sequences of
differing lengths such as A, 8, C may be ordered as specified by IJt
=!A3,C2,C1,B1,A5,82,CS]. These sequences may be sub-sequences of a larger random
sequence broken up into arbitrary sized pieces and assigned an identifier.
Given Basic Sequences A • [0101110[, B • [01100110001[ and C • [101J a
Complex Composite Sequence, ~ , can be produced.
::; = 1110010-110-011-11001100010-1001011-10011000101-110
A Complete Composite Sequence for A would have 49 bits, for 8, 121 bits and for
C 9 bits. There would be 21 possible rotated sequences that could be concatenated 21!
Times. Use of larger random sequences of the order of 1 * 1011 bits may make the task
of determining the basic sequence very difficult.
Any random or deterministic sequence can be treated in like manner and it may
be a non-trivial task to detennine whether a portion of the sequence is deterministic
(composite) or random. Any portion produced by sub-sequences smaller than a Basic
Sequence may be indistinguishable from a random sequence under any reasonable
test.
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Testing a Complex Sequence

5.8.7.

Using the eight bit DeBruijn sequence '000 Ill 0 1', as sequence A, '0 I0' as
~ll =JAO, AI, Bl, A2, A3, A4, AS, A6].
• 00011101-00111010-I00-01110100-IIIOI000-11010001-IOIOOOII-OIOOOIII

sequence Band
~

By inspection, a repeated sub-sequence is 1 Ito 10 and this may be a part of the
Basic sequence. The format displayed below shows the number of I 'sin the first n bit
sequence and each consecutive sequence discards the leading bit. However, testing for
8 bit patterns which are expected:

:!: • 00011101 00111010 10001110 10011101 0001

... 0111•

4,4,4,5

4. 00111010 01110101000111010011101000110100011010001101000111
4. 01110100 1110101000111010011101000110100011010001101000111
5. 11101001 110101000111010011101000110100011010001101000111
5. 11010011 10101000111010011101000110100011010001101000111
5. 10100111 0101000111010011101000110100011010001101000111

:!: • 01001110 10100011 10100111 0100 ... 0111

•

4,4,5

5. 10011101 01000111010011101000110100011010001101000111

±· 00111010

•

0111

10001110 10011101 ...

4,4,5

5. 01110101 000111010011101000110100011010001101000111
5 • 11101010 0011101001110100011010001101000 1101000111
4. 11010100 0111010011101000110100011010001101000111
3. 10101000 111010011101000110100011010001101000111
3. 0101000111010011101000110100011010001101000111

•

1•1010001110100111 0100011 ... 0111

4,5

4 • 01000111 010011101000110100011010001101000111
The interpolation of a simple three bit sequence into an ordered rotation
sequence hides the basic sequence structure. The test may detect the Basic Sequence
depending on the application of the test and the observations drawn by the user.
However, while a User may visually determine the Basic Sequence in this example, a
test implemented on a computer may need to be complex.

Detailed explanation of the method is provided in the Appendix 9.21.

5.8.8.

Specification of a Complete Composite Sequence

A Complete Composite Sequence can be specified in n 2 bits, however, the
information needed to generate a Complete Composite Sequence is the Basic Sequence
and the rotation and concatenation sequence, IJt. This will be n bits for the Basic
Sequence plus n rotations specified in binary format. Ordering information, 0,
0 = n + (n log2 n)

Equation SMS
Specification of a Composite Sequence in this manner is more efficient for large
values of n even allowing for the work in generating the Composite Sequence. The
larger the Randomiser simulated, the more efficient the specification, S, of the
Composite Sequence becomes:

S

=

0

71"

=

n+nlog,n

,z -

Equation SM9
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To determine the limit on S as n increases:
Using L'hopital's rule (Grossman p448) for the indeterminate form oo/oo, divide
through by n

(I

lim

11 -7

ooS :::: lim

11 -)>

log211

+ ---- -)

oo -----'-1'-1II

II

Equation 5-10

limit n -7 cc 1/n"' 0
As n increases toward infinity the limit on S tends toward zero.
For example, if n = 8 then each rotation can be specified in a minimum of log:.m
or 3 bits and there are 8 possible rotation numbers in the set :11 ={0,1,3,2,6,5,4,7} and
using Equation 5.8 this information can be stored in a minimum of S = 8 + (8 * 3) or 32
bits which is 0.5 of the length, n 2 or 64, of the Complete Composite Sequence
A Basic Sequence of 1.37438 * 1011 or 23 7 bits (17.1798698 Gigabytes) can
produce a Complete Composite Sequence of 1.88894 * 1022 bits by specifying the
rotation sequence. This Complete Composite Sequence can be specified in S = 1.37438
* 1011 + (1.37438 * 1011 * 37) bits. This evaluates to 5.22267 * 1012 bits (652.83375
Gigabytes) which is substantially less than the Complete Composite Sequence of
1.88894 * 1022 bits (2.361175 * 1012 Gigabytes). There are 237 factorial ways of
ordering the rotated sequences to produce a similar sequence.

A Complex Complete Composite Sequence can be specified by the sum of the
ordering information used to generate the various rotated sequences from the Basic
Sequences.
Where the Complete Composite Sequence is not used in its entirety, then to save
space and time it need not be generated. For example, when only 5 * 109 bits are
selected or discarded then only the relevant portion of the Complete Composite
Sequence of 1.88894 * 1022 bits need be generated.
Additionally, a randomiser of N bits may be partitioned into as many smaller
subsequences as required.
For example, with N = 1 * 106 bits then subsequence A= 1000 bits, 8 = 10000
bits, C = 100000 bits and D = 889000 bits, or further A= 12345 bits, 8 = 543210 bits,
C = 123321 bits and D = 321124 bits.
The ordering of the subsequences may be changed to produce differing
randomisers. For example, ABCD or ACBD. It is clear that reconstructing the Basic
Sequence from an unknown partitioning of a random sequence may be difficult when
little is known of the subsequences.

5.8.9.

Summary

a Any random or deterministic sequence can be rotated and concatenated and it may
be a non-trivial task to determine whether a portion of a sequence is deterministic
(composite) or random.

a Use of sub-sequences smaller than a Basic Sequence may make it infeasible to
determine the Basic Sequence and the Rotation order.

a

A composite randomiser can be stored efficiently in a reduced form with suitable
rotation and ordering information. This storage (or perhaps 'compression1 of the
randomiser is more space efficient than storing the randomiser is its original form.

a Complex Randomisers may be infeasible to analyse.
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5.9.

Transactions with the Smart Card Function Generator

5.9.1.
Introduction
Having defined the characteristics of the Smart Card Function Gener<JI()r, !iOmc of I he
uses need to be defined.
The Function Generator (I"G) is normally considered to he unique, except when a
matched set of FGs is created for symmetrical processes.
The 'simplex' implementation refers to a single unique FG used in asymmetric funclions.
An asymmetric function uses the unique FG physically associated with an mlf!f<Jct in
such a way as to be readily identifiable and able to provide an authentication of the
artefact.
'Duplex' or 'Multiplex' implementation refers to a matched pair or set of FGs to perform
symmetric functions. S_vmmetric functions require that an identical copy of the data
necessary for the function is available at both ends.

5.9.2.

Simplex Implementation

An originator can interrogate the FG and store the input and output sequences as a
means of identifying the FG uniquely. A unique FG can be bonded to an artefact or
assigned to a person. Possession of specific information about the FG can be used to
prove access to and knowledge of the FG and its accompaniment.
An auditor can randomly interrogate the FG and store the input and output
sequences. These input and output sequences may not be inscribed on the artefact as
proof that the auditor has seen it. This implies that many different auditors can take
unique proofs of the seal's integrity without conferring.
An attempt at fraud may include suborning an auditor. However, introducmg
an arbitrary selection of auditors from a pool may complicate the task. As it is not
known which auditors may have validated the FG the opportunities for fraud are
reduced.
If all the input sequences used are known then a spurious FG can be
implemented which can duplicate the correct response to each input sequence as a
replacement for a genuine FG.
However, if the auditor keeps a secret set of random
input sequences and their corresponding outputs from the FG the substitution may be
readily detected. This is a form of collective security in that an unknown number ol
output sequences may have been taken and each sequence must be repeated for each
person for the artefact to be authenticated. Consequently, an artefact may be validated
by an unknown number of anonymous auditors and it may not be practical to forge an
FG.
Unilateral anonymous identification can be achieved by providing an FG that can
be interrogated to produce an output sequence that is acceptable to a third party. For
example, to prove the attendance of a person at a specilic location, the person must
interrogate an FG and store the input and output seque11ces. This can later be used as
proof that the person and the FG have communicated.
Bilateral anonymous identification can be achieved by nn exchange of details
from their respective FGs. For example, a person can obtain the output sequence of
their own FG using a specific input sequence. This can be used to interrogate the other
FG to prove a meeting has taken place without the necessity of divulging personal
details.

5.9.3.

Multiplex Implementation

A unique matched set of FGs can be produced and an origin.~tor cnn interrogate
the FGs and store the input and output sequences as a means of identifying tht• FGt-1
uniquely.
In a symmetric system, such as access control, one card may h(' n~tnin('d on the
inside of the secure area and a matching card must be produced from tlw outsidt• tu
validate an access request.
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provide key generation and management facilities.

5.9.4.

Combination Implementation

For example, a single FG may be bonded to a shipping container in such a
manner as to be destroyed if the container is opened. The details of the FG output can
be stored by the vendor and transmitted to the customer by separate secure
communications. If Seal is validated before the package is opened then the customer
can be sure that the package is the same as the Vendor has sent.
A Vendor may assign a matched FG to a shipping company which provides a
courier serYice. This FG is compared against the retained matching FG to identify the
courier as coming from the shipping company. The shipping company can issue an
employee with a matched FG which can be used to identify the courier picking up a
package.
The courier's details can be stored by the Vendor as proof of pickup and the
courier can retain details of the Vendor's package.

5.9.5.

Summarv

0

Identification of individuals or artefacts can be rapidly achieved with
implementations of the FG.

0

Identification does not necessarily require disclosure of personal details at the time
of the transaction

5.10.

Conclusions

5.10.1.

Theoretical Method

0

The theoretical method is impractical to implement fully.

0

The size of the randomiser and work required for a solution are the principal
constraints.

5.10.2.

Proposed Method

0

The proposed method can be implemented fully.

0

The randomiser size constraint can be met with the deterministic method of
generating sequences.

0

The proposed method describes a stream cipher application that meets the
recommendations of the theoretical method but is easier to implement and faster.

5.10.3.
a

Proof of Security

As the proposed method encapsulates the theoretical method, the proof of security
for the theoretical method is not necessarily applicable.

5.10.4.

Composite Sequences

a

A binary sequence o~ any length can be constructed as a Composite Sequence by
rotating and concatenating any Basic Sequence.

0

The Basic Sequence can be of any length and the construction of the Composite
Sequence can be specified in less bits than a Complete Composite Sequence.

a

It may be difficult to determine the Basic Sequence and the rotation ordering by
analysis to reconstruct the randomiser.

0

It may be impractical to distinguish a portion of the Composite Sequence from a
portion of a Random Sequence.
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0

Complexity of the Composite Sequence can be enhanced by using multiple basic
sequences of differing lengths.

5.10.5.

Fraud Costing

Q

A primary measure of the security of the proposed method is the costs and
likelihood of fraud.

0

The Function Generator design is practical and easy to implement.

0

The Function Generator design is provably secure under single usc conditions and
conditionally secure under limited use conditions.

o

The construction of large randomisers is practical but analysis of the characteristics
of these randomisers may be impractical.

0

Asymmetric and symmetric implementation methods may be used to provide
security under a \\'ide range of conditions.

5.11.

Smart Card Implementation of One Way Function

5.12.

Introduction.

Simulation of the Smart Card design described in the previous chapters will be
addressed. The development environment is 'Turbo Pascal'. This imposes a number of
constraints on the simulation such as array length and specific exception handlers but
they do not affect the proposed design.
The design documentation contains a structure chart, top-level algorithm and
complete source code in a separate appendix to the thesis. The implementation of the
design and the test data give a basis for decisions relating to further development of the
design on a Smart Card.
Development environments exist to implement the algorithm on a Smart Card
but this option is outside the scope of the research. Gemplus manufacture a reader
and software environment which can be used to develop a working Smart Card.
(GCR400)

5.13.

Design of Smart Card Application.

5.13.1.

Introduction

The function generator described in chapter 5 was developed as a model for the
generation of random-like sequences from a known input sequences. The use of the
method to generate identification and authentication sequences is fundamental to the
development of the thesis and its resolution in terms addressing the questions posed.

5.13.2.

Functions

5.13.2.1. Serial Numbers and Card Identification
Each Smart Card must have a unique serial number that cannot be removed
without destroying the card. This serial number identifies the card and permits it to be
assigned to an individual or group. This first or external serial number is created when
the card is manufactured and can be embossed or encoded on the surface of the card,
for example, bar coding to permit scanning. Additionally, the serial number can be
stored in ROM on the card to provide an electronic method of displaying it. This is to
reduce the possibility of a chip being excised from a Smart Card and grafted onto
another card with different identification characteristics.
A second or internal serial number can be generated by implementing a standard
a1gorithm which generates an output sequence from the randomiser. Either the first
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sequence of bits from the randomiser can be chosen or a specific selection algorithm can
be employed using a standard input sequence. This second number positively
identifies the ramlomiser on the card and enhances the card security by ensuring that
the randomiser as well as the Card is clearly identified. The hard-wiring of the serial
numUer into the fabric of the card appears to be the best option as the manufacturer
can ensure that card serial numbers arc unique.
5.13.2.2. Password And Access Control
Identification of the authorised user of the card may be important depending on
what function is required. For example, an electronic image stored within the card may
be compared against the image of the person presenting the card.
A password to permit selection of functions is needed and this requires that
either the password is unchangeable and issued with the card or the card must be field
programmable either by the bank or by the user.
Limitation of the number of access operations is needed for three reasons,
restricting losses, identifying illegal transactions and preserving card security.
If a misused card is reserved for low value, off-line transactions to preserve its
utility, there will be little benefit from these transactions owing to the time taken to
perform them. A misused card may either expire or be refused by the system
operators. If the serial number is coded to identify the year and month of the issue, the
access control can be designed to ignore cards without the necessar:y characteristics.
High value, on-line transactions need to be authorised and a check of internal
and external serial numbers can identify stolen or misused cards. Biometric or imaging
details stored on the card can provide a check on the identity of the user. Automatically
storing the user's image at the time of the high value transaction may limit the amount
of fraud.
Accessing a card by trying passwords at random can be prevented by counting
the number of failed attempts and disabling the card if these attempts exceed the preprogrammed limit. A temporary lockout can be implemented where the card refuses to
function for a period of time or the card can self-destruct when misused and destroy the
randomiser and the selection algorithms stored on the card.
The card access-control module limits the amount of time the card can remain
active without an activity being performed. This time-out function limits the amount of
use to which a card can be put without the password being re-entered.
In the implementation a 3 digit serial number is used. Larger passwords may be
implemented at the wish of the manufacturer or user.
5.13.2.3. Ha&h Functions.
A hash value of a transaction provides the User with a check on the transaction.
Validation of the hash value by the User before committing a signature and confirming
acceptance of the transaction ensures that the transaction is not altered.
Owing to the limited space on a real Smart Card, the hash value may be omitted
from the implementation. However, an implementation that mimics MD5 operations
has been used in the simulation.
5.13.2.4. Validation Sequences
The use of the card to generate a validation sequence is analogous to a digital
signature where each unique input sequence generates a unique output sequence.
The serial number of the card can be appended to a document prior to hashing
and the hash value could be used to generate a validation sequence. This would provide
both parties with a unique signatltre that is related to the transaction, the consent of
the User and the specific card assigned to the User.
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5.13.2.5. Encryption and Decryption.
A hash sequence of a document can be used to generate an encryption key to a
block algorithm such as Data Encryption Standard (DES). The validation sequence can
be prolonged to provide a key sequence for a stream cipher application.

Depending on processing speed it may be possible to usc the Smart Card to
generate a stream cipher encryption to provide a User with on-line secure voice, mail or
electronic document communication for commercial confidentiality reasons.
The key sequence can be transmitted with the message header or sent separately
as the Smart Card used is unique.
5.13.2.6. Randomiser.

The randomiser is used to deterministically generate sequences in response to
particular inputs. It can only be copied at time of manufacture. The selection
algorithms can be altered by the manufacturer to provide certain characten'stics for sets
of cards with the same randomiser or selection algorithms. Alternatively, the Issuer or
User may program the Selection algorithms for a particular card.

5.13.3.

Security

The design meets the requirements of a 'One-Time-Pad' which is provably secure
only if it is used once and discarded. The security is reduced by the repeated use of the
method even though bits are used in different sequences. Consequently the user must
determine a limit to the amount of uses permitted.

5. 13.4.

Memory Requirements

Assembly Language implementation of common algorithms exist and Rankl &
Effing suggest that a Hash algorithm requires 4 kilobytes of code (Rankl & Effing, 1997,
p84) and the Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA) requires 1 kilobyte of code. (Rankl &
Effing, 1997, p71)
Estimation of the total memory requirements is based on the following
considerations. A stream encryption method is more space efficient than a block
algorithm, bit selection algorithms may require less space than a hash algorithm and
the randomiser may be as small as 10000 bits (1250 bytes).
The executable simulation program, SMARTCD.EXE, incorporating all the
functions including access control, bit selection algorithms, stream encryption and the
MD5 hash algorithm takes approximately 21 kilobytes of memory. This compiler
produced executable file could be implemented more efficiently in assembly language.
A Philips P83C855 Smart Card has 20 kilobytes of ROM, 2 kilobytes of EEPROM
and 512 bytes of RAM. (Rank! & Effing,1997, p430)
Consequently, the memory estimation is 4 kilobytes for a hash function, 2
kilobytes for a stream cipher function, 2 kilobytes for the bit selection algorithm and 4
kilobytes for access control, selection and recording. This leaves 8 kilobytes for
additional applications and implementing the randomiser. For example, a randomiser
of 32768 bits can be implemented in 4 kilobytes.

5.13.5.

Summary

IJ

This limitation of usage has substantial economic consequences both in the costs of
manufacturing and distribution of new cards and the costs of fraud in a
compromised system. The implementation costs reduce with many cards in usc but
the opportunity for fraud increases with the uses. For the purposes of the
simulation a limit of 500 uses is chosen.

Q

Implementation is practical with the estimated memory usage. However, further
investigation into the viability of the Smart Card design is desired.
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5.14.

Software Simulation of the Design

5.14.1.

Introduction

The simulation environment. is a Pascal development environment which
·
h.-.· s listed.
rOVl'des f<?r_ ~h<!. _deve Iopt_ncnt of a suite o f__ programs t~ tmplci!J~n~_!
c f-unctiOn
·-

I Input File I I Randomiscr File I IActivity Lt)g File I
.- - - - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - -- - - ~ lSelection Algorithm I

~ /Hash Algorithm

I

Access Control
& Operation
Sequencing

'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'

IEncryption Algorithm I !Display I:
·------------------------------------ -·
!output File!
I Configuration File I
~

Note. The program exists
within the dotted line area
and the files arc defined
outside the area in the
environment.

.

Figure 5-1 Schematic of Smart Card Simulation
In figure 5-1, the inputs and outputs are either data files or keyboard inputs to
permit testing and evaluation of results. A limited amount of display is available on the
screen to administer the program and explain what is happening. The primary aim of
the simulation is to develop data for evaluation rather than examine user interface
aspects or comment on the physical characteristics of the card.

5.14.2.

Functions

5.14.2.1. Serial number
The serial numbers can be generated algorithmically from the randomiser using
a specific input sequence or it can be stored in the configuration file. Both options
permit the card to be positively identified.

5.14.2.2. Selection Algorithm
This has been discussed in chapter 6 and is being implemented with
characteristics to suit a proposed Smart Card regime.

5.14.2.3. Hash Algorithm
The 'Message Digest 5' or MD5 algorithm has been available since 1991, having
been proposed and implemented by R Rivest. As this hashing algorithm has weathered
the probing attacks on its characteristics it is considered to be a reasonable algorithm
to use.

5.14.2.4. Encryption Algorithm
The proposed encryption algorithm is a stream cipher for speed and simplicity of
processing. An implementation of DES or other block cipher, however, could be used.
Symmetric algorithms require that the encryption key and the decryption key are
available to the sender and recipient of the message, which means that the key is as
important as the message.
This can be provided by having two Smart Cards created identical at manufacture. One
can be issued to a User and the other retained by the Authoriser.
Key generation for a block encryption method can be the hash value of a text file
that can be communicated by a separate method to the recipient. Stored key tables
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can be used to select a new key sequence and then it can be deleted. This way, a user
of the system can produce a reasonable crypto-system usine'·d simple computing
package which is dependent on the availability and securit.y of a Smart Card at both
ends of the system.
Key security can be enhanced by destroying the Smart Card by exceeding the
amount of permitted log-ins. Additionally, a User may destroy a card rather than permit
it to be misused.

5.14.2.5. Display
The display is a simple visual indication of the current status of the card and
option permitted. The effective life-cycle, measured in number of accesses, is indicated
by a bar graph display and a non-functional card can be indicated by a complete graph.

5.14.3.

Implementation

The executable file for the simulation is approximately 21 kilobytes not including
the randomisers and data files. Implementation in Assembly language and application
specific hardware may substantially reduce this requirement. Files and file access
routines could be implemented by ROM access while the hash algorithm and control
functions could be implemented in hardware. The randomiser and selection data can be
implemented in ROM.

5.14.4.

Summary

Cl

The simulation is able to process all the transactions required.

0

The display is adequate for the user to select or reject as required.

o

It is expected that an implementation in assembly language may be much more
economical in terms of memory storage. Additionally, a purpose built hardware
implementation may reduce the memory requirements substantially.

0

Implementation of an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), while expensive,
could be cost effective if many thousands of cards are manufactured.

5.15.

Trials

5.15.1.

Introduction

It is proposed that the software is duplicated in a simulated transaction
environment to permit the testing of the design. With a PC to simulate both Smart
Cards the functions and the responses can be tested.

5.15.2.

Lease Protocol

1\vo copies of the software can be created with changes to the identifying details.
The randomiser and selection sets can be changed to ensure two complete Smart Card
Simulations.
Each User can then use the Smart Card to hash a sequence to obtain a value.
This value can be appended to the contract and then hashed again. The hash value
depends on the original hash value of the contract and the signature sequences
appended to it. The card serial numbers can be appended to identify the card in the
transaction as well as a signature sequence.

5.15.2.1. Tooting
o

A transaction file listing various activities and the costs involved was created and the
information used as input to the Smart Card
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o

Comprehensive testing is not within the scope of this research which is
concentrating on proof of concept rather than a bsolut.e security testing.

5.15.3.

Summary

o Creation of two sets of Simulation Data is not difficult. Different responses arc
recorded for identical inputs.

5.16.

Possible Transactions

5.16.1.

Introduction

The two main classes of transactions are off-line and on-line. Off-line refers to
transactions that do not require validation by the other party before processing. Ideally
this will refer to low value, infrequent transactions. On-line refers to high value
transactions such as bank transfers which require validation for legal and business
reasons or secure transactions that must be validated before access can be permitted.

5.16.2.

Off-line transactions

After the Smart Card is inserted into the reader:
S. Card 1
Reader
Controller
[ insert card 1
Input Seq.
<=:
Ask for Serial number
[ card identity I
Serial No.
:::::>
Input Seq.
I interrogate Card 1
Input Seq.
c:
Output Seq.
[Validate identity]
Output Seq. :::::.
Transadion Seq.
[ store 1
Transaction Seqs.

5.16.3.

Vendor Transactions
[ daily transactions ]

On-line Transactions

After the Smart Card is inserted into the reader;
S. Card
Reader
Controller
I insert card J
[ card detected I
Input Seq.
c
Ask for Serial number
( card identity 1
Serial No.
:::::.
Response from Card
[ interrogate Card 1
Input Seq.
e::
Interrogation Seq.
[Validate identity]
Output Seq. :::::>
Serial No. +
Interrogation Seq.
I request validation J :::::>
Input Seq.
[ interrogate card copy
Input Seq.
e::
Output Seq.
[ interrogate card I
Input Seq.
e::
Output Seq.

[Validate identity[
Output Seq. =>

[forward [

=>

Input Seq.

Input Seq.

e::

[ compare validation
Response
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[ If Card Valid then
hash of transaction details
else ignore card]
Output Seq.

Input Seq.
<=
[ Card Accepted ]
I Validate transaction ]
Output Seq. :::::>
Input Seq.
[Hash + Validation
+ transaction value]
Output Seq.

5.17.

:::::>

Input Seq.
[ Store Transaction Seq.
For processing]

Conclusions

0

The design is simple, fast and practical to implement.

0

Size of the software is excessive but this may be addressed with hardware and
software methods.

0

Smart Card implementation must address memory limitations.

0

Testing is limited to functional testing or proof of concept testing.

0

Substantial testing of the design may be necessary before production could be
considered

6.
6.1.

Evaluation of Smart Card Function Generator
Introduction

This section addresses the testing and analysis of the data generated by the
proposed method with conclusions. The data will be addressed in sequence and the
testin methods identified and ex lained.

t

• Analyse Test Datal
1

Yl

Graphical
Results
Nurrerical
Results

Figure 6-1 Overview of test program
Figure 6-1 describes the overall test regime. It is noted that substantial testing of
all the characteristics of the design is impractical within the scope of the research.
Consequently, testing of design characteristics will be discussed but will not be
implemented due to time and resource constraints. The principal impediment to
thorough testing is the difficulty of giving a valid proof of thr. security of the method.
Additionally, describing randomness adequately is a non-trivial task owing to the
construction of the randomisers and the methods of using them.

6.2.

Overview or method

The Smart Card is able to accept an input sequence from nny source and is able
to calculate the output sequence according to n variety of algorithms.
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A Secure Hash Function provides nominally unique output sequences from
unique input sequences of varying length. The purpose of the hash function is to
generate a characteristic of the input sequence which can he used to identify the input
sequence and more importantly determine if it has been altered in any way since the
previous hash value was generated. Consequently, it is important for the user to record
the hash value produced as this constitutes a check on the validity of the input
sequence which may be an electronic copy of an agreement.
Parameters which should be tested include Selection Methods for generating
Start Points, Selection Sets and algorithms for generating randomisers. The Input
Sequences, Output Sequences and randomiscrs need to have their respective
characteristics determined and any encryption methods need to be evaluated.
A substantial concern is any correlation between the input and output
sequences. Owing to the large amount of input sequences, in this case 2121:1, it is
infeasible to test any significant portion.

Selection Methods

6.2.1.

In general selection methods must be deterministic (able to be repeated exactly)
but have the characteristic of being unpredictable to any reasonable degree to ensure
security of the method.

6.2.1.1.

Start Points

The calculation of the starting point for the selection algorithm is by taking a
selection of bits from the input sequence and producing an integer value from them.
This process is not limited by the size of the input sequence providing that the input
sequence is of sufficient length, which is as yet undetermined.
For example, should the input be a typical sequence from a secure hash
function, (MDS produces a 128 bit sequence) then the selection of a starting point is
simply a matter of choosing and arranging some of the bits in the input sequence into a
binarv representation of an integer .
.),
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Index

FJpre 6-2 Scatter Plot of --Si8ii.P0intl.
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This selection method can be described as a set, SPI, of integers defining the
order, index and number of the bits to be selected from the input sequence. The
numbers in SPI are integers of nny vnlue and may be repeated producing 'nn unordered
multiset with repetition' {Lew p46). A reasonable practice mny be selecting bits ns n
combination that is 'nn unordered multiset without repetitiun'(l.ewp•l6).
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For example, with I= j01100101010100101001010] (reading from the ldt) and
SPI = j8,3,6,1 L the start point would be '1110' which translates into 14 in the decimal
base. The only limit on the length and values of Sis the amount of time taken in
calculating the start point as any result can be adjusted by the modulo N division of the
number. (N is the length of the randomiscr in use)
An initial test produced 100 16 bit start points from a single selection algorithm
using 100 random input sequences. These results were stored in a file to be processed
by a spreadsheet package.
In figure 6.2, it can be seen that there is very little obvious relationship between
the data plotted. The scatter appears to be random with little correlation between the
individual points. A simple test for relationship consists of sorting the data sequence
and plotting it. A distribution that peaks may indicate a preference for a particular
range of values.
After ordering the generated start points from lowest to highest and graphing
them, the initial sequences showed characteristics that could be percdved as linear.
(refer figure 6.3)

Comparison of Start Point Sequences
70000
60000

,•

!i

..·~

"~

50000

- - RNDSP1 Sorted

40000

- - RNDSP2 Sorted
30000

RNDSP3 Sorted

20000
10000

0 ..
1

8

15

22 29 36 43 50 57 64 71

78

85

92 99

Start Point Number

Figure 6-3 Ordered Sets of 100 Start -Points
The data plotted shows three sequences of start points generated from the same
randomiser but with differing selection sequences. It can be seen that the data appears
to have linearity and the next step was to calculate and plot the regression lines of the
data.
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Regression Line Comparison
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Figure 6-4 Comparison of regression estimate with sorted data
The selection sequences were:
RNDSPI.DAT = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 10, 11, 12, 13,14, 15, 16}
RNDSP2.DAT = {16,15, 14,13, 12, 11, 10,9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1}
RNDSP3.DAT = {59,2,5,103, 123, 107,64,68,69,90,70,35,8,33, 19,78}
where the bits were selected from a sample of 100 random bit sequences of 128
bits in length.
The linearity was checked by performing a linear regression on the data and
plotting the derived regression line with the ordered data sequence.
The data plotted in figure 8.4 shows that the regression line has a close
similarity to the ordered data and constitutes a good approximation of the data
RNDSPI.DAT.
It is considered that any data with a uniform distribution across the range will
display a trace with linearity after it has been sorted.

6.2.2.

Selection Sets

Selection Sets are groups of integers that specify the number of bits to select or
discard during the construction of a random sequence from the randomiser. The size of
the selection set is arbitrary and may range from one to many thousands of integers. It
is considered that a selection set could be created by expanding an exponential or
factorial number and selecting digits from the sequence. For example, there are 158
digits in 1001 and this factorial number may be selected by a combination of bits in the
input sequence.
If the input sequence is uniformly distributed across the sequence space, that is,
each possible sequence is equally likely then the input sequence is assumed to be
random.
A typical input sequence may be 128 bits such ns the output of a hnsh
generator. For example, using a rnndomiser of 1.125HlJ9Q07 • 101 01 hits (2.-• 11 hits) any
50 bits may be used to specify a Start Point. From the remaining 78 hits a spedfic
selection of bits can be used to specify the selection sequence such as I J six bit
number:'! runging between 0 and 63.
Alternatively, a specific selection of20 bits will givt• a numht•r bt'I\\Tt'll 0 nnd
1048575 and this number com·t•l'tl'd into nn cxpont•ntinl ur factorial muld pru\'ldt• n
selection set of rr"!snnnhle h·ngth. A1lditionul\y, tht• tligits m tlw t->~'tiiii'IH't' t'illl bt•
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grouped to give multiple digit numbers. For example, from the sub-sequence 123456,
numbers 1, 23 and 456 can be selected.
There are many possible ways of specifying the next bit to select or discard and
as long as the bits in the randomiser are random then it is expected that the samples
from the randomiser are also random. Consequently, testing the selection set is not
considered necessary.

6.2.3.

Randomisers

Randomisers for use in this system should be as large as possible to permit the
user the greatest freedom in selecting bits. The randomiser should be random or if this
is not possible then it should be indistinguishable from random when it is used.
Generation of randomisers includes deterministic, non-deterministic and hybrid
methods.
Testing randomisers demands a substantial investment in testing. The use of a
randomiser in a cryptographic method requires that the randomness characteristic is as
near perfect as possible. Analysis of this characteristic is not easily achieved and the
amount of knowledge and work necessary to reduce the uncertainty is beyond the scope
of this research.
A simple approach using visual methods was developed with a view to sifting the
test sequences for 'non-randomness'. This method is subjective but very quickly
These flaws include preferences for a
identifies generators that may be flawed.
particular sub-sequence and any sequence that passes these initial tests can then be
analysed with numeric techniques.

6.2.4.

Encryption Methods

At present the only encryption method implemented is a simple stream cipher
though implementation of more complex methods is practical. Hardware
implementations of DES are available and it is considered that a block cipher could be
used with independent sub-keys. (Schneier p295) These sub-keys can be generated
by the processing of the encryption of each block through the selection algorithm to
obtain a new key sequence for the next block.

6.3.

Testing

A Pascal version of MD5 was acquired and modified to run under the 'Turbo
Pascal' development environment. The version from GnomeWorks was written to run
under 'Delphi' and the modifications to run under Turbo Pascal were relating to string
manipulation routines.
The program was modified to read information from a lite of data, perform a
hash to the data and write the hash sequence to a file.
An input text file, 'fred.trn' contains a short summary of transactions generated
by the mythical person 'Fred'. Each line of data includes the date and time of the
transaction, the name of the card holder, the signature sequence of Fred, the name of
the vendor and signature sequence followed by <1 short description of the item and the
price. Date is formatted in two digits for the day, thw:-ce digits for the month nnd two
digits for the year. Time is stored in twenty four hour formnt and tlw timC' zont• is listed
alphabetically with WA time from GMT being ',J'.
For example, 'OIAUG98.J0900 Fred l.td 0123·1S67H9AHCDEF Bill Bluggl'i
ABCDEF0123456789 CommodoreS l'i~dun 3300 rego 123·1Sfl hhu- with grey trim $50'
describes the purchnse of u car by Fn·d from Uillnn tlw first nf august ltJ9H at nint' am
for fifty dollars.

ThiN sequrncr iH hashrd into 'AAE27E·IOJH9.l.15Fb'.!HCCOHIJb1151JF77tlll' antlthili
vnlue i11 unique to the u·unNilction ilti hsted. Thr :u dliHit ·trrs Hit' a ht·.xadt•t·lmal
trant~cription of thr lllllllt'ric lf1 h\'tt' hiiHh vollllt'.
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The hash value of the transaction is processed by the Smart Card to produce an
output sequence '99D 16D302782241~517l313078584Sg6655' which can be retained by
both parties as an authorisation of the transaction. Additionally it can be provided to
the bank as a means of validating the transfer of funds.

6.3.1.

Testing of Output St:ts

The initial concern with generating output sets from a randomiscr is that the
selection method does not alter the samples in any detectable way. This is to
demonstrate the 'Law of Large Numbers' of statistics where the characteristics of a large
group of samples from a population has the characteristics of the population.
Using an eight bit binary sequence from which any four bits will be selected as
an example. To generate all the possible samples from zero to eight bits the complete
range of the binary number is generated from 0 to 2 11 -1 (0 to 255). These are ordered
according to the decimal equivalent. Sorting this array of binary numbers by the
number of ones in the sample and the decimal equivalent gives a listing of all the
possible samples.
no of
cumulative
number of
samples total
bits
sampled

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Table 6-1 Enumeration of Samples

0
8

28
56
70
56
28
8

1

1
9
37
93
163
219
247
255
256

For a complete table see the Appendix 11.18. The table demonstrates that the
average of all the samples is equal to the average of the population in accord with
statistical theory.

6.3.2.
0

Summary

It is accepted that the average of the all possible samples from a population is the
same as the average of the population. With this established, using the average of
a population of samples may characterise an unknown random sequence.

a Using a set of rnndomisers of 10000 bits where a sample of 128 bits is to be
selected, the average of the randomiser is calculated and the average of a set of 128
bit samples is calculated and compared.
0

The use of a set of starting points with each selection set ensures thnt the sequences
are comparable, thnt is usc the same rnndomiscr nnd selection scquencr with only
the starting point varying.

0

It is noted that the average of the samples close-ly approximates tht' average of thr

randomiser and this supports the view that the sampling nwthod dot's nut a!ler the
chnmctcristics of tlw samples.
C

It iA noted thnt n randomist•r <irawu from a nutHlt•tt•rministic sourno may tlisplil)'
similnr charactt•risli('S.

6.3.3.

Encryption Dt'cryption ~h·thod~

It is nnted that nny meHS<tgr from a mt'!iSiagr prot't"HHing s.\'Htrm is nblr 10 pro\•idr
an eavesdropper with information ilhout llu· mrss<IJ.;t' and thr K)'tih"m. Thit~ ~lglnc,'
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parameter of the system is related to the amount of use of the system and not just the
amount of bits generated.
For example, a small number of very long messages may give away less
information than a large number of small messages. This is due to the structure of the
messages which may have similar components such as a business salutation or an
address block.
However, if reasonable limits are placed on the use of the system, the ease with
which a new system can be provided is able to counter the problems of overuse or
compromise.

Summary

6.3.4.
o

Testing may become a major task involving much effort, consequently much
planning is needed to ensure that the results gained are useful and meaningful in
the context of this program.

7.
7 .1.

Recommendations and Conclusions

Introduction

This section lists a selection of possible uses for the Smart Card Design. It is
considered that the design may be useful in applications other than those listed.
Conclusions are listed with reference to the original questions in Chapter 4.
Directions for future research are limited by the lack of validation of the
developmental method. It is practical to implement but without substantial testing and
certification if cannot be used in commercial products.

7.2.
7.2.1.

Recommendations
Driver's Licence

A unique Smart Card may be personalised and assigned to the Driver. Personal
details recorded on the card can identify the lawful user and the electronic serial
numbers can be used in automated data processing systems.
For example, a driver being booked by a Traffic Patrol may be identified by the
personal details on the Smart Card. The card can be identified to the system by the
unique details and the information relating to the traffic offence can be validated by
storing the output sequence which would provide a signature and an authentication of
the identity and transaction. Should the card permanently store details of an offence
then it would be available off-line to any authorised reader.

7.2.2.

Automotive Lease/Lend environment

The use of the Smart Card as a key to validate the identity of the user is
practical. Once the owner of the vehicle has identified the person concerned a unique
Smart Card can be issued that is acceptable to the car computer as permission to use
the vehicle.
The owner ensures that the VMU can recognise the Smart Card. This can be
achieved by ensuring that the VMU has a copy of the randomiser, selection, sets, and
startpoint algorithms and can apply them only to validate a smart card.
During manufacture of the Smart Card, a matched set of 2 or more chips can be
created and one can be hardwired into the VMU. The remaining chips can be
encapsulated into Smart Cards to provide a set of Master Keys to suit the particular
VMU.
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This implies that the Smart Cards arc uniquely and specifically related to a
particular VMU and they can be considered to be a 'certilicatt: of ownership' of the VMU
and, by association, the car.
To ensure the security of.the method, the VMU must be physically secure
against attempts to change the 'Key' chip. In cases where the VMU is encnpsulated in
tamper-resistant materials it may be necessary to change the VMU for maintenance.
The VMU may also include WORM memory which can b1: configured with specific
information such as the engine number or owner details which can provide theft
protection by identifying the components of the car.-;
The Smart Cards, as a certificate of ownership can be used as Master Keys to
permit a User to access all the functions providcd'by,thc VMLJ:, This function can be
used to 'teach' the VMU to recognise another Smart 'card whiCh functions as a limited
session key for a user i.n a lease/hire environment.
·
7.2.2.1.

Complete Copy

If the VMU has a c0mplete copy of the dar·a, it can periodically ask the Smart
Card to prove its identity by as~:ing 'If you are Card XYZ then what is your answer to
Question ABC' and wait for a response. The VMU will generate it's own answer after the
challenge and response and compare them. If there is a match the smart card is
acceptable and the use can continue. If there is no match the VMU can repeat the
interrogation until at some stage the transaction is stopped.

This may detect
removed.

sub~~ttution

of an alternate card after the authorised card is

The Owner generates two copies of a subordinate Smart Card and installs one
subordinate Smart Card in the VMU which is unable to be removed without damaging
it.
The Master Smart card can authorise the VMU to store identification details of
the subordinate Smart Card in case it is altered or swapped. With this copy of the
subordinate Smart Card installed, the VMU can then validate any access and use of the
vehicle with the other subordinate Smart Card.
7.2.2.2.

Incomplete Copy.

The VMU keeps a table of questions and responses from the Smart Card and
selects from it at random to validate the User's Card.
This method may not be very secure, but further research may resolve this issue.

7 .2.3.
7.2.3.1.

Electronic Commerce Environment
Large transactions on-line by default

If minimum and t'naximum amounts are defined for a transaction then a Smart
Card can be used to authenticate transactions. Transactions below the minimum limit
can be processed off-line to permit the use in all conditions. Transactions above the
maximum limit can be recorded but not processed to provide evidence of attempted
misuse.

All transactions above the minimum limit must be processed on-line to minimise
the possibility of fraud. The security can be enhanced by the bank interrogating the
Smart Card during the transaction and ensuring that the card answers multiple
interrogations to limit the possibility of falsely identifying a card.
All transactions above the daily transaction limit can be validated by a Bank
Employee where the image of the user is stored and compared against the details of the
person presenting the card. This may become a mandatory requirement for
transactions above a certain limit.
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Fraud would be possible if the smart card could be copied by recording and
playing back the answers to particular interrogation sequences. If the interrogation
sequences arc random then the chance of predicting om~ in1crrogation sequence is
small. If multiple random interrogations nre used then the Smart Card must generate
multiple complete replies. If the reply is 128 bits long then three sequences would be
384 bits (48bytes) enhancing the security of the method.
The attempted fraud must predict beforehand what the three interrogation
sequences are and gcnemte the correct responses to return. This can he only
accomplished by determining the structure and contents of the Smart Card and the
startpoint, sdcction set and randomiscr used.
Examination by recording all the inputs and outputs is impractical due{~ the
amount of time necessary to obtain enough information to reconstruct the function
generator. Sophisticated tools to examine the internal structure of the Smart Card may
not be generally available.
Restricted access to the card would be achieved either by limiting the amount of
uses or by limiting the amount of time before the card is declared lost or stolen. A card
reported lost or a card subject to invalid access attempts can be incapacitated. A card
reported lost and incapacitated then found again must be reactivated by the legitimate
user.
A card may be incapacitated either completely or partially. Partial
incapacitation may mean that the card can perform a limited number of low value
transactions such as buying a public transport ticket but not perform transactions
above a certain limit. This would permit a legitimate user to use a card until it can be
re-validated at a bank office and reinstated.
If the card is stolen and the pin number is also obtained, then once the card can
be reported stolen then all transactions with it can be stopped. Additionally, on-line
transactions could be used to trace the location of the card and off-line transactions
would limit the amount of losses incurred.

7 .2.3.2.

Small transactions off-line by. default

With small transactions, below a specified limit , the vendor can record the
details. Each transaction would be processed at the end of the day gathering these
small amounts of data.
Transactions less than a specified amount can be performed off-line. A Card
Used to pay for public transport usage would generate identification and output
sequences in response to a question. The question (input sequence) could identify the
date and time of the transaction as well as the costing details. Periodically, the
transport company can process the stored information and update its balances with the
banks.
A public transport corporation may issue these cards as an account card similar
in use to a credit card with a monthly statement being issued.

7.2.4.

Access to Secure Areas

A pair of Identical Cards can be produced during manufacture. The issuing
authority keeps one and issues the other to an identified person. The retained card can
be kept as a reference library for the computer controlling the access systems.
Once the authorising card is removed from the library then the identification
card cannot be used to access the system. This may prevent a stolen card from being
used to unlawfully access premises. Should an employee leave the company without
returning the card it poses no threat to the security of the system as long as the issuing
authority removes the authorising card from the !ibrary.
The pair of cards must be functionally identical but may have different sizes.
The identification card may be the usual size for an identification document and the
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authorising card may be physically smaller to fit a card fmmc. However, if both cards
are identical in shape and have the photograph of the user imprinted then the card
frame may provide a visual reference to the authorised users.

7.2.5.

Identification.

Usc as an idcntificalion nrtcfact depends on being able to link the card with the
user. Imprinting an image of the user on the card exterior can readily be achieved but
the use of digitised images may take up too much of the Smart Card's memory. A
method mentioned in 'New Scientist' suggests that a method of encoding a face into
about 50 bytes of data may be suitable for usc on magnetic stripe cards.(New Scientist)
This could be implemented easily in a Write Once Read Many (WORM) memory location
permitting a Smart Card to store an image of the user internally.
The User's face is recreated by superimposing digitised images from a library of
290 faces. The library of images is not stored on the card. The composite face is
specified by the images. used to construct it and this sequence is stored on the card.
This may add to the security of using the card by permitting a picture of the
lawful user to be displayed for comparison or record keeping purposes. Additionally,
unless a universal standard library is used it may not be possible for a hacker to
recreate or modify an image without the original database.

7.2.6.

.,

Link Encryption in noisy environments.

"

Using a pair of cards as a link encryption method is practical in an environment
where noise can corrupt a signal. Cable-less transmissions such as infra-red remote
transmitters could use encrypted sequences of commands or instructions. Any
sequence that does not decrypt to a valid message would be ignored by the system until
it is re-sent and decrypted correctly.
If the sequence ts encrypted differently a number of times then the receiver must
ensure that it decrypts to a valid command before responding. This ensures that crosstalk and interference from other transmitters in the area has a minimum effect.
Superimposing two or more dissimilar signals at the same frequency may
produce a detectable sequence but not every receiver may decode the signal sensibly. If
the Pulse Repetition Frequency (PRF) of transmitter A differs slightly from the PRF of
transmitter B then the production of erroneous signals would be reduced. Changing the
fundamental frequencies of both signals would enable the erroneous signals produced
by beating to be detected.
In figure 7.1, signals A and Bare superimposed to produce signal C. Signal C
may be a valid sequence subject to misinterpretation by the system. If Signal A and
Signal B are encrypted differently a number of times in sequence then the occurrence of
a meanin ful su erim osition would be less like! •.

Figure 7·1 Superimpoaitlon of Signal•
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7.2.7.

Stream Cipher Application

A development of the stream encryption method is lo usc larger randomisers
such as families of compact discs and the rotation and conc<c~tenation algorithm. This is
a most effective method of generating nnd encrypting a mes:mge.

7.2.8.

One Time Pad

A Smart Card FG may be used to generate a key sequence for a cryptognlphic
algorithm. As long as the FG is only used once then the method is provably secure. A
single FG may be used as a private key to an asymmetric method of encrypting Personal
data for storage. A matched set of FG's can be used for secure communications in a
symmetric method.

7.2.9.

Digital Photographs

A digital image may be authenticated by a matched pair of Smart Cards. The
image and its hash value can be appended to the card. The hash value input sequence
can be stored with its output sequence as protection against the image being changed
unilaterally.

7.2.10.

Documentation verification

A function generator may be bonded into or on a hard copy of a legal document
in such a way that removing or tampering with it will destroy its functions. The
function generator may then provide an output sequence to the document's hash
sequence and this Seal Sequence can be inscribed in the document signature or seal
portion.
The originator of the document can retain the random input and output
sequences of the FG to identify the artefact. This prevents the document being altered
without knowledge by substituting a new document and FG.
If the FG fails to
function or produces an incorrect sequence then the document may not be acceptable.
However, the document can be authenticated by the original issuers and a replacement
issued.
Hierarchical signatures are '"'here a supervisor signs a document prepared by
subordinates who have identified their contributions to the document by a signature.
To sign the document, the seal sequence and the serial number of the respective
FG are concatenated and the hash sequence is computed and may be inscribed on the
document. The hash sequence produces an output sequence from the signer's FG
which is appended to the signature portion.
The Hash sequence and Output Sequence then constitute a 'signature' or Seal
sequence on the document attesting to its integrity. The document can then be tested
for alterations.
An auditor can regenerate the hash sequence and ensure that the FG attached
to the document has produced a specific output sequence. This hash sequence can be
used to generate an output sequence from the auditor's Seal which can be appended to
the document.
A document may be stored on a Smart Card in permanent memory. The hash
value of the document can be used to generate an output sequence from the FG to
provide a validR!ion of the document.
Additionally, the VLSI or other implementation of the proposed algorithm may be
incorporated into the structure of the document in such a way that tampering with the
document will destroy the device.
It is considered that a 'Seal' may also be associated with a position rather than a
person in the manner of corporate seals
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7.2.11.

Security Seals

Additionally, VLSI or other implementations or the algorithm may be
incorporated into artefacts as a 'Seal' or proof mark. For example, a Sm'art Card or
other implementation could be permanently bonded across the gap between a container
and the container door. Opening the door would destroy the Seal and replacing it
would be- very difficull when only the legitimate user knows the details of its
construction.

7.2.12.

Anonymous Identification

Unilateral Anonymous Identification can be achieved by using a unique FG.
Any person able to produce an input and output sequence for the FG is able to prove
that they have had access to the FG. Personal details are not necessary.
For example, a security patrol supervising a set of premises must be able to
prove attendance at specific times. The patrol uses one FG to prove they have attended
the premises by allowing the security system on the premises to interrogate the FG and
store the results. This may also be reciprocal in that the patrol can interrogate the
security system FG and store the results.
For example, an artefact may use an attached unique FG for identification and
its responses to interrogation can prove that the artefact has been seen by an auditor.
Every auditor can randomly interrogate an FG and store an output sequence and this
means that each auditor can obtain a unique 'proor of the Seal's integrity which need
not be shared or made known.
For example, a password may require a specific number of consenting
'signatures' for access to bank accounts. Each person can then take the account
identification sequence and process it through their personal FG. These output
sequences can be used as a password directly or they can processed provide an input
sequence to the artefact's FG and if this matches the password then the access is
permitted.
Bilateral Anonymous Identification can be achieved with two unique FG's. For
example, two parties may use the FG output sequences to identify themselves to each
other and these details can be provided to others as proof that they have communicated.
Knowledge of the input and output sequences of an FG can be used to identify
an unknown person. For example, a treasure hunt where the prize is an FG which has
had its details stored by the convenor of the hunt prior to it being hidden. If the correct
FG is found then it can be verified for prize giving purposes.
For example, multiple copies of an identification Smart Card may have the image
of the user embossed on it. If the card has an access password to initialise it then it
can be used to authenticate access requests. The user initiates the access request by
placing the card in a reader which may be accompanied by the user's password. The
secure access control system identifies the Smart Card by its serial number and
supplies a random interrogation sequence to the card and stores the response.
Comparison of the output sequence with the output sequence from the copy of the card
in the secure area can be used to approve access.

7.3.

Conclusions

What are the characteristics of a Users, F, Resources, G, and levels, H, access
environment and which authentication model, if any, could effectively represent this
relationship in a real-time, distributed computing environment?
Each relationship is characterised by a triplet (F, G, H) which describes the User,
Resource and Access level. A manager must identify the user and define the resources
and levels of access appropriate. A single user may have multiple access triplets. The
triplets (Fl,Gl,Hl), (Fl,G2,H2) identify multiple resources and access permissions. The
triplets (Fl, G3, H3), (Fl, G3, H4) identify th~ different options within a specific
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resource. For example, for accounting purposes where one triplet describes work use
and the other describes the personal usc.
The authentication model proposed is bused on lht: 'Challenge- l~esponsc'
model and addresses the identification and authentication of the individual users,
resources and constrnints where the User or Resource is in possession of information
which must be provided on demand. A User is identified by the Owner who issues an
artefact which identifies and authenticates the usc of the resource. Identifying the user
to the resource is effected by the Smart Card which serves as an identification and
authentication artefact. If the Smart Card is unique it is practical to assign a specific
card to a User and subsequently identify the User and all transactions made with it.
The distributed environment may entail on-line and off-line transactions which
will demand secure, reliable transactions. The use of the 'Challenge - Response' model
in a transaction record enables all involved in the transaction to obtain a unique record.
1. Posith·e identification of the Smart Card and the Authorised User of the card is
achieved by creating a unique Smart Card. The card characteristics arc recorded
with the details of the authorised User and are used to validate transactions both offline and on-line. Secure transmission and storage of information will minimise the
possibilities of fraud or breach of privacy. The unique characteristics of the Smart
Card can be used to provide cryptographic protection of all data in the system.
2. Authentication of a User can be carried out by verifying the identity of the Smart
Card, The embossed external serial number of the card may be a first-line
identification and the second line could be an internal serial number.. Additionally,
the Smart Card may provide specific answers to varied questions in a 'Challenge Response' model, where the card must provide specific answers to a varied set of
questions.
3. Validation of Transactions can be performed either on-line or off-line. The hash
code of the transaction summary can be used to stimulate the Smart Card to
produce a unique sequence which can be used to prove that a particular transactionwas authorised by a specific Smart Card. Security of the method needs to be
carefully examined. Initial data indicates the method is provably secure under
restrictive conditions and conditionally secure under the most likely conditions.
4. Investigation into the requirements of authentication and digital signatures to
determine the technical considerations that may have a bearing on the security of
the proposed model.
5. A digital signature must be substantially secure against fraudulent actions and very
difficult to forge. Any signature algorithm must be provably one-to-one and unique.
A unique Smart Card can embody a signature generation algorithm that can ensure
the signature generated is particularly unlikely to be generated by another card with
the same input. Smart Card construction techniques may make each Smart Card
unique. Additionally, determining the characteristics of the card by disassembly
should be destructive.
6. Implementation strategies must include secure manufacture and distribution of new
cards.
User strategies must include card identification methods, personalisation
methods and secure access methods. The existence of a global network of electronic
information systems makes the proposal effective.
Cheap, bulk manufacturing of
cards with variety to suit different applications.
0

What requirements are necessary for untamperable electronic data storage for short
and long term storage to assist in resolution of disputes in the transaction cycle?

1. Memory devices must be physically and electrically robust and securely installed.
The data may be encrypted prior to storage to prevent the data being intentionally
altered by illegal access. Altered data may not be decrypted in a meaningful way
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which would indicate that data has been altered. l!:ncryption makes the problem of
intentionally altering the relevant data bits substantially difficult.
2. Memory access methods must be secure to permit access for reading or writing by
authorised users. Audit of Data to determine its value and storage needs. Data
must be auditable and able to be validated by the card and the user. Flash Memory
is considered suitable for this proposal due to its long term power-off data retention
(20 years). Low Power versions may use as little as 3 volts where the vehicle
electrical system provides a nominal 12 volts.
3. The card must be resistant to misuse and abuse. Probing with sophisticated
electronic devices must be very difficult after construction and pcrsonalisation. Data
must be encrypted with an algorithm as strong as necessary to ensure that the data
is secure in Htorage and transmission. A stream cipher would be suitable depending
on the qualiti.es of the key generation method.
4. Access to the card may be from password 1 PIN number retained by the user.
There should only be one password for each card at a time. A manufacturer should
not implement any global passwords for a card series as this would weaken the
security of the system. Personal data kept on the card in secure memory and any
information that uniquely identifies the user may be used. A photographic image of
the user may be stored for recording and comparison by the vendor during certain
transactions.
5. The amount of data to be stored depends on the construction of the prototype
systems. This depends on the amount of sensors, rate of data reading and the
methods of data processing. Eg. Compression, encryption etc. Business
requirements may require data to be stored for at least seven yt ars for taxation and
audit purposes
6. Physical threats such as intentional or accidental damage where the memory chips
need to survive a major accident and fire where the vehicle is completely destroyed.
Electrical faults intentional or othenvise may affect the integrity of the data. Static
electricity and high voltages from ignition systems may corrupt data or damage the
memory chips. Electronic threats include hacking against the administration
system. Eavesdropping on the data by unauthorised persons can be countered with
secure transmission techniques which include cryptographic protection.
7. What data from the operation of a prototype is of importance in effecting the
proposal and which security issues need to be addressed?
8. Memory requirements, speed of operation and reliability data is. essential.
Identification of the U"3er prior to issuing the card and identificar.ion of the card in
use. Authentication of each use of the resource. Secure storage of all data.
Memory size and type, processing speed and data transfer speed.
9. Algorithms chosen to implement the system. Externally, embc~smg and proprietary
data such as logos. Internally, serial numbers and access algorithms. If the issuer
interrogates the card with an random sequence, the reply must match the issuer's
generated reply or the card may be considered unacceptable and any transaction
could be ignored. After identifying the User by the Issuer, a card can be
programmed with personal details of the User. A picture may be embossed on the
outside and stored inside as well. If a unique Smart Card is assigned to a particular
User then the User is identified by the Card details.
10. The use of memory technologies such as the WORM memory may permit an issuer
to hard-code the identification details such as a picture of the user. Ease of
manufacture, update and modification where a manufacturer or issuer should be
able to personalise a number of cards. A matched set of cards may be used as a
party key.
11. Large scale manufacture could bring the costs of the Cards down and permit many
additional uses. Reliability where a Card must repeatedly generate the same output
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sequence for the same input sequence.
use.

Controls on the Card should be simple to

12. ['ositive identification of the card by the internal and external characteristics. The
user is identified by the additional details stored on the card and the knowledge of
privileged information such as the password of the care].
13. A stream cipher may be efficiently implemented in the limited space available and

must be at least conditionally secure. The proposal is provably secure if it used only
once and discarded. Multiple usc means that the stream cipher is conditionally
secure. The de~ign meets this requirement. The proposal may be used to generate a
key for a block cipher such as DES or may be used to provide public key details,
accessible only to the authorised user. Both stream and block methods may be
implemented on a Smart Card, however, the limitations are data transfer rate and
memory size, coupled to processing speed.
14. The proposed method can be implemented on the Smart Card and may require Jess
than 3 kilobytes of data depending on randomiser s1ze. Measurements of the
security are complex and may be substantially outside the scope of this research.
However, the method is provably secure under single use and conditionally secure
under multiple use conditions.
15. Use of proprietary protocols to identify the user before the card is issued are
practical. For, example, SET and Lite-SET exist to handle funds transfer. User
identification can be broken down into artefacts and information. Artefacts such as
Smart Cards with unique characteristics can be recognised by the system as being
genuine and acceptable. Information includes pin number, image matching and
possibly even biometric methods of identifying the user. The use of hash value and
identification sequences from the smart card are used to positively identify a
transaction. The hash value is input into a function generator and the output
sequence from the card is stored. The storage of these two pieces of information can
be used to check on the validity of a copy of the transaction.
16. Secure transmission methods as all data must be transferred and stored securely.
As all system information may be of use to the unauthorised person the data must be
either validated or encrypted to ensure that modification or error has been detected
before use. Unique Smart Cards or sets of Smart Cards matched at time of
manufacture.
17. Protocols to identify users and transfer funds are generally outside the scope of this
thesis. The transaction descriptions list the basis for a protocol design which would
need development and formal proof before it could be used. A unique Smart Card
used as a Function Generator (FG) provides a method of generating a unique output
sequence from a unique input sequence.

18. The input sequence may be the hash value of a transaction. The output sequence
is unique to the FG and related to the input sequence. The output sequence can be
recorded as an authorisation for the transfer of funds.

19. As the Smart Card issuer retains a copy of its details, the start point, selection
algorithms and the Randomiser, then reconstruction of any output sequence is
possible by applying the input sequem:e. Transaction details, hash value and output
sequence are used to recreate the output sequence for comparison with the supplied
sequence. A match between the supplied output sequence and the recreated output
sequence means the tran3action can be approved.
·i·"
·.·.''

,'

20. Every party to an agreement may use a FG to generate unique sequences.

Subsidiary sections of the contract can be signed with a particular sequence from its
contributors and all participants may keep the final hash value. If a disagreement
arises the contract must be hashed again and compared against the stored hash
value. Identification of a Smart Card by its serial number and its response to specific
interrogation sequences permits the Smart Card, and by association its User, to be
identified to other parties.
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7.4.

Directions for Future Research

The research has shown that it is practicnl to produce a Smart Card to provide
authentication, identification, secure communications and data logging. Directions for
further research arc constrained by one key factor, namely, the evaluation of the level of
security provided by the developmental algorithm.
While the goal is 'unco~'ditional' security, many commercially acceptable
algorithms are 'computationally·.: secure in that the data, processing or storage
requirements and complexity of'thc algorithm are infeasible. (Schneier ppS-9)
'Provable Security' depends alrri'Ost entirely on complex. theoretical mathematics as the
magnitude of the ana\y)>is may exceed even the most remarkably equipped researcher.
Consequently, this is outside the scope of this Master's thesis and may pose substantial
questions to more experienced researchers.
Should the developmental algorithm provide provable security in the sense of
being acceptable for use in Electronic Commerce then development of the suggested
applications are described in the Recommendations section.

8.
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Appendices

9.

9.1.

Sensor Integration Levels

(BOSCH93 p 103)

Legend.
SE - Sensors
SA - Signal Processing (analog)
AD- Analog-digital con\'ertcr
SG - Control Unit
MC- Microcomputer

Icontrol Unit (ECV) I

!Transmission Path

Susceptible
SA

Com•entional

!Integration Lc\'el

m er crencc
(analog)

11

I I 1/o

jintegration Level

!Integration Level

SE

31

SA

I I Vol
SE

SA

Buo

Interference

Compatible

Proof
(Digital)

SG

Bus
MC :

Compatibl

e
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9.2.

Engine Types and Classifications

IBOSCH93 p 352)

Type of Process

Opt;n Process
Internal Combustion
Combustion gas -working medium

Closed Process
l!:xtcrnal
Combustion
Combustion gas
i· working medium
Phase change in
working medium
No

Tvue of Combustion
Tvpe of Ignition
Enclosed Working
Chamber
Turbine
Type of Mixture

Cvclic Combustion
External Ignition
Auto~ign
Diesel
Hybrid
OttoCvcle

-

-

Heterogenous

-

I Yes

\ Continuous Combustion
Rohs

Stirling

Hot Steam
Heterogenous

Gas

Steam
Steam

Homogeneous
In combustion chamber
In a continuous fla.me

Table 9·1 Classification of Engine Types
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9.3.

Overvi~w

of Semiconductor Memory Devices
(Hm;diiJ3 p%)

I
I

~~micunductnr

M!•umry

I
Volatile Memory

I

Non-vu!ntile Memory

j

.:·.

_., •'

I

JProgrmumed by User

Programmed in
mm1ufacturc

I
Static
Memory

Dynamic
Memory

Programmed
while installed

Programmed on
programming
...l~,.;nn

/Non-erasable/

I

Standard
Types

1

Erasable

Special
Types

Special
Types

Standard
Types

Pago

Mode

I

SRAM

ZRAM

Static

Zero
Power

RAM

RAM

I
'Bipolar

ROM

Read
Only
Memory

I

PROM
Programmable
Read only
memory

I
(C) MOS

II

I
Erased with
uv Light

DTP

One time
programmable
EROM
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I

I

DPR
Dual
Port
RAM

I
Ecasod
Electrically

Nibble Static
Mode column
Mode

FIFO VRAM DRAM
First in Video Dynamic
first
RAM
RAM
out

I

EPROM
FLASH
EEPROM
Erasable
EPROM Electrically
erasable
programmable
PROM
ROM
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9.4.

Information Security Objectives

(Menezes, Van Oorschot and Vanstone p3)
Privacy or Confidentiality
Data integrity
entity authentication or identification
message authentication
Signature
Authorisation
Validation
Access control
Certification
Time stamping
Witnessing
receipt
confirmation
Ownership
Anonymity
non-repudiation
Revocation

keeping information secret from all but
those who arc authorised to sec it.
ensuring information has not been
allered by unauthorised or unknown
means
corroboration of the identity of an entity
(e.g. a person, a computer terminal, a
credit card etc.)
corroborating the source of information;
also known as data origin
authentication
a means to bind information to an entity
conveyance, to another entity, of official
sanction to do or be something
a means to provide timeliness of
authorisation to use or manipulate
information or resources.
restricting access to resources to
privileged entities
endorsement of information by a trusted
entity
recording the time of creation or
existence of information
verifying the creation or existence of
information by an entity other than the
creator
acknowledgment that information has
been received
acknowledgement that services have
been provided
a means to provide an entity with the
legal right to use or transfer a resource
to others.
concealing the identity of an entity
involved in some process.
preventing the denial of previous
committments or actions.
retraction of certification or
authorisation.

Table 9·2 Some Information security objectives
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9.5.

Smart Card Specifications

(Hendry p 106)

Application
Phone Card

Eurochip
2nd

Manufacturer
ODS (Siemens
chip!
Philips

.

Processor

ROM
16 bits

PROM
56 bits

6805

6 kb

-

SGS-Thomson

6805

-

Gem plus

6805

16 +
1.5 kb
8 kb

So laic

8051

8+2
kb

-

Philips

8051

20 kb

Generation
public
telephony
GSM

telephonv
Bank
!credit/debit!
Health I
Secure
Payments
Computer

.

-

Access

Table 9·3 Sample Card Specifications
Application

RAM

EEPROM

Coprocessor

Phone Card

-

32 bits

-

Security
Features
Included
security
logic;

countdown
onl •
128 bytes

I kb

-

GSM telephony

384 bytes

8 kb

Arithmetic

Bank (credit debit)
Health f Secure
Pavments
Computer Access

-

Arithmetic
Crypto (RSA)

.

256 bytes

1 - 8 kb
2.5 kb

640 bytes

8 kb

Crypto {fast
exponentiation)

Low
frequency
and voltage

Eurochip

2nd Generation
public telephony

randomised
response
times; low
frequency
protected
Address
scrambling

-

sensors
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9.6.

Entity Relationship diagrams
VAMP- Top Level Diagram 01.0 Ownership

I

(owner

[vehicle

Master
Card

Ownership
1.
2.
3.

Owner with legal ownership of Vehicle
Owner Has Master Card to Vehicle
Master Card has Vehicle

Note. At present, it is assumed that there exists a form of Master
Card for the Vehicle which serves as a certificate of ownership and
gives complete access to all functions of the control system.

1,1 '
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VAMP - Top Level Diagram 01.1 Transfer of Ownership

(owner

(vehicle

[Card

!Agreement to

New

Owner

Transfer of Ownership
1.
Owner and New Owner reach agreement about sale of
Vehicle
2.
Owner cedes Master Card to New Owner
New Owner has Master Card
3.
4.
Master Card has Vehicle

Note. At present, it is assumed that there exists a form of Master
Card for the Vehicle which serves as a certificate of ownership and
gives complete access to all functions of the control system.
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VAMP - Top Level Diagram 01.2 New Card Preparation

Iowns
!owner

!recognise

I

[New

Issue of Vehicle

1.
2.

Owner with legal ownership of Vehicle
Owner uses Master Card to prepare the Vehicle to accept

New

Card

3.
4.
5.

Owner has New Card and allocates it to the car
Vehicle recognises New Card
New Card has Vehicle

Edith Cowan University
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VAMP- Top Level Diagram 02.0 Lease Agreement

Iowns
[owner

!Agreement to

Issue of Vehicle

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Owner with legal ownership of Vehicle
Owner assigns New Card to Vehicle (refer 0 1.2)
Owner and User reach agreement about use of Vehicle
Owner assigns New Card to User
User has New Card
New Card has Vehicle

108
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VAMP- Top Level Diagram 02.1 Lease Hesolution

!Accents

[owner
','

ignores

[replaces [

[unassig [

(Old Card J

(user

Return of Vehicle

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Owner and User reach agreement about return of Vehicle
Owner accepts Vehicle
Owner assigns New Card to Vehicle (refer 0 1.2)
Owner unassigns Old Card from Vehicle
New Card replaces Old Card
Vehicle ignores Old Card

Note. The Old Card can be retained as a receipt or advertising
material and may be destroyed or retained by either owner or user.
The assumption is that all Cards are unique and no information is
able to be determined about the cards

Edith Cowan University
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VAMP- Top Level Diagram 02.2 Lease Extension

(vehicle

[old Card J

jassigns

J

jreplaces j

J

[user

Extension of Lease of Vehicle
1.
2.
or
3.
4.
6.
7.
8.

Owner and User reach agreement about extension of lease
Owner Reassigns Old Card to Vehicle
Owner assigns New Card to Vehicle (refer 0 1.2)
New Card replaces Old Card
User has New Card
New Card has Vehicle
Vehicle ignores Old Card

Note. The Old Card can be retained as a receipt or advertising
and may be destroyed or retained by either owner or user. The
assumption is that all Cards are unique and no information is able
to be determined about the cards

Edith Cowan University
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VAMP- Top Level Diagram 03.0 Buying and Selling

!offer and

[seller
[Identifies Self [

(Receipt

jdescribe

j

[Article

Buying and Selling
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Buyer offers and Seller Accepts Offer
Seller Identification on receipt
Buyer Identification on receipt
Seller provides Transaction details
Buyer provides Payment details
Electronic copy of Details to Seller
Receipt describes Transaction and Article (refer 03.1)
Paper copy to Buyer
Seller cedes Article to Buyer

Ill
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VAMP- Top Level Diagram 03.1 Receipt Processing

Seller Identity

Buyer Identity
Payment

Electronic Receipt

lv<llirll'ltinn

Paper Receipt

!Transaction

jValidatio )

Generate a Receipt
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Seller Identification on Receipt
Seller provides Transaction details on Receipt
Buyer Identification on Receipt
Buyer provides Payment details on Receipt
Receipt provides Transaction details to Validation process
Validation Process returns Validation details to Receipt
Receipt describes Transaction and Article
Electronic copy of Details and Receipt to Seller
Paper copy of Receipt to Buyer

Edith Cowan University
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------------

..•.

-- --·-

VAMP- Top Level Diagnun 03.2

--------------~

f~cccipt

/validation

Transaction Details

'

Processing

·'

/Transaction

lsignatur

I

Digital
Signatur

Receipt Processing

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Transaction details from Receipt
Transaction details to Secure Hash process
Hash result returned
Hash to Digital Signature process
Digital Signature returned

Validation details to Receipt

Edith Cowan University
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VAMP- Top Level Diagram 04.1 AcccsH Control

(control (

Iaccess
(card
!Identifies

(user

Granting Access

1.
2.
3.
4.

Authority controls access to premises
Authority assigns Card to premises
User Identified to Authority
Authority assigns Card to User

5.
6.

User has Card
Card has access to premises

Edith Cowan University
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VAMP- Top Level Diagn.tm 04.2 Access Control

jcontrol
{Premises]

(Authority}
]From

j Junassig

[Ignores

Surrenders
or

!Refuses

I

Keens

(user

Terminates Access
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Authority controls access to premises
Authority refuses User access
Authority unassigns Card from User
Authority unassigns Card from Premises
Premises ignores Card
User surrenders or keeps Card

Edith Cowan University
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VAMP· Top Level Diagram 05.0 Signature

jNcgotiat

I

jParty A

Smart

Smart

Card A

Card 8

Hash &
authenticatio

Hash &

authentication
sequence

n sequence

Hash

Algorithm

Signature
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Party A and Party B reach agreement
Party A and Party B have unique Smart Cards
A and B append a card signature to the agreement
The agreement is hashed
The hash value is used to generate an Authentication Sequence.
The hash and authentication sequences are stored by both parties
for reference.
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9. 7.

Random Noise Sampler

This design was provided by Mr. G. Robbins, Research Support Engineer, Edith Cowan
University.

'\

v
Radio
Receiver

Serial
Port
Voltage
Limiter

_L

/_-

If
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9.8.

Calculation of Large Factorials and Exponentials

9.8.1.

Comparison of Results for Factorial Calculations.

A comparison of results gained by Stirling's Method and the Sequential
Summation method shows that, in general, Scqucnti<Il Summation produces results
___greater than the results g~incd with Stirling's .')pproximation.
Logarithmic
Stirling
101
3.5986956250E+OO 6
3.6288000000 * 10 "6
11!
3.9916800000. 10 A7
3.9615625127E+OO 7
121
4.7900160000. 10 A8
4.7568748747E+OO 8
6.2270208002 • 10 A9
13!
6.1872394893E+OO 9
8.7178291203. 10 A1Q
8.666100 1955E+OO 10
14!
1.3076743680. 10 A12
1St
1.3004307256E+OO 12
2.0922789888 ' 10 A13
2.0814114472E+OO 13
16!
3.5568742811 * 10 A14
3.5394832971E+OO 14
17!
6.4023737057' 10 A15
18!
6.372~046458E+OO 15
191
1.2164510041 * 10 "17
1.2111278698E+OO 17
2.4329020081'10A18
2.4227868550E+OO 18
201
2.6525285982 • 10 A32
2.6451709723E+OO 32
30!
8.1591528323.
10
'47
40!
8.1421726985E+OO 47
3.0414093197. 10 '64
3.0363446196E+OO 64
50!
8.3094383964E+OO 81
601
8.3209871117. 10 '81
1.1978571669. 10
1.1964320185E+OO 100
70!
"100
7.1569457061. 10
7.1494945686E+OO 118
80!
1\118
1.4857159644. 10
1.4843409665E+OO 138
90!
"138
9.3326215494 • 10
9.3248477868E+OO 157
1001
A1S7
1.5882455416. 10
1.5870428136E+OO 178
110!
A178
6.6895029130. 10
6.6848591871E+OO 198
1201
'198
6.4668554867. 10
6.4627115428E+OO 219
1301
A2}9
1.3462012447. 10
1.3454002075E+OO 241
1401
A241

Table 9-4 Comparison of Logarithmic and Stirling's Approximation
It is noted that Stirling underestimates the value of the fac~orial compared against the
logarithmic method and it is suggested that the logarithmic method is a more accurate
method of generating large factorials.

9.8.1.1.

Calculation by Integer Methods

Comparing Direct Calculation with Sequential Summation shows occasions
where the results differ and this is due to the methods of generating logarithms on the
computer. Logarithms are approximations of a number where speed of calculation is
more important than accuracy. The user must define suitable error levels when using
logarithms to calculate large numbers.
It is considered that Integer methods of calculating large factorials are more
accurate but substantially slower to use. Above a certain number, the ability to check
the accuracy of the Integer method becomes difficult and may be infeasible unless
another method becomes available.
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•

=

1307674368000
20922789888000

>
<

19!

>

121645100408832000

20!
>
<

11

15894272

<
<
1Q81

70!

1.1978571669.

<

lQlOO

•

>

<

556996128468876694221686370498539309406
587654599213137088405964561723446997811
>
10157

526816992388562667004907
159682643816214685929638952175999932299
156089414639761565182862536979208272237
582511852109168640000000000000000000000

Table 9-5 Comparison of Logarithmic and Direct Calculation
The logarithmic result differs from the Integer result after 8 decimal places and
this is considered to be due to the methods of generating logarithms. More accurate
methods of generating logarithms by direct calculation were not considered even though
the algorithm is relatively simple.

Edith Cowan University

119
11/12/99

I
Development of a Model for Smart Card Based Access Control in Multi-User, MultiResource, Multi-Level Access Systems
In general, logarithms umJercstimatc a-nurnbc·ru·nlcSs the comp\cle logHrithm of a number is used in calculation. For example, Pi is irralional and most calculators
give Pi as 3. t 41592654 and the logarithm of Pi to I he base I 0 HS 0.497149872. A
truncated value of Pi means that the numbers generated underestimate the correct
value.
Logarithmic methods arc quicker to implement hut limited by the numeric
representation of 11oating point numbers on the computer which appear accurate only to
eight decimal places.

9.8.2.
Calculation of Large Binary Numbers by Integer
Multiplication
Large exponentials are calculated in entirety and listed in the table below.
Each number is displayed in the following form : exponent of 2 ; calculated value

038837035105112493612249319837881569585812759467291755314682
518714528569231404359845775746985748039345677748242309854210
746050623711418779541821530464749835819412673987675591655439
460770629145711964776865421676604298316526243868372056680693
76
Table 9·6 Integer Calculation of Powers of Two
Modest values for N produce substantial values of 2N and the level of accuracy
available is considered to be in excess of any reasonable requirements.
It is noted that where n is a multiple of 20 the last two digits of the number are
76 and where n is a multiple of 10 the last two numbers are 24.

9.9.

Visual Testing

9.9.1.

Single Bit Sequences

The program is called 'LWALKl.PAS' which displays the results of 10 runs of a
single bit generator in graphical form. A composite display created from summing the
individual values of the runs characterises the output of the randomiser.
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Multi~bit

9.9.2.

Sequences

The Program is called 'DWC.PAS' and includes a library file called 'DWI.JB.PAS'.
The implementation performs tests up to four bits on a random generator.
The program includes input and output file handling, printing of the results and
trace. Input parameters include choice of target shape and size, number of test runs,
two, three or four bit tests, overlapping and non-overlapping samples and
characteristics calculated from the trace.

9.9.2.1.

Parameters.

The program displays the file input menu first to determine if files will be used.
After selecting an option from INPUT, OUTPUT, INOUT- (input and output files used)
and NONE the program continues with the Data Input screen.
The Data Input Screen permits the user to change the number of runs, the size
and shape of the target, the number of bits tested and whether the samples overlap.
Each trace is displayed in blue and then the blue pixels are counted and set to
green.
Maximum Runs
User selectable number of runs where the trace starts at the origin and terminates
at the periphery.
Run Number
Actual number of the run being performed.
Target Radius
Radius of the circular target and half the dimension of the square target.
Target Area
Area of the target calculated from counting the pixels inside.
Blue Count
The total number of pixels visited during the test
Blue Area
The actual number of pixels illuminated during the test
Blue Density
The result of dividing the Count by the Area
· Blue Direction
Not implemented at present
Green Area
The area of the green trace compared with area of the target as a percentage.
Expected Blue
The expected number of bits according to Kaye.
Average Per Cent
calculated from the average blue count divided by expected blue as a percent
Overlap
if set to yes the test is for a binary source with memory.
If set to no the test is for n bit sequences.
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Files Input
Displays the file name for data input to the program
Files Output
Displays the file name for data output from the program

Q to Quit
press 'Q' or 'q' to exit the program when this is displayed

P to Print
press 'P' or 'p' to print the screen to the local printer.
Time

System time at time of test

Date
System Date at time of test

9.9.2.2.

Testing

In the examples provided, a file called 'TESTI.DAT' was generated and stored
with the program using the compiler random function. The file was then used
repeatedly as input for a variety of tests and the different tests compared.

9.9.2.3.

Results.

The resulting graphs are stored in the appendix 9.13.
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Secure Sequence

9.10.
program scl;

{
A program to simulate the input from a s~cure hashing protocol and
use it to generate a secure sequence in return.
'

author
date
version

,.

David Shaw 0956404 (/
OS july 97

1

initial -version. 05jul97.'

2

loop and error flag added. Start_point stored in a
file 'for analysis 08jul97.

ancillary programs
scl 1

fill a file with the randomizer

sc1_2

fill a file with input sequences of integers

scl_3

read the contents of an integer file

}

{ use text mode facilities }

uses crt;

canst
file_error_message
program_error_message
continue_message
terminate_message

=

= 'file is incomplete';
•program is terminated due to error';
= 'Press any key to continue';
= 'This program has terminated correctly';

sequence_input_file_name = 'd:\programs\rndinp1.dat';
{ name of file of inputs }
randomizer_file_name = 'd:\programs\rndmise1.dat';
{ name of randomizer file }
output file name= 'd:\programs\rndout1.dat 1 ;
{ name-of file outputs }
sp output file name= 1 d:\programs\rndsp1.dat';
{~arne of-file-for storing start_points generated}
no bits in = 128;
nbi 1 = no bits in -' 1;

{ number of bits in input sequence }

no _bits out - 128;
nbc 1 = no bits out

{ number of bits in output sequence }

-

-

-

1;

size_of_sp_select = 16;
{ number of bits used to calculate SP }
sp_1 = size_of_sp_select - 1;
size_of_select = 10;
s_1 = size_of_select - 1;
size_of_randomizer = 32768;
sp_select

{ number of values in select array }
4096 bytes of rom in bits

array[o .. sp_1]
{ selection sequence}
of integer= (1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16);

{
numbers may be of any value from 0 to nbi_1 and in any order. these
numbers indicate which bit from the input sequence is used in which
order to generate a starting point long integer

}
selection: array{O .. s_l] {selection sequence 1

\ ..'
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of integer- (1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10);
these numbers are the increments added to the lltarting point and
may be of any valid integer or long integer value.
negative numbers may be used

·

}

type
in_sequence

of integer; { input sequence type }
{ ou-tput sequence type }, 1
out_sequence = array [0 .. nbo_,l], of integer;
{
startpoint file }
sp_out_file = file of longint;
out file
data
file type }
{
= file of integer.;
{ name of file type
file_ name
string-[40];"
!/ - ·--;)'

array(O, .nbi_l]

~

)

'

var

sequence_input_file

. ""., c-

{ file of inputs }

o\J,t~.-f-i.le;

'•-',

randomizer file }

randomizer file

out_;file;

sequence_output_file

out_file;

{ file of outputs

sp_output_ file

sp_out_file;

{ file of start points }

start_point

longint;

{ starting point in randomizer }

input
output
error_flag

in_sequence;
out_sequence;
boolean;

{ input sequence from input file }
{ output sequence to output file }
{ file error flag }

{+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

}
procedure get_sequence(var f: out file;
var flag : boolean;
var i : in_sequence) ;
{
get an input sequence from an input file and store the bits in an
array
}
var count : integer;
{ loop variable }
begin
writeln( 1 Getting Input Sequence From File 1 ) ;
Writeln;
for count := 0 to nbi 1 do
begin
if eof(f) then
begin
writeln(file_error_message);
flag := true;
exit;
end; { if eo£ }
read(f,i[count]};
{ read value and store in array }
end; { for count }
end; { get_sequence }
procedure generate_SP(i
in_sequence;
var sp : longint);
{
use the input sequence and the constant sp_select to generate a
starting point.
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var temp,

value,
count

{ temporary value )
{ incremental value for starting point sp }
{ loop variable }
longint;

begin
writeln('generating a starting point from input sequence');
writeln;

•=

m~lto
lA'

value
0;
/)
for count : =

'
sp 1 do

begin
temp := i(sp_select[countll;
value := value or temp;
if count < sp 1 then value := value shl 1;

li

end; { for count }
sp := value;
writeln('start point is

1

,sp:l0);

writeln;
end;

{ generate_sp }

procedure generate_output_sequence{var rif : out_file;
var ref : out_file;
sp ; longint;

var o : out_sequence);
Use the starting point and the selection sequence to select
output sequences from the randomizer file and store the output
sequence in an output file

var rifsize,
rifpos
count,
temp

{ random input file size }
{ pointer to position in random input file }
longint;
{ loop variable }
{ index to selection increments }
integer;

begin
writeln('Generating output sequence');
writeln;
reset (rif);
rifsize := filesize(rif);
rifpos : .. sp;

{ get size of file }
{ set 'file position to start point }

for count := 0 to nbo 1 do
begin
if rifpos > rifsize then rifpos :: rifpos mod rifsize;
{ ensure file position is always within the file }
seek(rif,rifpos);
{position pointer and get bit )
read{rif,o[count]);
temp :: count mod size_of_select; { calculate next increment }
rifpos := rifpos + selection[temp];
write(rof,o{count]);
{write to output file }
end; { for count }
end; { generate_output_sequence);
{ ++'+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

)

begin

.

{ main }

clrscr;
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writeln('Smart Card simulation Program J

');

{ identify and prepare files for use }
{ file of input sequences }
assign (sequence_input_file, sequence_.input_file_name);
reset(sequence_input_file);

{ file of randomizer data }
assign(randomizer_file, randomizer_file~name);
reset(randomizer_filel;
{ file of output sequences calculated from input sequence and
randomizer data }
assign(sequence_output_file, output_file_name);
rewrite(sequence_output_file);
{ file of start points generated from the input sequences }
assign(sp_output_file, sp_output_file_name);
rewrite(sp_output_file);

./
'

{ loop until input file of input sequences is empty }
error_flag

:=

false;

{ set error_flag condition }

While not EOF(sequence_input_file) do
begin
get_sequence(sequence_input_file,error_flag,input);
if error_flag then
begin
writeln(program error message);
exit; { if true stop-program }
end; { if error_flag }
generate_SP(input, start_point);
write(sp_output_file,start_point);
generate_output_sequence(randomizer_file,sequence_output_file,
start_point, output);
end; { while not eof }
{ close all files before exiting
close(sequence_input_file);
close(randomizer_fileJ;
close (sequence_output.~file);
close(sp output file);
{ finish-message }
writeln('This program has terminated correctly'};
writeln(continue_message);
readln;
end.

{ main }
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program scl 1;
{
A program to simulate the input from a secure hashing protocol and
use it to generate a secure sequence in return.
This program generates randomizer bits as integers 0 & 1 and stores
them in a file

author
date
version

David Shaw 0956404

OS july 97
1 initial version

uses crt;
canst
no bits_out

{ use text mode facilities }

= 128;

size of randomizer

= 32768;

{ number of bits in output sequence
{ 4096 bytes of rom in bits }

type

out_file = file of integer;
file_name = string[40];

var

output_file_name : file_name;
output_file
out_file;
value

{ random value for storage }
integer;

{ loop counter }

count
: longint;

{ ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++,+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

}
procedure fill file(var f : out_file);
begin
rewrite(£);
randomize;
{ initialize random generator }
for count := 1 to size_of_randomizer do
begin
value := random(2);
write(output file, value);
end; { for coUnt }
close (f);
end; { fill_file }

procedure read_file(var f:
var value
integer;
begin
reset(f);
while not eof(f)do
begin
read (f, value);
write (value);
end; { while not eo£ }
close(£);
end; { read_file

out_file~;

~

{+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++}
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begin { main }
clrscr;
writeln('Smart Card Simulation Program 1_1 ');
writeln('Random sequence generation ');
output_file_name := 'd:\programs\rndmisel.dat';
assign(output_file, output_file_name);

.. ,
fill_file(output_file);
read_file(output_file);
writeln ('File terminated correctly');

end.

I•'

{ inain }

.

•. •

"
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program scl 2;

-

{

A prog1·am to simulate the input from a secure hashing protocol and
use it to generate a secure sequence in return.

This program generates sequences,of 128 random bits as integers
0 & 1 and stores them in a file;
author
date
version

David Shaw 0956494
OS july 97
1 initial version

}

uses crt;

{ use text mOde facilities J

canst
no bits_out

= 128;

no_of_sequences

=

{ number of bits in output sequence }
{ 100 * 128 bits }

100;

type

out_file = file of integer;
file_name = string[40];

var

output_file_name : file_name;
output_file

out_file;

value

random value for storage }
integer;

count

loop counter }
: longint;

{+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

}
procedure fill file(var f

out_file);

var countl, count2, value

integer;

begin
rewrite(£};
randomize;
{ initialize random generator }
for countl := 1 to no_of_sequences do
begin
write ( 1 * 1 ) ;
for count2 := 1 to no bits_out do
,01
begin
value := random(2);
write(£, value);
end; { for count2 }
end; { for countl }
close(£);
end; { fill_file }
procedure read_file(var f: out_file);
var value
integer;
begin
reset(£);
while not eof(f)do
begin
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read(f,value);
write {value);
end; { while not eof }
close(f);
end; { read file

{+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

}
begin { main }
clrscr;
writeln('Smart Card Simulation Program 1_2');

writeln('Random sequence generation for selection sets ');
output_file_name : = 'd: \programs\rndinpl. dat •.·;

assign(output_file, output_file_name);
{ files closed within procedures }
fill_file{output_file);
read_file(output_file);

writeln;
writeln ('press any key to continue');

readln;
end.
{ main }
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program scl 3;

-

{

A program to simulate the input from a secure hashing protocol and
use it to generate a secure sequence in return.
This program reads the bits as integers 0 & 1 from a file
author
date
version

David Shaw 0956404
05jul97

1

initial version

}

{ use text mode facilities }

uses crt;

canst
no bits_out = 128;
size_of_randomizer

32768;

{ number of bits in output sequence
{ 4096 bytes of rom in bits }

type

out_file = file of integer;
file name= string[40);
var

output_file_name : file_name;
output_file

out_file;

value

{ random value for storage }
integer;

{ loop counter }

count
: longint;

{+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

}

procedure read_file(var f: out_file);
var value
integer;
begin
reset (f);
while not eof(f)do
begin
read(f,value);
write (value);
end; { while not eof }
close(f);
end; { read_file }
{+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

}
begin { main }
clrscr;
writeln('Smart Card Simulation Program 1 1 ');
writeln ('Sequence reading from a file 1 ) 7
writeln;
write('What is file name to be read? : 1 ) ;
readln(output_file_name);
writeln;
assign(output file, output file name);
{ file opened-and closed i~ pro~edure }
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read_file(output_file);
writeln;
writeln;

writeln('This program has terminated correctly. ');
end.

( rna in )
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Test Results- Menu and Access Control
Jiillut Value
password

EX-pected Hcsult
access granted

-No. Of Tries
-time out
Usage Limit
-Excess use
Menu choice
Time Out
-legitimate
-legitimate

No. Tries >limit
do nothine:
No. <=limit

0
Do Nothing
I
2

access denied
exit session
permit access
access denied
exit program
redo password
show S.No.
show sequence

-legitimate

3

Hash sequence

-legitimate
-legitimate
-error
-error
-error
-error
-error

4

crypto choice
summary
ignore it
ignore it
ignore it
ignore it
ignore it

Parameter
Input
Password

9.11.

No. > limit

5
A
s
1.3
4232657
-1

Actual Result
access
granted
access denied
exit session
permit access
access denied
exit program
redo password
show S.No.
show
sequence
Hash
sequence
crypto choice
summary

ignore it
ignore it
to option I
to option 4
to ootion 1

Comment

ok
ok
ok
ok
ok
ok
ok
ok
ok
ok
ok
ok
ok
ok
?
?
?

Simulation of Smart Card Design.

9.11.1.

Introduction.

The design from chapter four has been implemented with copy of the MDS hash
algorithm from Gnome Works. The design of the main program and sub-procedures is
discussed and testing of the main program is documented.
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9.11.2.

Design of Program SMARTCD.PAS

9.11.2.1, Conatanta
Name
Value
NumberOffries
3
Password
123
CardSeria!Numbc '1234567890 123456'

Purpose

login attempt limit then error
password for card access
serial number of card

r

Hexlist

'0 123456789ABCDE
F'

Delay!
delay2
timeoutlimit
numberotbitsin
numberofbitsout
rna" bits
maxusage
size_of_select

4000
8000
15000
128
128
255
500
10

size_of_sp_select

16

size_of_randomize

32768

r

nbi_l
nbo_l
sp_l
s_l
windowO
window!
window2
window3

pathname
randfilename
usagefilename
inputfilename
outputfilename
logfilename
inseqfilename
headennessage

notokmessage

errormessage
exitmessage
endmessage
sn_select
sp_select

numberofbitsin · 1
numberofbitsout · 1
size_of_sp_select - 1
size_of_select - 1
1, 1,80,25
1, 1,80,12
1,13,80,25
10, 5,70, 7
'd; \programs\ scard \
'rndmizel.dat'

'usagel.dat'
'inputl.dat'
'output.dat'
'logfile 1.log'
'inseq1.txt'
'Smart Card
Simulation Software'
'Access to this card
has not been
successful'
'Access to this card
has been DENIED'
'Exit from session
selected'
'This program has
terminated correctly'
1,15,4,13,2,11, 10,99,
48,27 ,66,15,34,33,2,
11
59,2,5,103,123,107,6
4,68,69,90,70,35,8,3
3,19,78

Edith Cowan University

convert to hexadecimal
characters
short delay
medium delay
long delay
size of input strings
size of output strings
largest string permitted
usage limit
number of values in select
array
number of bits used to
calculate SP
4096 bytes of rom in bits
for o.. n-1 references
for O.. n-1 references
for 0 .. 15 references
for O.. n-1 references
full window coordinates
menu window coordinates
result windo\\' coordinates
warning \'lrindow coordinates
path name
randomiser file name
usage record file name
input string
output string
security log
input sequence
standard message
standard message

standard message
standard message
standard message

Serial number select values

start point select values
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selection

1,2,3,4,5,6, 7 ,8,9, 10

Selection set select values

9.11.2.2. Inputs, Outputs (Top Level Procedures only}
Main Program
choice

char

[menu choice]

sDigest

string

[ hash process string ]

session

sessionrecord

( global information J

procedure initsession

session

Sessionrecord

[ global information ]

IN OUT

procedure textsetup

integer

headermessage :

[ screen type ]

IN

constant

OUT

procedure getpassword
session

Sessionrecord

[ local password ]

integer

pw

integer

tries

[ global information ]

IN OUT

OUT

[ no, of access tries]

OUT

procedure closesession
session

Sessionrecord

[ global information ]

IN OUT

9.11.2.3. Algorithms (Top Level Procedures Only)
begin

main procedure

initialise session record
prepare text screen
get password
i f OK
loop while choice is not 0
choice 0 clearscreen and display exit message
choice 1 display the card and randomiser serial
numbers
choice 3 get a text string and hash i t with MDS
choice 4 get a text string and hash it for a start
point and encrypt it
choice 5 display logfile data
choice 6 display usage data and bar graph
endloop choice
if NOTOK
display notokmessage
if ERROR
destroy randomiser, input,output, log and usage files
clear screen and display errormessage
close the session
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display goodbye message
end main program

9.12.

Testing
Test Results

-

Parameter
Input
Password
-No. Of Tries
-time out
Usage Limit
-Excess use
Menu choice
Time Out
-legitimate
-legitimate

Input Value
password

Menu and Access Control
l~xpccted Result
Actual Result
Comment
access
access gran ted
ok

No. Tries >limit
do nothing
No. <- limit
No. >limit
0
Do Nothing
I
2

access denied
exit session
permit access
access denied
exit program
redo password
show S.No.
show sequence

-legitimate

3

Hash sequence

-legitimate
-legitimate

4
5
6

crypto choice
summary
Usage Record +
Card Serial No.

A
s
1.3
4232657
-I

ignore it
ignore it
ignore it
ignore it
ignore it
Card Serial No.
+
Randomiser
Serial No.

9 12 I

~legitimate

granted
access denied
exit session
permit access
access denied
exit program
redo password
show S.No.
show
sequence
Hash
sequence
crypto choice
summary
Usage Record
+ Card Serial

ok
ok
ok
ok
ok
ok
ok
ok
ok
ok
ok
ok

No.
~error
~error
~error

-error
-error
Serial Number

Hash Function

Encryption
Function

...

this is a test

hash value

this is aa test

hash value

this is a test

hash value

this is a test

Encryption
seouence

this is aa test
this iG a test
Usage Record

...
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usage record +
card serial no.

ignore it
ignore it
to option 1
to option 4
to option 1
12345678901
23456 +
2404AE08862
BEFA5F3CF9
4C2386A60A4
00300220E04
805CEA9556
338 I C6042A8
95360061304
A9837784E5
C34A0404AO
E
00300220E04
8D5CEA9556
3-3BIC6042A8
00300220E04
805CE
95360061304
A9837
00300220E04
805CE
123/500 ::
12345678901
23456 + bar
graph

ok
ok
ok
ok
ok
ok

ok
ok

ok
ok
ok
ok
ok
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9.12.2.

Logfile

Input Output function indicator
sequence separator
Output Sequence

0::

0123456789ABCDEF

Input Sequence

FE1BF09FF604ACB3

Hash function indicator
Hash Output Sequence

H::

0030D220E048DSCEA955633B1C6042A8

Encryption function indicator E· ·
Encryption Output sequence

0030D220E048DSCE hash value of input

sequence
Sample of Log file
0: :0123456789ABCDEF :: FE18F09FF604AC83
H::0030D220E048D5CEA95563381C6042A8
E::0030D220E048DSCE
0::0123456789ABCDEF :: FE1BF09FF604AC83
H::0030D220E048DSCEA95563381C6042A8
E::0030D220E048DSCE
E::0030D220E048DSCE
0::0123456789ABCDEF :: FE1BF09FF604AC83
H::0030D220E048DSCEA95563381C6042A8
E::0030D220E048DSCE
0::0123456789ABCDEF :: FE1BF09FF604AC83
H: :0030D220E048DSCEA95563381C6042A8
E::0030D220E048D5CE
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Source Code

9.12.3.

SmartCD.PAS, a simulation of the design

program mnartcd;
Author David Shaw

File Name: SMARTCD.PAS
this program simulates the functions of a design for a smart card
proposed in chap 4 of the thesis documents.
version: l initial version 15jul97
2 common include file theslib.pas added 05nov97
3 include MDS unit

4 complete menu options
functions include
1. serial number 16 bytes
2. accept a hash function and return a transfer function
3. generation of a hash function from input data
4. generation of a stream cipher encryption using a hash key
5. storage of transaction details plain or encrypted output

6. Password controlled access
7. function selection
it is considered that a security function that counts the number of unsuccessful
attempts to access the card and deletes or destroys the data to prevent any reuse of the
card
{ use text screen calls }
uses crt,
{ use string processing calls }
strings;

{$I d:\programs\scard\sclib.pas}
{$I d:\programs\scard\mdSlib.pas}

{include general modules }

var
{ global variables }
{ menu choice }
choice
: char;
{ hash process string }
sDigest : string;
{ global information }
session : sessionrecord;
{-------------------Main Program-------------------------------------}
begin { smarted main }
textsetup ( 0) ;
initsession(session);
getpassword(session);

{ prepare text screen }
{ prepare global record }
{ validate access request

if session.aflag <> error then displayusage(session);
case session.aflag of
ok : begin
choice := 'X';
while choice <> '0' do
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{ ok )

begin
menu(choice); { check timeout }
case choice of
'0'
begin { exit from session
text setup ( 1) ;

gotoxy(22,5);
write(exitmessage);
delay(delayl);
end;

{ ok )
)

'1'
1

2'

getserialnumber(session);

begin

{ display card serial no.

{ output for an input sequence }

getinput(session);
{ get input string }
generateoutput(session); { display outputstring
end;

{ ok )

'3'

begin

{ hash an input message }

gethashinput (session);
session, outstring

{ get input string
{ perform hash }

:= MDSProduceDigest(session.inputstring);
putoutsequence(session) { display outputstring }

end;

{ ok )
{ ok )

notok

error

'4'

begin
{encrypt a message }
getcryptoinput(session); { get input string }
session.tempstring
{ perform hash }
:= MDSProduceDigest(session.inputstring);
encryptmessage(session); { encrypt message}
end;

'5'

displaydata (session);

display log file }

displayusage (session);
display usage records
end; { case choice }
end; { while choice <> o }
end; { case ok }
begin
{ access not approved
writeln;
writeln(' ':8,notokmessage);
delay(delayl);
{
resetting of the number of tries is simulated by closing
the program. In a real application if 3 tries are made
before stopping then 24 hours must elapse before the
numberoftries is set to zero.
)
end;
begin
{ illegal activity performed or card expired }
{ destroy randomiser and selection algorithms}
1

6

1

{ with session do
begin
erase(usagefile);
erase (inpfile);
erase (outfilel;
erase (ranfile) ;
may not need to
erase (logfile);
end; {with}
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{ display error message }
textsetup {3);
textcolor(white + blink);
textbackground (red) ;

clrscr;
writeln;
writeln(' ':lS,errormessage);
delay{delay2);

clrscr;
textsetup(l};

end;
end; { case aflag }

closesession{session);

close all files }
goodbye message }

ending;

end. { smarted main
Library Program SCLIB.PAS
(
Author D. Shaw
SCLIB.PAS is used with SMARTCD.PAS

include this file to use generic data structures
used by smartcd,pas
}

canst
numberoftries
password

cardserialnumber
hexlist

=

=

login attempt limit then error }
password for card access }

3;

= 123;

=

'1234567890123456'; { serial number of card}
convert to hexadecimal characters }

'0123456789ABCDEF';

{ time constants}
delayl
4000;
8000;
delay2
timeoutlimit
= 15000 i

{ delay periods }

( numeric constants }
numberofbitsin = 128;
numberofbitsout = 128 i
maxbits
255;
maxusage
= 500;

{
{
(
(

size_of_select
10;
=
size_of_sp_ select =
16;
size of randomizer = 32768;

( number of values in select array
{ number of bits used to calculate SP }
( 4096 bytes of rom in bits }

( derived numeric constants
nbi 1 = numberofbitsin
nbo_ 1 = numberofbitsout
sp_ 1 = size_of _sp_select
s _1
= size of select

size of input strings }
size of output strings }
largest string permitted
usage limit }

}
1;
1;
1;
1;

(
(
{
(

for
for
for
for

0 .. n-1 references
o .. n-1 references
0 .. 15 references
0 .. n-1 references

}
}
}
}

{ text windows }
140
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window a
windowl
window2
window3

array[l. .4] of
array[l. .4] of
array[l .. 4] of
array[l. .4} of

integer •
1' 1,80,25);
integer •
1, 1,80,12);
1,13,80,25);
integer •
integer • (10, 5, 70, 7) ;

(
(
(
(

full }

menu }
result }
warning }

( file names
•d:\programs\scard\';
• •rndmizel.dat';
• 'us agel. dat';
• •inputl.dat';

pathname
randfilename

usagefilename
inputfilename
outputfilename

•output.dat';
• • logfilel.log';
• • inseql. txt';

logfilename

inseqfilename
{ text messages
headermessage =
notokmessage =
errormessage
exitmessage
=
endmessage
=

(
(
(
(
(
(
(

path name }
randamiser }
u~:;:~ge record }

input string }
output string }
security log }
input seqeunce }

'Smart Card Simulation Software';
'Access to this card has not been successful';
'Access to this card has been DENIED';
'Exit from session selected';
'This program has terminated correctly';

{ constant arrays }
sn_select : array[O .. 15]
{ serial number selection sequence }
of integer= (1,15,4,13,2,11,10,99,48,27,66,15,34,33,2,11);

(
numbers may be of any value from 0 to nbi_1 and in any order. these
numbers indicate which bit from the input sequence is used in which
order to generate a serial number

}

.

sp_select : array[O .. sp_1]
{ start point selection sequence }
of integer =
(59,2,5,103,123,107,64,68,69,90,70,35,8,33,19,78) i
(
numbers may be of any value from 0 to nbi_l and in any order. these
numbers indicate which bit from the input sequence is used in which
order to generate a starting point long integer

}
selection

array [O .. s_l]
{ incremental selection sequence }
of integer = ( 1, 2 1 3 1 4 1 51 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 1 10) j

(
these numbers are the increments added to the starting point and
may be of any valid integer or long integer value.
negative numbers may be used

}
type
{ enumeration types }
accessflag = (ok,notok, error);
messagetype = (input,output);

{ string types
shortstring =
hexstring
=
file name
=
anystring
=
longstring
=

}
string [16];
string [32];
string [40];
string [80] ;
string [255] ;

{ access control flag }
{ message buffer index }
{
{
{
{
{

16 byte message }
hexadecimal string }
name of file type }
generic string }
largest string permitted }

( array types }
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in_sequence
intarray
inputarray

array [0 .. nbi_l]

of shortint; { input sequence type }

= array[O .. maxbits] of shortint;
= array [1 .. numberofbitsin) of Bhortint;

{ record types }

usagerecord = record
psword
integer;
usecounter : integer;
numbertries : integer;
end;

{ current state of card usage

{ password for access control
{ current usage counter }
{ number of access tries permitted

{ usagerecord }

{ file types }
:
usagefile
file of usagerecord;
sintfile
file of shortint;
:
log_file
text;

{ file of usage record
{ short integer file }

{ record type

sessionrecord =
record
serialnumber

{ current state of session }
shortstring; { card serial number

a flag

accessflag;

usage

usagerecord;

usagefile

usagefile;

{ file of session record }

sintfile;

{ input file of characters }
{ output file of shortint }
{ randomiser file of shortint

inpfile,
out file,
ranfile
inseqfile,
logfile

text;

inarray

inputarray;

inputstring

longstring;

tempstring,
instring

shortstring;

{ access permitted }

current status of program }

{ input sequence to be transformed
{ log data file }

{ array of shortint }
input string for hash 255 chars }

{ work space strings }

outstring,
logstring
: hexstring;
end; { sessionrecord }

{ hexadecimal strings }
logfile entry }

{----------------------- functions---------------------}
function getbit{v,b : integer): integer;
var temp : integer;
begin
{ extract a bit from a byte }
temp := 0;
case b of
0
temp := v and
1·
'
2·
1
temp := v and
'
2
temp := v and
4;
3
temp := v ond
B;
4
temp := v and 16;
5
temp := v and 32;
6
temp := v and 64;
7
temp := v and 128;
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end; { case }
getbi t : = temp;

end; { function getbit

{-------------------procedures --------------------------------}
procedure textsetup(i : integer);
begin
{ set up text window and colours }
case i of
{ set text window size and location
0

window (windowO [ 1) , windowO (2] , windowO [3) , windowO [ 4] ) ;

1
2

window(windowl[l) ,window1(2) ,window1[3) ,window1[4]);
window(window2[1],window2[2] ,window2[3),window2 [4]);

3

window(window3 [1) ,window3 [2) ,window3 [3],window3 [4));

end; { case }
textcolor(yellow);
textbackground(blue);
clrscr;

{ default text colour }
{ default background colour }
{ reset screen }

gotoxy(20, 1);
writeln(headermessa~e);

{ display message

end; { textsetup }
procedure initsession(var s : sessionrecord);
b2gin
{ preset session paramters }
with s do
begin
serialnumber := cardserialnumber; { set password }
aflag := notok;
{ default no access }
{ preset files }
assign(usagefile, pathname + usagefilename);
assign(inpfile,
pathname + inputfilename);
assign(outfile,
pathname + outputfilename);
assign{ranfile,
pathname + randfilename);
assign(logfile,
pathname + logfilename);
assign{inseqfile, pathname + inseqfilename);
reset(usagefile);
read{usagefile,usage);
close(usagefile);

{ get current usage state }

with usage do { put usage data into current buffer }
begin
if usecounter > maxusage then { check if card expired
s.aflag := notok;
numbertries

:=

numberoftries; { max permitted tries before lockout

}
psword
:= password;
inc (usecounter);
end; { \•dth usage }
end; { sessionrecord }
end; { initsession }

{ store password }
{ increment usage count

procedure getpassword(var s : sessionrecord);
{
obtain a password from the user and compare it against
the stored value. there is no facility for the password
to be changed.
}
integer;
var pw
{ get integer password I pin number
integer;
tries
{ number of tries at access }
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begin
s.aflag
:= notok;
{ initialise }
tries := 0;
with s.usage do
begin
while tries co numbertries do

not excessive tries }

begin
textsetup ( 1);
gotoxy(10,4);
write('Input the password now
read (pw) ;
tries := tries + 1;
if pw = pS\IIOrd then

{ prepare screen }
'); { get password }

{ increment try counter
{ password entered ok

begin
s.aflag

:=

ok;

exit;

{ set ok condition }
{ exit while loop }

end;

if pw = 0 then

begin
s.aflag := notok;
exit;
end; { if pw

{ user chooses to

s~op

}

{ set notok condition }
{ exit while loop }

{ too many tries at guessing password
if tries > numbertries then s.aflag := error;
end; { while tries }
end; { with u }

end; { getpassword
procedure Menu(var c : char);
var timeout : integer; { current time }
begin
{ display choices and response }
textsetup(l);
{ initiailise text screen }
timeout := 0;
{ clear timer }
gotoxy(20, 1);
write{headermessage);
gotoxy{l0,4);
{ display menu
write('O : Exit from Session');
gotoxy(lO,S);
write('l : Display serial number of card');
gotoxy(lO, 6);
write('2 : Generate Output Sequence from Input Sequence');
gotoxy{l0,7);
write{ 1 3 : Generate a hash value for an input Message');
gotoxy(lO,B);
write('4 : Encrypt a message with a Hash value'};
gotoxy(lO, 9);
write('S : Display Log File');
gotoxy(lO, 10};
write('6 : Display usage Record');
gotoxy(20,12);
write('Enter Choice : ');
{ default response = exit
repeat
{ input process loop }
inc (timeout) ; { increment usage time }
if keypressed then
begin
c : = readkey;
{ calculate input value }

C

:=

I

Q

I j
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{ echo to -screen }

wdteln (c);
exit;

end;

until timeout

>=

timeoutlimit;

write('Access Timeout');

{if timeout and no keypressed then exit}

delay (delayl) ;

clrscr;'
end;

{ menu }

procedure closesession(var s : sessionrecord) ;
begin
{ close current session }
with s do

begin
aflag

:=

notok;

disallow access }
store usage data at end of session }

rewrite(usagefile);
write(usagefile,usage);
close(usagefile);
end; { with }
end; { closesession }
proceU~re

ending;

begin
textsetup(3);

{ display goodbye message
{ initialise screen }

gotoxy(10,3);

writeln(endmessage);
delay (delayl) ;
end; { ending }

{------------------option 1 procedures-------------------------------}
procedure getserialnumber(s :

var
bits,
chars
ch

lint

sessionrecord);

{ generate randomiser serial number }
{ loop counters }
integer,·
{ characters in sequence }
byte;
{ hex character equivalent }
shortint; { input bit from randomiser }

begin
textsetup(2);

{ initialise text screen }

reset(s.ranfile);
open file }
ch := O;
gotoxy(5,3);
write ('SERIAL : 1 ) ;
write(s.serialnumber); { write card serial number }
write { 1 : : ' ) ;
for chars := 1 to 32 do { get first 128 bits from file }
begin
for bits := 1 to 4 do
begin
iead(s.ranfile,lint);
ch := ch shl 1;
{ shift left 1 place }
ch := ch or lint;
{ add LSB ch or ooooooox}
ch := ch and 15;
{ blank 4 msb digits ch and ooooxxxx}
end; { for bits }
write (copy(hexlist, ch+1, 1));
{ convert to hexadecimal chars
ch := O;
end; { for chars }
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9.12.4.

sp :

sp + getbit(intvalue,bit);
{ get bit }
{ make sp }

sp := sp shl 1;
end; { for count }
end; { startpoint }

procedure generateoutput (var s : sess.ionrecord);

{
open an input file and generate a sequence ·according to

a particular startpoint and selection algorithm
}
var
convert input string to bits }
linarray
loutarray
index,

bits
filelength,
start
logstring

in_sequence; { input string for conversion }

in_sequence; {
{
integer;
{
{
longint;
{
short string; {

output sequence from conversion
index to selection set }
loop counter }
size of randomiser
position in randomiser
log file record }

begin
textsetup (1);

startpoint(start,s.instring};

{ initialise screen }
{ generate a start point }

reset(s.ranfile);
filelength := filesize(s.ranfile);
start := start mod filelength;
for bits := 0 to nbi_1 do
begin
seek(s.ranfile,start);
read(s.ranfile,loutarray[bits]l;
index := bits mod 16;
start :=start+ sn_select[indexJ;
start : = start mod filelength';'end; { for bits }
·

generate output sequence }
get length of randomiser }
calculate start point }

{
{
{
{
{

seek position in randomiser
read bit }
get next bit index }
increment selection value
make sure it is inside file

close(s.ranfile);
append(s.logfile);
{ store details in log file }
textsetup(2);
{ initialise screen}
gotoxy(5,3);
write( 1 The input sequence is
•,s.instring);
write(s.logfile, 1 0:: •,s.instring);
gotoxy(5,5);
write ( •The output sequence is : 1 ) ;
convert2hex(logstring,loutarray);
writeln(logstring);
writeln(s.logfile, 1 : : 1 , logstring);
close(s.logfile);
delay(delayl);
clrscr;
textsetup (1);
end; { generateoutput }
{------------------option 3 procedures-------------------------------}
procedure gethashinput(var s : sessionrecord);
begin
{ get a string to hash }
textsetup ( 1) ;
{ initialise screen }
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gotoxy(S,S);

write ('HASH : What is the input meaoage ?
readln (s, inputstring);

if length(s.inputstring)

');

0 then { clear buffer }

read(s.inputstring);
writeln;
end;
{ gethashinput }

procedure putoutsequence(var s : sesaionrecord);
begin
{ display output sequence }
gotoxy(S,lO);
write ('The output sequence is : ');
write(s.outstring);
append(s.logfilel;
{ write hash value to logfile }

writeln(s.logfile, •H:: ',s.outstring);
close(s.logfile);
delay{delayll;
end; { putoutsequence }

{------------------option

5

procedures-------------------------------}

procedure getcryptoinput (var s : sessionrecord) ;
{ get input string }
begin
textsetup(l);
{ initialise screen }
gotoxy{S,S);
write ( 'CRYPTO :

');

readln(s.inputstring);
if length(s.inputstring)
readln(s.inputstring);
end; { getcryptoinput }

get input string }
0 then

procedure encryptmessage(var s

~

{ clear buffer }
{ get input string }

sessionrecord);

var
msg,
{
{
key,
{
bit
: shortint;
filelength,
{
{
sp
: longint;
{
index,
{
loop,
{
count,
{
inlength
integer;
ch
{
byte;
begin
textsetup (1);
J
.... {
gotoxy(S,S);
rewrite(s.inpfile);
rewrite(s.outfile);
reset(s.ranfile};
append(s.logfile);
index := O;
startpoint(sp,s.tempstring};

message bit }
key stream bit }
process bit process
randomiser size }
start point }
index to array }
loop counter }
loop coounter }
length on string }
character in string
initialise }

{ calculate a startpoint }

{ convert inputstring to input file of shortints }
inlength

:=

length(s.inputstring};

{number of characters to process

}

for count

:= 1

to inlength do
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begin
ch := ord(s.inputstring[count]);
get a character }
for loop := 1 to 8 do { convert to bits and store }
begin
bit := ch and 1;
ch : = ch shr 1;
writ~(s.inpfile,bit);

end; { for loop }
end;

{ for count }

reset(s.inpfile);
filelength := filesize(s.ranfile);
get length of randomiser
sp := sp mod filelength;
set start point }
seek(s.ranfile,sp);
while not EOF(s.inpfile) do
{ process message bits }
begin
inc{index);
{ selector for array }
read(s.ranfile,key);
{ get bits from files }
read(s.inpfile,msg);

sp
sp
}

:=
:=

sp + sp_select[index mod 16] ; { increment selector }
sp mod filelength;
{ ensure less than randomiser size

i f key = msg then
bit ::::: 0
else
bit := 1·
'
write(s.outfile,bit);
end;
{ while }

{ i f same then 0 }
{ i f different then 1 }

{ store crypto bit )

gotoxy(5,10);
write ( 1 OUTPUT : 1 ) ;
{
reset crypto file }
reset(s.outfile);
while not eof(s.outfile) do
{ convert file to ascii
begin
ch := 0;
for count := 1 to 8 do
{ convert char to ascii }
begin
read(s.outfile,bit);
ch := ch shl 1;
ch := ch or bit;
end; { for }
write( chr(ch));
{write ascii char }
end; { while not eof }
writeln(s.logfile, 1 E:: 1 ,s.tempstring); { store tempstring
close(s.inpfile);
close(s.outfile);
close(s.ranfile);
close(s.logfile);

close files }

delay(delay1);
end; { encryptmessage }
{------------------option 5 procedures-------------------------------}
procedure displaydata(var s: sessionrecord);
var
display logfile data }
linecount
integer;
{ number of lines displayed }
inputsequence
anystring;
{ input string from file }
begin
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reset (s.logfile);

linecount := 0;
text setup (1);

{ open logrile

initialise screen

gotoxy(S,S);
wri teln ( 'LOG : • ) ;

while not eof(s.logfile} do
begin
inc (linecount);

{ count line }
readln(s.logfile,inputsequence); {get line }

writeln(inputsequence);
{ display line
if linecount mod 10 = 0 then
{ pause to read lines }
begin
writeln('Enter to continue '};
readln;
end; { i f }
end; { while }
write ('FINISH : ');

{ close files }

close{s.logfile);
delay(delayl);
end; { displaydata }
{-----------------option 6 procedures ------------------------}
procedure displayusage(var s : sessionrecord);
var maxuse, { maximum usage in tens }
tenuse, { actual usage in tens }
oneuse, { actual usage in ones }
count
integer; { loop counter }
begin
{ display current usage status }
clrscr;
textsetup (2);
{ initialise screen }
maxuse := maxusage div 10; {max uses of card in 10 1 s }
tenuse := s.usage.usecounter div 10; { use by tens }
oneuse := s.usage.usecounter mod 10; { use by units }
gotoxy(10,4};
{display usage }
write( 1 USAGE : 1 ,s.usage.usecounter:5,
writeln ( 1 Serial : 1 , s. serialnumber) ;

1

/

,maxusage);
{ display card serial number }
1

{ display bar graph
gotoxy(10,5); for count := 1 to maxuse do write(IOI);
Gotoxy(10,5); for count := 1 to tenuse do write ( 1 ~ 1 ) ;
gotoxy(10,6);
gotoxy(10,6);

for count := 1 to 9 do write{' 01 ) ;
for count := 1 to oneuse do write{'

2 ');

{ if maximum usage limit exceeded destroy card }
if s.usage.usecounter > maxusage then s.aflag := error;
text setup (1),
end; { displayusage}
4.3 MD5LIB.PAS MD5 Hash Program Library
{program md5lib .pas ;}

{
this program is taken from the network. Gnomeworks 1998 modified to run
under turbo pascal but not perfect modified to work with the Smart Card
Simulation Program
}
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canst
hexlisting

811
812
813
814
821
822
823
824
831
832
833
834
841
842
843
844

=

'0123456789ABCDEF';

7;
= 12;
= 17;

=
=
=
=
=

22;
5·
'
9;
14;
2 0;

= 4;
11;

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

16;
23;

6;
10;
15 i
21;

type
MDS_CTX = record

state : Array[O .. 4] of Longint;
count : Array[O .. 2] of Longint;

buffer : Array[0 .. 64] of char;
end;

- = .Longint;
-

PMDS CTX = AMDS CTX;
PLint

var
PADDING : Array[0 .. 63] of Char;

{--------------------------------------------------------}
procedure RotateLeft (var x : Longint; n : Integer);

var
Resultl : Longint;
xTemp

Longint;

begin
xTemp

: = x;

Rezultl

:=

(xTemp shl n) or {xTemp shr (32-n));

x ::::: Resultl;
end;

function F(x : Longint; y
var
resultl
Longint;

Longlnt; z

'Longint)

:i' Longint;

/

'

result2
Longint;
begin
resultl := x and y;
result2 .- (not x) and z;
F
:= resultl or result2;
end;

function G{x : Longint; y
var
resultl
result2

Lon9Int; z

Longint)

Longint;

Longint;
Longint;
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begin
resultl := (x and z) ;
result2 := y and {not
:=

G

z) ;

result! or result2;

end;
function H (x : Long!nt; y : Long!nt; z

Longint)

Longint;

Longint)

Longint;

begin
H ::: {x xor y xor z);
end;

function I(x : Longint; y
var
resultl : Longlnt;
begin
resultl := x or (not z);
I := y xor resultl;

Longint i) z
'

end;

Longint;

X

Longint; s

Longint

Longint;

X

Longint; s

Longint

Longint; b,c,d
procedure HH(var a
Longrnt)
;
ac
i
'
begin
a := a + H(b,c,d) + X + ac;
RotateLeft(a,s);
a := a + b;
end;

Longint;

X

Longint; s

Longint

Longint; b,c,d
procedure II (var a
Longint)
;
ac
i
'
begin
a := a + I(b,c,d) + X + ac;
RotateLeft(a,s);
a := a + b;
end;

Longlnt;

X

Longlnt; s

Longint

procedure MDS_memcpy{output
PChar
var
Index : Word;
begin
for Index := 0 to length do
output [Index] : = input [Index] ;
end;

input

procedure FF(var a
Longint) ;
i ac

Longint; b,c,d

'

begin
a .- a + F(b,c,d) +
RotateLeft(a,s);
a ·- a + b;

X

+ ac;

end;

procedure GG(var a
Longint) ;
i ac

Longint; b,c,d

'

begin
a := a + G(b,c,d) +
RotateLeft(a,s);
a := a + b;

X

+ ac;

end;
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{Decodes input (unsigned char) into output (UJN1'4). Assumes len is

a multiple of 4.}
procedure Decode(var output : Array of Longint ; input : PChar ; len
Word);

var
i, j

: word;
a,b,c,d : Long!nt;

begin
i : = 0;
j := 0i
while j < len do

begin
a := Longint{input[j]};
b := Longint(input[j+l]);
c := Longlnt(input[j+2]);
d := Longint(input[j+3]);
output [i] := a or (b shl B) or (c shl 16) or (d shl 24);
Inc (i);
Inc(j,4);

end;
end;

procedure MDS_memset(output
var

PChar

value

Integer

length

Word);

Index : Word;

begin
for Index

:=

0 to length do

output [Index]

:"' Chr (value);

end;
procedure MDSTransform (var state
var

Array of Longint

block

PChar);

a,b,c,d : Longint;
x : Array[O .. 15] of Longint;
sA,sB,sC,sD : string;
begin
a := state[O];
b := state [1] ;
c := state [2];
d := state [3] ;
Decode {x, block, 64);

FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF

(a,
[d,
(c,
(b,
(a,
(d,
(c,
(b,
(a,
(d,
(c,
(b,

b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,

c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,

d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,

xi
X[
X[
xi
X[
X[
x[
x[
X[
x[

OJ. 811, $d76aa478);
lJ. 812, $e8c7b756);
2]. 813, $242070db);

3]. 814, $c1bdceee);

4]. 811, $f57cOfaf) ;
5]. 812, $4787c62a);

6]. 813, $a8304613);
7]. 814, $fd469501) i
BJ. 811, $698098d8);
9]. 812, $8b44f7af);
X[10], 813, $ffff5bbl);
X [11) , S14, $895cd7be) ;
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PF Ia, b, c, d, X [12] I
FF (d, a, b, c, X (lJ) t
FF (c, d, a, b, x(l4],
FF (b, c, d, a, X (15] 1

GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG

( Round 2
(a, b,
(d, a,
(c, d,
(b, c,
Ia, b,
(d, a,
(c, d,
(b, c,
Ia, b,
(d, a,
(c, d,
(b, c,
(a, b,
(d, a,
(c, d,
(b, c,

c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,

d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,

( Round 3
HH (a, b,
HH (d, a,
HH (c, d,
HH (b, c,
HH (a, b,
HH (d, a,
HH (c, d,
HH (b, c,
HH (a, b,
HH (d, a,
HH (c, d,
HH (b, c,
HH (a, b,
HH (d, a,
HH (c, d,
HH (b, c,

)
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,

d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,

( Round 4
I I (a, b,
I I (d, a,
I I I c, d,
I I (b, c,
I I (a, b,
I I (d, a,
I I (c, d,
I I (b, c,
I I (a, b,
I I (d, a,
I I (c, d,
I I (b, c,
I I (a, b,
I I (d, a,
I I (c, d,
I I (b, c,

)
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,

d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,

state [OJ
state [1]

811, $6b901122) i
812, $fd987193);
813, $a679438e);
814, $49b40821);

xl 1], 821, $f6le2562) ;
'
x[ 61, 822, $c040b340);
X

(11),

823, $265e5a51);

xl O], 824, $e9b6c7aa) ;
xl 5]' 821, $d62flOSd);
x(lO],
X (15),

822,
823,
824,
821,
822,
823,
824,

X [ 5)

831, $fffa3942);

$2441453) i

$d8ale681);
$e7d3fbc8);
X I 4],
91,
$21elcde6);
X[
x[14),
$c33707d6};
X [ 3] I
$f4d50d87) ;
$455al4ed) ;
x[ 8],
X (13] 1 821, $a9e3e905);
X( 2] 1 822, $fcefa3f8};
x[ 71, 823, $676f02d9) i
X [12) t
824, $8d2a4cBa);

I

X[ 8] ' 832, $8771f681) ;
x[ll], 833,
x(l4], 834,
x[ 1], 831,
X ( 4) 1 832,
x[ 71, 833,
x[lO], 834,
X [13] , 831,
xl 0], 832,
x[ 3], 833,
x[ 6], 834,
x[ 9], 831,
X (12] , 832,
X (15] , 833,
X ( 2] , 834,

$6d9d6122);
$fde538Dc);
$a4beea44);

$4bdecfa9) ;
$f6bb4b60);
$bebfbc70);
$289b7ec6);
$eac..127fa);
$d4ef30B5);

$4881d05);
$d9d4d03 9) i
$e6db99e5);
$1fa27cf8);
$c4ac5665);

X[ O], 841, $£4292244);
X [ 7], 842,
X [14], 843,
X[ 51, 844,
X [12] 1 841,
X [ 3], 842,
X (10] 1 843,
x[ 1], 844,
x[ B], 841,
X [15] 1 842,
x[ 6], 843,
x[13], 844,
X [ 4], 841,
x[11], 842,
X[ 2], 843,
X[ 91, 844,

:= I'> tate [0]
:: state (1]
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$432aff97);
$ab9423a7);
$fc93a039);
$655b59c3) ;
$8fOccc92);
$ffeff47d);
$85845dd1);
$6fa87e4f) ;
$fe2ce6eO);
$a3014314);
$4e0811a1);
$f7537eB2);
$bd3af235);
$2ad7d2bb);
$eb86d391);

+ a;
+ b;
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state[2]
state[J]

:- state[2] + c;
+ d;

:= state[3)

{zeroize sensitive information.}
MDS memset {PChar(®x), 0, sizeof (x));
end;

procedure MDSUpdate(context

PMOS CTX

input

PChar

inputLen

Word);

var
i : Word;
index : Word;
partLen : Word;
w_temp : word;

stemp : string;

begin
{Compute number of bytes mod 64}
index :=Word(

(Word(context~.count[O])

shr 3) and $3F);

{update number of bits}
:1
w_temp := (inputLen shl 3);
context"'.count(O] := context .... count[O] + w_temp;

if context"'.count[O] < w temp then
Inc(context"'.count[l]};
w_temp := (inputLen shr 29);
context .... count [1] ::::: context" .count [1] + w_temp;
partLen := 64 - index;
{Transform as many times as possible.}
if inputLen >= partLen then
begin
MDS_memcpy(PChar(®contextA.buffer[index]), PChar(input}, partLen);
MDSTransform (contextA.state, contextA.buffer};
i := partLen;
while (i + 63) < inputLen do
begin
MDSTransform (contextA.state, ®input[i]);
i : = i + 64;
end;
index := O;
end

else
i : = 0;
{Buffer rema~n~ng input}
MDS_memcpy(®contextA.buffer[index] ,®input[i) ,inputLen-i);
end;

procedure MDSinit(context
PMDS_CTX);
var
Padindex : Integer;
begin
{Initialize the PADDING array}
PADDING[O] := Chr($80);

!54
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for Padindex :
1 to 63 do
PADDING [Padindex] : = Chr (O);

{Initialize the context}
context"' .count (O] := O;
context"'.count[l)
cantext"'.state[O)
context" .state [1]
context"'.state(2]
context"'.state[3]

:= 0;
:= $67452301;
:= $efcdab89;
:= $9Bbadcfe;

.- $10325476;

end;
procedure Encode(output : PChar ; inPut

Array of Longint

len

Word);

var
i, j

begin
i :=
j

!=

: word;
0;
0;

while j < len do

begin
output[j]
output [j+l]
output [j+2]
output [j+3]
Inc(i);
Inc(j,4);

:=

Char(input[i] and $FF);

~= Char{ (input [i) shr 8) and $FF) ;
:= Char(
:::: Char{

(input [i)

shr 16) and $FF)

(input [i] shr 24} and $FF)

;

end;
end;

procedure MDSFinal(digest : PChar; context
var
bits : Array[O .. B] of Char;
Index : word;
padLen : Word;
sTemp ~ string;
begin

PMD5_CTX);

{save number of bits}
MD5_memset{bits,64,8);
Encode (bits, context" .count," . ~);
{Pad out to 56 mod 64.}
index := Word((context".count[O] shr 3) and $3f);
Str{index,sTemp);
if index < 56 then
padLen .- (56 - index)
else
padLen .- (120 - index);
Str{padLen,sTemp);
MD5Update(context, PADDING, padLen);
{ Append length (before padding) }
MD5Update {context, bits, 8);
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{Store state in digest }
Encode (digest, contextA.state, 16);

{ Zeroize sensitive information. }
MDS_memset(PChar(context),

0,

sizeof(context));

end;
function tohex(a: integer} :string;
var MSnibble,LSnibble : integer; temp
begin

string;

MSnibble := O;

LSnibble := 0;
temp := ' ' ;
LSnibble := a AND 15;
MSnibble := a AND 240;
MSNibble := MSNibble shr 4;
temp := copy(hexlisting,msnibble,l);
temp :=temp+ copy(hexlisting,lsnibble,l)
tohex := temp;
end; { tohex }

function
var

MDSProduceDigest(PassText

string)

string;

context : MDS_CTX;
sDigest : string;
sTemp : string;
szMessage : Array[O .. 255] of Char;
digest : Array[0 .. 16] of Char;
len

Word;

i,x : integer;

begin
szMessage[O] := Chr(O);
StrPCopy(szMessage,PassText);
len := StrLen(szMessage);
MD5Init(®context);
MD5Update(®context,szMessage,len);
MD5Final(digest, ®context);
sTemp : = ' ' ;
sdigest :='';
for i := 0 to 15 do
begin
x := Integer(digest[iJ);
stemp := tohex(x);
sDigest := sDigest + sTemp;
end;
md5producedigest := sDigest;
end;
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9.13.

Test Run of Smart Card Simulation
Initial Screen to Request Password

9.13.1.

Smart Card Simulation Software

Input the password now: 123

If the password is entered incorrectly more than three times the card self destructs by
destroying the randomiser, selection set and startpoint files. This option is implemented
but disabled in the simullation.

9.13.2.

Menu Screen

Smart Card Simulation Software
0 : Exit from Session
1 : Display serial number of card
2 : Generate Output Sequence from Input Sequence
3 : Generate a hash value for an input Message
4 : Encrypt a message with a Hash value
5 : Display Log File
6: Display Usage Record

Enter Choice :
Smart Card Simulation Software

USAGE:

241/500 Serial: 1234567890123456

XX. _ __

Displays permitted options and the current usage state. If no choice is made within a
set time the session enters the 'time-out'state and is closed.

Edith Cowan University
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9.13.3.

Display Card Serial Number

Smart Card Simulation Software

0 : Exit from Session
1: Display serial number of card
2 : Generate Output Sequence from Input Sequence
3 : Generate a hash value for an input Message
4 : Encrypt a message with a Hash value
5 : Display Log File
6: Display Usage Record
Enter Choice : 1
Smart Card Simulation Software
SERIAL: 1234567890123456 :: 2404AE08B62BEFA5F3CF94C2386A60A4

The number '1234567890123456' is the serial number of the card devised by the
manufacturer.
The number '2404AE08862BEFA5F3CF94C2386A60A4' is the serial number derived
from the randomiser written into the ROM on the Smart Card.

Generate An OutPut Sequence From And Input

9.13.4.
Sequence

Smart Card Simulation Software
0 : Exit from Session
1 : Display serial number of card
2 : Generate Output Sequence from Input Sequence
3 : Generate a hash value for an input Message
4": Encrypt a message with a Hash value
5 : DisPlay Log File
6 : Display Usage Record
Enter Choice : 2
.

The output sequence is curr.ently fixed. It demonstrates the processing of an input
sequence into an output sequence.

'
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9.13.5.

Hashing an Input

Scqu~!lf.f.

Smart Card Simulation Software

0
1
2
3
4
5

: Exit from Session
: Display serial number of card
: Generate Output Sequence from Input Sequence
: Generate a hash value for an input Message
: Encrypt a message with a Hash value
: Display Log File

6 : Display Usage Record

Enter Choice : 3

The input sequence provided by the user is 'this is a test' which is hashed to produce an
output sequence of '0030D220E048DSCEA95563381C6042A8'.
Smart Card Simulation Software
HASH :What is the input message?: this is a test

The output sequence is: 0030D220E048DSCEA95563381C6042A8

Smart Card Simulation Softwar

Smart Card Simulation Software
The input sequence is : 0 123456789ABCDEF

The output sequence is: FE1BF09FF604AC83FEIBF09FF604AC83
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Encrypting An Input Sequence

9.13.6.

Smart Card Simulation Software

0 : Exit from Session
1 : Display serial number of card
2 : Generate Output Sequence from Input Sequence
3 : Generate a hash value for an input Message
4 : Encl}•pt a message with a Hash value
5 : Display Log File
6 : Display Usage Record

Enter Choice : 4

The input sequence is 'this is a test also' which is hashed to provide an input sequence
to the key generator. This sequence is used to select the start point in the randomiser
and a key of the requisite length is determined. The key sequence and the input
sequence are processed bitwise with an 'exclusive-or process' and the output sequence
is detennined.
Smart Card Simulation Software

CRYPTO : this is a test also

OUTPUT : 3+,_qj,l•=fuE+n_iD
.

Display The Transaction Log

9.13.7.

Smart Card Simulation Software

0 : Exit from Session
1 : Display serial number of card
2 : Generate Output Sequence from Input Sequence
3 : Generate a hash value for an input Message
4 : Encrypt a message with a Hash value
5 : Display Log File
·
6 : Display Usage Record
Enter Choice : 5
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Smart Card Simulation SoH ware
H::0030D220E048D5CEA955633131 C6042A8
0::0123456789ABCDEI' :: I'EIBF09FF604AC83
H::22847537D60D45DII20D95980A040119
E::4 !08A090A30C207E
O::OI23456789ABCDEF :: FEIBF09F1'604AC83
H::E40D37B I D8C7 ADE0470BA32133907161
E::2CA330885DC8CECO
O::OI23456789ABCDEF :: FE I BF09FF604AC83
0::0123456789ABCDEF ::FE IBF09FF604AC83
0::0123456789ABCDEF :: FE IBF09FF604AC83

Enter to continue
H: :0030D220E048D5CEA95563381 C6042A8
li'·· A4 7n~4rnru~n4h')n4

The output sequence is '0::0123456789ABCDEF :: FE1BF09FF604AC83' where the
initial character '0::' indicates an output.
The hash sequence is 'H::0030D220E048DSCEA95563381C6042A8' where the initial
character 'H::' indicates an hashed output. The input sequence is not stored.
The encryption sequence is 'E::A47034C008046204' where the initial character 'E::'
indicates an hashed output. The input sequence is not stored.and the output is stored
in hexadecimal format.

9.13.8.

Display Current Usage Record

Smart Card Simulation Software
0 : Exit from Session
1 : Display serial number of card
2 : Generate Output Sequence from Input Sequence
3 : Generate a hash value for an input Message
4 : Encrypt a message with a Hash value
5 : Display Log File
6 : Display Usage Record
Enter Choice : 6
Smart Card Simulation Software
USAGE:

241/500 Serial: 1234567890123456

xx_ __

The usage record consists of a session count (241) and maximum permitted uses (500),
The card serial number is displayed and a bar graph consisting of a top row which
count the tens and a shorter bottom row which counts from,O to 9. For example:
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XX_ __

indicates 241.
The card will cease functioning when the counter exceeds 500.

Exit From The Session Selected

9.13.9.

Smart Card Simulation Software

!,',

0 : Exit from Session
1 : Display serial number of card
2 : Generate Output Sequence from Input Sequence
3: Generate a hash value for an input Message
4 : Encrypt a message with a Hash value
5 : Display Log File
6 : Display Usage Record
Enter Choice : 0

The exit from the session displays the session count and disables the input. A complete
new session must be commenced.

Smart Card Simulation Software

Exit from session selected

Smart Card Simulation Software
USAGE:

241/500 Serial: 1234567890123456
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Data Visualisation

9.14.

program linearwalk;
generate an array of longintcgcrs and store in a file.
each array of longint is generated by starting a random generator
at the centre of the screen and counting the number of hits in each
pixel until a border value is detected then it stops.
the max longint value is then scaled to permit contouring of the
display.

uses

printer,

{ hardcopy of screen display }
{ text screen functions }
{ graphics screen functions }

crt,
graph;
canst

maxarray
arraycentre
ESC

portrait
landscape
type
lintarray
lintfile
!filename
var
store
storename

= 401;
= 201;
= #$1B;
= 0;
= 1;

{ array length )
{ midpoint of array length )
printer output orientation

= array(l .. maxarray]
= file of linta~ray;
= string[BO];
lint file;
!filename;

of !Ongint;

{ file of 'longinteger arrays }

anyarray,
{ input array )
gross
{ total array )
lintarray;
'
loop response )
ch
char;

'

increment,
max,
size : longint;
row,
count,
num,
current

integer;

{ arrayindex for insertion }
{ graphics ok flag }
{ terminate loop flag }

grflag,
finish
boolean;

{==========================================================)
procedure printgraph(Mode, direction : integer);
var i,j,k,m,
msb,lsb,Maxx,Maxy : integer;
begin
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maxx : = getmaxx;
maxy : = getmaxy;
setviewport ( 0, 0, maxx, maxy, false) ;
write (1st, ESC, 'A', #$07); { on printer set line spacing to 7/72 inch }

case direction of
portrait : begin
lsb := maxx AND $DOff;

{ maxx mod 256 }

msb : = maxx shr 8;
{ int maxx
for j := 0 to maxy div B do

I 256 }

begin
write(lst,ESC, char(mode) ,char(lsb) ,char(msb));
for i := 0 to maxx do
begin
m := 0;
for k := 0 to 7 do

begin
m := m shl 1; { shift m left 1 bit }

if getpixel(i, j*B + k) <> 0 then inc(m);
end;

( for k }

write(lst, char(m));
end; { for i }
write (1st, #$0D, #$0A);
end; { for j }

end; { portrait }
landscape

begin

lsb := maxy AND $DOff; { maxy mod 256 }
msb := maxy shr 8;
{ int maxx I 256 }
j

: = 0;

repeat
write (1st, ESC, '*', char (mode) , char {lsb) , char (msb)) ;
for i := maxy downto 0 do
begin
m ::: o;
for k ::: 0 to 7 do
begin
/m : = m shl 1,;1 { shift m left 1 bit }
if getpixel{(tr k,i) <> o then inc(m);
end; { for k }
write(lst, char(m));
end; { for i }
write(lst, #$OD, #$0A);
inc(j,B};
until j >= maxx-1;
end; { landscape }
end; { case }
write(lst,#$0C); { form feed}
end; { printgraph }
lintarray);
procedure cleararray(var a
var count
integer;
begin
for count := 1 to maxarray do
a[countJ :"' 0;
end;
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lintarray);
procedure writearray(var a
var count
integer;
begin
for count := 1 to maxarray do
begin
if count = 200 then textcolor(yellow)
else textcolor(white);
write (a [count],'
end;
end;
{ wri tearray

•);

procedure beep;
begin
sound(SOO);
delay(SOO);

nosound;
end;
procedure readfile(var s
var count : integer;
a : lintarray;

lintfile);

begin
reset(sl;
while not eof(s) do
begin
read{s,a);
writearray(a);
readln;

end;
end; { readfile }
procedure dorun{var s
var a

lintfile;
lintarray ) ;

begin
size := FileSize(s);
Seek (s, size);
finish := false;
cleararray(a);
randomize;
current := arraycentre;
While not finish do
begin
num ~= random(2);
case num of
1 : begin
inc (current);
inc{a[current]);
end;
0
begin
dec {current);
inc(a[current]);
end;
end; { case }
if (current

=

1) or (current

= maxarray)

then finish

:=

true;

if keypressed then break;
end; { while not finish }
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write (s, a);
end;
{ dorun }

procedure getmax(var s
var m
var temp : lintarray;
max : longint;
count : integer;
begin
reset(s);

lint file;
longint);

max := 0;

while not eof(s)do

begin
read(s,temp);

for count := 1 to maxarray do
begin
if temp[count] ~max then max
end;

:=

temp[count];

{ for }

end;
m:= max;

end; { get max }

procedure initialisegraphics(var gflag
var
grDriver: Integer;

boolean) ;

grMode: Integer;
Errcode: Integer;

begin
grDriver := Detect;
InitGraph (grDriver, grMode, 'c: \language\bp\bgi
{ setgraphmode{grmode); 0
vga low
640*200 2
640*350 2
vga med
1
vga high 640*480 1
2
Errcode

:=

if ErrCode

'l;
pages
pages
page}

GraphResult;

= grOk

then

gflag := true
else
begin
Writeln{ 1 Graphics error: 1
gflag := false;
end;
{ end if errcode }
end; { initialisegraphics }

1

GraphErrorMsg{ErrCode));

procedure putgraticule;
begin
rectangle{0,0 getmaxx,getmaxy);
floodfill{l0 1 10 1 White);
setcolor {black) ;
Line{99,10,99,459);
{ vertical left line }
Line{S02,10,502,459); { vertical right line }
1

line{l00,459,501,459); { base line }
line{301,10,301,459); { central line
outtextxy (100, 465 1 -200');
outtextxy(297,465, 1 0 1 ) ;
outtextxy(499,465, '200 1 ) ;
1

{ base line indices }
',',
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end;

{ put graticule }

procedure display(var a: lintarray;
x,y,r : integer);
var count, scale,

baselinex,
baseliney : integer;
begin
setcolor(black);
baselinex := x;

baseliney

:=

scale

20;

:=

for count
begin

r * y;

:= 1

to maxarray do

putpixel (baselinex + count, baseliney- (a (count] div scale), black);

end; { for }
end;

{ display

procedure displayline(a
lintarray);
var count, scale,
baselinex,
baseliney : integer;
begin
setcolor(black);
baselinex := 100;
baseliney := getmaxy - 50;
scale

1\.I

u

.- 10;

for count := 1 to maxarray do
begin
putpixel(baselinex +count, baseliney- (a[count] div scale),
black) ;
end; { for }

end;

{ displayline

procedure keeptotals(var a,g
lintarray);
var count
integer;
begin
for count := 1 to maxarray do
g [count] : = a [count] + g [count];
end;

{··························································)

-~

.

clrscr;
storename := 'd:\programs\datavis\store.lni';
assign(store,storename);
reset (store);
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initialisegraphics (grflagl;
if grflag then
{ graphics is ok }
begin
rectangle(l,l,getmaxx,getmaxyl;
setviewport(3,3,getmaxx-3,getmaxy-3,false);
clearviewport;
floodfill(lO,lO,white);
while not finish do
begin
if keypressed then ch := readkey;
{ test for quit
if (ch = 'Q') or (ch = 'q') then finish :=true;

reset (store);

{ Prepare input file }

row := 0;
putgraticule;

cleararray{gross);
while not eof{store) do
begin

inc (row) ;
cleararray(anyarray);

read{store,anyarray);
keeptotals(anyarray,gross) ;{ keep totals }
{ X
y
color }
display(anyarray,100,45 , row);
end;
{ while not eof }
if eof{store) then finish := true;

end; { while }
readln;
end; { if grflag }
ch : = readkey;
if (ch = 'P') or (ch
ch := readkey;

=

'p') then printgraph(4,landscape);

clearviewport;
putgraticule;
displayline(gross);
ch : = readkey;
if (ch = 'P') or (ch = 'p') then printgraph(4,landscape);
ch := readkey;
read;
{ pause until key pressed }
closegraph;
close{store);
end. { main }
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program dwc;
{$I d:\programs\datavis\DWCL18. PAS}

{ include library file }

{--------------------------main---------------------------------------

-}

begin { dwc }
cleartextscreen;
menu;
getfiles(session,start);

if start then
begin
loopl : = 0;

initialisegraphics(grflag);
{ test for graphics adapter }
{ graphics available }
begin
finish := false;
While not finish do
begin
dograticule(session);
{ set up screen }
initscreenrec(session);
{ set up default values
doinput(session);
{ alter values as required }

if grflag then

if session.shape = 1 then
squarecountpixels(session)
else
circlecountpixels(session);

{ size the target

initview(session.screen.g);
randomize;
{ initialise the randomiser }
for loop1 := 1 to session.maxrun do
begin
session.loop
:= loop1;
current ;= session.centre;
{ reset to centre }
restart := false;
loop2
: = 0;
case session.shape of
{ 1 = square 2
1 : case session.numberbits of
2
dosquare2(session);
3 : dbsquare3(session);
4 : dosquare4(session);
end;
2
case session.numberbits of
2
dotarget2(session);
3 : dotarget3(session);
4 : dotarget4(session);
end; { case }
end; { case }
case session.numberbits of
2
dorun2(session,loop2);
3 : dorun3(session,loop2);
4 ; dorun4(session,loop2);
end; { case }

= circle

}

density(session);
dotext(session,loop1);
end; { for loop }
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beep;
while not keypressed do

{ quit

or print result )

begin
ch : = read key;
case ch of

'R', 'r' : begin { restart }
finish := false;
break; { leave while state }
end;
IQI I

begin { quit }
finish ·- true;
break; { leave while state }

tqt

'P', 'P'

end;
: printgraph(4);

else finish

:=

true;

end;
{ case }
end; { while not keypressed }

end; { while not finish }
closegraph;
{ When program over close graphics }
end;
{ i f grflag }
end; { if start }

closefiles(session);
endmessage;
end.

{ dwc }
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{ Drunkards Walk Library functions
Uses
{ use des funct.iono for fj le and Urne
des,
{ output to printer }
printer,
{ use graphics window functions
graph,
{ use text window functions }
crt;

canst
shortdelay

1500;

blank6str
blank40str =

•GUOUUO•;
'OOOfrOUOUtitifrOo-o-frDCrOtifrOlifrfr(frOOfrOOOUOOVfrfrO';

headerstring

=

\r

'
'Data Visualisation
Program';

inputname

default values

'intinput. dat';
'intoutpt. dat';

outputname

days : array [0. ,6] of String[9) =
{ day conversion }
('Sunday', 'Monday', 'Tuesday',
'Wednesday', 'Thursday', 'Friday',
'Saturday');
array[l .. l2) of string[3)

months

{'JAN'
'JUL'

max runs

I
I

'FEB', 'MAR'
'AUG' I I SEP'

I
I

'APR'
'OCT'

I
I

= {

month conversion}

'MAY' I 'JUN',
'NOV', 'DEC');

default maximum number of runs permitted }

1;

minradius , 50;
midradius , 100;
maxradius
200;

{ default smallest size of target }
{ default size of target }
{ default largest size of target }

tcoll
tcol2
tcol3
tcol4

, 10;
, 150;
, 250;
, 400 i

{ text x position values }

trow

,

{ text y position values }

10 i

textmodetext , yellow;
textmodeback , blue;

{ text mode text colour }
{ text mode background }

{ graphics mode colours }
, magenta;
linecolour
labelcolour
textcolour

lightgray;
, lightcyan;

blankcolour , green;
changecolour , white;
errorcolour , red;
gratcolour
areacolour
tracecolour
crosscolour

gbackcolour

,
,
,
,

Edith Cowan University

{ blanking colour }
{ change text colour }
{ colour for errors }

yellow;
green;
lightblue;
red;

= lightgray;

{ text window labels }
{ text window results}

{ target colour }
{ overwrite colour }
{ trace colour }

{ backgound colour

f
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tbackcolour
ibackcolour

blue;
blue;
yellow;

hbackcolour

{ text wi.ndo"' background }

degree

= 0. 017453292;

degree in radians }

ESC

= #$1B;

hexadecimal equivalent of escape key }

onesize

= 255;

maxsize of ld array }

{-------------------data store types ------------------------------ }
type
values = (total,min,avg,max,counter);

valuesarray
realarray
onearray
twoarray
threearray
four array

array index }

array [values] of longint; { data store }

array(values] of real;
array[O .. onesize] of longint; {
{
{
{

= array[l. .2] of shortint;
array[l .. 3] of shortint;
= array[l .. 4] of shortint;

ld
2d
3d
4d

array
array
array
array

}
}
}
}

{-------------- file handling types -------------------------------}
direction
(input,output,inout,none);
{ file data direction
filename
sintfile

string[40];
file of shortint;

=

{ data file }

.
choicerecord = record { progam choices storage }
inputfile,
outputfile : sintfile;
inputf ilename,
outputfilename
filename;
flow : direction
end;
{--------------graphics types ------------------------------------}
numstr = string [20];
{ temporary strings }
nstr
= string[S];
view
= record
port : viewporttype;
fill : integer;
end; { view }
screens = record
g,
{ graphics }
i,
{ input }
t,
{ text )
h
{ help )
view ;
end;
screenrecord

= record
screen
centre
tradius
step,
maxrun,

Edith Cowan University

screen data storage
screens;
pointtype;
longint; { size from centre }
{ number of pixels increment }
{ maximum iterations }
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shape,

{ 1 - square 2

numberbits

integer;

~

loop,

iteration count

target area

longint;

aveexpblue,
greenarea

circle }

{ area in circle }

·.real;

totalbits,

{ total bits tested in all runs

expectedblue,
bluerunarea,
bluerunnurnber ·

{ area of run }

{ calculated value by kaye
{ number of digits
longi_nt;

bluerundensity

real;

bluecount,

bluearea

valuesarray;

bluedensity

real array;

bluedirection

valuesarray;

{

storage

arrays }
usefile,

{ file input/output

}

overlap

boolean; { overlap data }

filechoice

choicerecord;

timestr,
datestr
: numstr;
end; { end screen record }

var

vector = record
{ direction of trace }
s,f : pointtype;
end;
{-------------------global variables ------------------------}
start,
grflag,
finish,
restart
boolean;
current,
next

pointtype;

Run,
loopl,
loop2

integer;

{ determine direction }

count : longint;
pixelcolor : word;
session
ch

: screcnrecord;
: char;

{ common data for graphics }
{ user response }
173
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{--------------------- Functions ------------------------------------}
function LeadingZero(w : Word) : String;
var
{ place a leading zero and convert time to string }

s : string;
begin
Str(w:O,s);

if Length(s) = 1 then
s:='0'+s;

LeadingZero : = s ,·
end;

function num2str(a

longint) :numstr;

var
templ,

temp2
longint;
numstr;
c
begin
{ convert integer to string for display }
c := " . templ : = a; temp2 := 0;
'
if a = 0 then c :='0';
templ := abs(templ);

while templ
begin

<>

0 do

temp2 : = templ mod 10;

c := chr(temp2 + 48} + c;
templ := templ div 10;
end; { while }

if a< 0 then c := '-'+ c;
num2str := c;
end;
{ num2str }
procedure beep;

begin
sound(400);
delay(lOO);
nosound;
end; { beep }
integer): integer;
function getnum(a : nstr; p,q
var i,code : integer;
tch : char;
begin
while (ord(tch) <> 13) do
begin
tch := readkey;
case ord(tch) of
48 .. 57: begin
a : = a + tch;
outtextxy(q,trow * p,a);
end;
13 : break;
end; { case }
end; { While }
val (a, i,code);
getnum := i;
end; { getnum }
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function getstr(p,q : integer): filename;

var s : filename;
code : integer;
tch : char;

begin
s :=

"i

while

(ord(tch} <> 13) do

begin
tch : = read key;

case ord(tch} of
32 .. 122 : begin
S:=S+tCh;
outte~:txy(p,trow

*

q,s);

end;
13 : break;
end; { case }
end; { While }
getstr := s;

end;

{ getnum

{---------------------Procedures ------------------------------------}
procedure initview(v
view);
begin
with v do
begin
setviewport(port.xl,port.yl,port.x2,port.y2,port.clip);
clearviewport;
end; { with v }

setcolor(v.fill);
floodfill{v,port.xl,v.port.yl,linecolour);
end;

{ initview }

procedure circlecountpixels{var g : screenrecord);
var x,
integer; { count pixels in target }
y
longint;
t
word;
c
count
boolean;
range
integer;
begin
with g do
begin
range := g.tradius + 1;
initview(g.screen.g);

i,'·

setcolor(gratcolour);
setfillstyle{solidfill,gratcolour); { draw and fill target }
fillellipse{centre.x,centre.y, tradius,tradius);
t := O;
{ initialise count }
for x := centre.x - range to centre.x + range do
for y := centre.y - range to centre.y + range do
begin
c := getpixel(x,y);
test pixel colour }
if c

= gratcolour

then

{ if yellow then part of target }

begin
inc(t);
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putpixel (x, y, areacolour.);

end;

if c

= gbackcolour

then count

{ ar.eacolour when counted )
:=

false;

end;
g.targetarea := t;
end;
{ with g )
end; { countpixels }

procedure squarecountpixels(var·g : screenrecord);
var x,
y
t

c
count
range

rect
begin

integer; { count pixels in target }
longint;
word;

boolean;
integer;
array[l .. 4] of pointtype;

range := g.tradius + 1;
initview(g.screen.g};
with g do
begin
setcolor(gratcolour);
setfillstyle(solidfill,gratcolour); { draw and fill target }
rect [1] .x :=
rect(ll .y :=
rect [2] .x :=
rect [2] .y :=
rect [3] .x .-

(centre .x

(centre.y

tradius);
tradius);

(centre.x + tradius);
tradius);
(centre.y
(centre .x + tradius);
rect[3].y := (centre.y + tradius);
rect [4] .x := (centre .x
tradius);
rect [4] .y := (centre .y + tradius};

{ print target }
FillPoly(Sizeof(rect) div SizeOf(PointType), rect);
t := 0;
{ initialise count }
for x := centre.x - range to centre.x + range do
for y := centre.y - range to centre.y + range do
begin
test pixel colour }
c := getpixel(x,y);
if c = gratcolour then
if yellow then part of target }
begin
inc(t);
putpixel(x,y,areacolour);
{ areacolour when counted }
end;
if c = gbackcolour then count := false;
end;
g.targetarea := t;
end;
{ with g )
end; { countpixels
procedure cleartextscreen;
begin
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textcolor(textmodetext);

textbackground(textmodeback);
clrscr;
gotoxy(20,l);

write(headerstring);
end;

{ cleartextscreen

procedure endmessage;

begin
cleartextscreen;
gotoxy(lS, 7);

write('This Program has terminated normally.');
delay(shortdelay);
end;

{ endmessage }

procedure closefiles(g
screenrecord);
begin
if g.usefile then
begin
cleartextscreen;
if (g.filechoice.flow = input) or
(g.filechoice.flow = inout) then
begin
close(g.filechoice.inputfile);
gotoxy(lO,S);

write (g. filechoice. inputfilename,
end;

= output) or
(g.filechoice.flow = inout) then
begin
close(g.filechoice.outputfile);
gotoxy(10,7);
write(g.filechoice.outputfilename,
end;
delay(shortdelay);

' closed 1 )

;

if {g.filechoice.flow

end;

' closed');

( if )

writeln;
end; { closefiles }
procedure menu;
begin
gotoxy(15,3);
gotoxy(l5,4);
gotoxy(lS,S);
gotoxy(l5,6);
gotoxy(l5,7);
gotoxy(l5,8);
writeln;
end; { menu }

Write('Choice
write('
write('
write('
write('
write('

procedure filetest(var f
var fn

c
var cf

1
2
3
4
C
Q

NONE <Default>');
Input') ;
Output');
Input and Output•);
Continue');
EXIT I) i

sintfile;
filename;
integer;
boolean) ;

begin
if length(fn) > 0 then
begin
9.15. assian(f,fn};
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case c of
1 : reset (f);
2 : rewl-i te (f) ;
end;

{ case }

{$I+}
case ioresult of
0
2
3
5
12

writeln (fn, •
writeln (fn, 1
writeln(fn,'
writeln(fn,'
writeln(fn, 1

is available'};
-:

File NOT found');

Path NOT found');
File Access Denied');
Invalid File Access Code');

end; { case }
if ioresult <> 0 then cf

:=

false;

{ if }

end;

end;

{ testfile }

procedure getfiles(var g
screenrecord;
var s
boolean) ;
var choice
char;
anyfile
filename;
choice£ lag
boolean;
begin
choiceflag := false;
s

:=

true;

while not choiceflag do
begin
Write('What is Choice <1>,<2>,<3>,<C>,<Q>?
readln {choice) ;

');

writeln;
case choice of
'1'

: begin

g.usefile := false;
g.filechoice.flow :=none;
choiceflag := true;
end;
begin
g.usefile := true;
g.filechoice.flow := input;
Write {'What is the Input file Name ?
readln(g.filechoice.inputfilename);
filetest{g.filechoice.inputfile,
g.filechoice.inputfilename,
1, choiceflag) ;
writeln;
end;,

'2'

1 );

)1

begin1
g.usefile := true;
g.filechoice.flow := output;
Write{ 1 What is the Output file Name ?
readln{g.filechoice.outputfilename);
filetest{g.filechoice.outputfile,
g.filechoice.outputfilename,
2, choice flag);
writeln;
end;

'3'

141

:

I) i

begin
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t !- " ;
GetTime(h,m,s,hund);
t := LeadingZero(h) + ':' + LeadingZero(m) + ':' + LeadingZet·o(s);
end;
{ dotime }
9.16.

procedure dodate (var t

var

: numstr);

{ get date from system }

y, rna, d, dow : word;

''

begin
GetDate(y,mo,d,dow);
t

:=

end;

leadingzero{d) + MONTHS[mo] +

leadingzero(y);

{ dotin:e }

procedure initialisegraphics(var gflag : boolean);
var

{ check for a graphics driver and configure

grDriver: Integer;
grMode
Integer;
ErrCode : Integer;

begin
grDriver := Detect;
InitGraph(grDriver, grMode, 'c:\language\bp\bgi ');
ErrCode

:=

if ErrCode

GraphResult;
=

grOk then

gflag .- true
else
begin
Writeln ( 'Graph.i.cs error:', GraphErrorMsg (ErrCode));
gflag := false;
end;
{ end if errcode }
end; { initialisegraphics }
procedure printgraph(Mode
integer);
var i, j, k,
{ loop counters }

m,
msb,lsb,Maxx,Maxy : integer;
begin
maxx := getmaxx;
maxy := getmaxy;
{ get whole screen }
setviewport(O,O,maxx,maxy,false);
write(lst, ESC, 'A' ,#$07); { set line spacing to 7/72 inch }
lsb := maxy AND ~nOff;
rnsb := maxy shr 8;

{ rnaxy mod 256 }
{ int rnaxx I 256

j := 0; { initial x value }
repeat
{ scan x values }
write(lst,ESC, '*', char(mode) ,char(lsb),char(msb));
for i := maxy downto 0 do
{ y values to scan }
begin
m := O;
for k := 0 to 7 do
begin
{ construct m from individual pixel values
m := m shl 1; { shift m left 1 bit }
if getpixel(j + k,i) <> 0 then inc(m); ( if pixel not black )
end; { for k }
( record it }
writc(Jst, char(m));
end; I fori I
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write(lst, #$OD, #$OA); { character 13 and character. 10 }
inc(j,B);
until j >= maxx - 1;
{ complete width used }
write{lst,#$OC);
{ form feed }
end;
{ printgraph- }

procedure dotext(gr : screenrecord;
i : integer);

var tint
temp
tempstr,
tmin,
tavg,
tmax

longint;
word;

: numstr;

begin
{ display text screen data
settextjustify(lefttext,centertext);
with gr do
{ set text v:iewport }
initview (screen, ·t) ;

.

'·,

beg~n

setcolor(labelcolour);
{ print headings }
outtextxy(tcoll,trow, 'MAX.RUNS');
outtextxy(tcoll,trow *

3, 'Run Number')i

outtextxy(tcoll,trow *
outtextxy(tcoll,trow *
outtextxy(tcoll,trow *

6,'Radius');

outtextxy(tcol1,trow
outtextxy(tcol1,trow
outtextxy(tcol1 1 trow
outtextxy(tcol1 1 trow
outtextxy(tcol1 trow
1

)/
/

:_-· ',--::

"

*
*
*

5, 'TARGET');

7, 'Area');
9

1

'BLUE') i

10~'Count');

11 1

* 12,
* 13 1

'

I

'

Max');
AVg•);
Min') ;

outtextxy{tcol1 trow * 14, 'Area');
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 15,' Max');
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 16 1 ' Avg');
outtextxy {tcoll, trow * 17 1 ' Min');
1

outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 1B,'Density');
outtextxy{tcol1,trow * 19,' Max');
outtextxy{tcoll,trow * 20,' Avg');
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 21, 1 Min');
outtextxy{tcol1,trow * 22, 'Direction•);
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 23,' Max');
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 24,' Avg');
outtextxy{tcoll,trow * 25, • Min');
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 27, 'GREEN AREA');
outtextxy(tcoll 1 trow * 28, 'Per Cent');
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 30 1 'Exp.Blue');
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 31, •ave %');
outtextxy(tcoll,trow

*

outtextxy(tcollltrow

* 34, 'Total Blta');
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outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 35, 'Files');

{ use files }

if gr.usefile then
case gr.filechoice.flow of
input

begin
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 36,' Input');

tempstr

:=

gr.filechoice.inputfilename;

outtextxy(tcoll, trow* 37,tempstr);

output

end;
begin
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 36,' Output');

tempstr
inout

:=

gr.filechoice.outputfilename;

outtextxy_(tcoll, trow* 37,tempstr);
end;
begin
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 36,' Input');

tempstr

:=

gr.filechoice.inputfilename;

*

outtextxy(tcoll, trow
outtextxy(tcoll,trow

tempstr

:=

37,tempstr);

* 38,' Output');

gr.filechoice.outputfilename;

outtextxy(tcoll, trow* 39,tempstr);

end;
end; { case }
{ overlapping }
if i = gr.maxrun then
begin
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 42, 'R to repeat');
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 43, 'Q to quit');
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 44, 'P to print');
end; { i f finish is true }
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 45, 'Time');
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 46, 'Date');
write in values }
settextjustify(righttext,centertext);
setcolor(textcolour);
str(gr.maxrun,tempstr);
outtextxy{tcol2,trow * l,tempstr);
str(gr.laop,tempstr);
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 3,tempstr);
str(gr.tradius,tempstr);
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 6,tempstr);
str(gr.targetarea,tempstr);
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 7,tempstr);
str(gr.bluecount[counter),tempstr);
str(gr.bluecount[max] ,tmax);
str(gr.bluecount(avg) ,tavg);
str(gr.bluecount[min],tmin);
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * lO,tempstr);
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * ll,tmax);
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 12,tavg);
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 13,tmin);
str (gr, bl uearea [counter] , tempotr) ;
str(gr.bluearealmaxl ,tmax);
str(gr.blucarea [avg] ,tavgl;
18 t
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str (gr. bluearea [min] , tmln) ,·
outtextxy (tcol2, trow * 14, ternpstr);
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * lS,tmax);

outtextxy(tcol2,trow

*

16,tavg};

outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 17,tmin);
str (gr .bluedensity [counter] :2:4, tempstr) ;
str (gr.bluedensity [max): 2:4, tmax);
str(gr.bluedensity[avg] :2:4,tavg);

str(gr.bluedensity[min] :2:4,tmin);
outtextxy(tcol2,trow
outtextxy(tcol2,trow
outtextxy(tcol2,trow
outtextxy(tco12,trow

* 18,tempstr);
* 19,tmax);
* 20,tavg);
* 2l,tmin);

str (0, tempstr);

str(gr.bluedirection[max] ,tmax);
str(gr.bluedirection[avg] ,tavg);
str{gr.bluedirection[min] ,tmin);

outtextxy{tcol2,trow
outtextxy(tcol2,trow
outtextxy(tcol2,trow
outtextxy(tcol2,trow

*
*
*
*

22,tempstr);
23,tmax);
24,tavg);
25,tmin);

str(gr.greenarea:2:2,tempstr);
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 28,tempstr);
tempstr := num2str(gr.expectedblue);
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 30, tempstr);
if gr.expectedblue <> 0 then
begin
gr.aveexpblue := {gr.bluecount[avg] I gr.expectedblue)*lOO;
str{gr.aveexpblue:2:4,tempstr);
outtextxy{tcol2,trow * 3l,tempstr);
end;

{ if )

if gr.overlap then
tempstr := 'Yes'
else
tempstr := 'No';
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 33, tempstr);
tempstr := num2str(gr.totalbits);
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 34,tempstrl;

if not gr.usefile then outtextxy(tcol2, trow* 35, 1 none');
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 45, gr.timestr);
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 46, gr.datestr);
end; { with
end; { dotext

view

procedure getcoords(x,y,r,deg : integer;
var t : point type l;
begin
{ calculate coordinates for radial labelo }
t.x :~ trunc(oin(deg • degree) * r);
182

Edith Cowun University

t l/12/99

Development of a Model for Smart Card Based Access Control in Mulli-User, Multi-

Resource, MultiMLevel Access Systems
t.y :- trunc(cos(deg
t.x := x + t.x;
t.y := y + t.y;
end;

*

degree) * r);

{ getcoords

procedure cross(x,y
integer);
var temp : integer;
begin { draw a cross at coordinates
setcolor(crosscolour);
temp := 5;
line(x-temp,y,x+temp,y);
Line(x,y-temp,x,y+temp);
circle(x,y,temp -2};
end; { cross }

procedure dosquare2(var g: screenrecord);
var count : integer;
coord : pointtype;
increment : integer;
begin
with g do

begin
{ initview(screen.g};
} cross{centre.x,centre.y);
setcolor(gratcolour);
rectangle{centre.x - tradius,centre.y
tradius,
centre.x + tradius,centre.y + tradius); { print target }
increment := tradius + 10;
settextjustify(centertext,centertext);
outtextxy(centre.x,
centre.y
increment, 1 oo');
I 01 1 ) j
outtextxy(centre.x + lncrement,centre.y,
outtextxy(centre.x,
centre.y + increment, '10 1 ) ;
I 111) ;
outtextxy(centre.x
increment,centre.y,
end; { with g }
end; { dosquare2 }
procedure dosquare3(var g: screenrecord);
var coord
pointtype;
increment : integer;
begin
with g do
begin
initview(screen.g);
cross(centre.x,centre.y);
{ pn.nt target }
setcolor(gratcolour);
rectangle(centre.x- tradius,centre.y
tradiua,
centre.x + tradiua,centre.y + tradiua);
increment :~ tradiuo + 15;
settextjuotify(centertcxt,centertext);
outtextxy(centre.x,
centt·c.y
outtextxy(ccntre.x t incn::ment, centre.y
outtextxy(centre.x + increment, centre.;outtextxy(centre.x t increment, ecntn~.}'
outtextxy(centre.x,
CL•Iltl·e,y
outtextxy(centre.x
increment, ct>nt rt•.y
outtextxy(centn~.x
incn!ment, ct:ntte.'/•
outtextxy (centn!,X
inLTt·rnt~nt, n•nt n·. ~·

t

1

inct·ement,
increment,
,
incrernPnl,

'000');
'001');
'010');
'011'1,•
incn·mPnt, '100 •);
itll'l'l'lllt•nt., '101 •):
'110'1;
lllcl

t•nwnt, • Ill' l;
I~J

Edith Cownn Univerttity

lt/12/99

Development of a Model for Smart Card Based Access Control in Multi-User, MultiResource, Multi-Level Access Systems
end; { with g }
end;
{ dosquare3 }

procedure dosquare4(var g: screenrecord);
var coord : pointtype;
halfinc,

increment : integer;
begin
with g do

begin
initview(screen.g);
cross{centre.x,centre.y);
setcolor(gratcolour);
rectangle(centre.x- tradius,centre.y
tradius,
centre.x + tradius,centre.y + tradius); { print target }
increment := tradius + 25;
halfinc := trunc(increment/2);
settextjustify{centertext,centertext);
outtextxy(centre.x,
outtextxy(centre.x +
outtextxy(centre.x +
outtextxy{centre.x +
outtextxy(centre.x +
outtextxy(centre.x +
outtextxy(centre.x +
outtextxy(centre.x +
outtextxy(centre.x,
outtextxy(centre.x
outtextxy(centre.x
outtextxy(centre.x
outtextxy(centre.x
outtextxy(centre.x
outtextxy{centre.x
outtextxy{centre.x
end;
{ with g }
end; { dosquare4 }

halfinc,
increment,
increment,
increment,
increment,
increment,
halfinc,
half inc,
increment,
increment,
increment,
increment,
increment,
half inc,

centre.y
increment, '0000');
centre.y
increment, '0001');
centre.y
increment, '0010');
centre.y
halfinc,
'0011');
centre.y,
'0100');
centre.y + halfinc,
'0101');
centre.y +increment, '0110');
centre.y +increment, '0111');
centre.y +increment, '1000');
centre. y + increment, '1001');
centre.y +increment, '1010');
centre.y + halfinc,
'1011');
centre.y,
'1100');
centre.y
halfinc,
'1101');
centre.y
increment,'1110');
centre. y
increment, '1111') ;

procedure dotarget2(var g : screenrecord);
var coord
point type;
begin
{ do 2 bit target }
with g do
begin
initview(ocreen.g);
croas(centre.x,centre.y);
aetcolor(gratcolour);
circle(centrc.x,centre.y,tradius); {print target )
settextjuotify(ccntertcxt,centertext);
getcoordo{centrc.x, centre.y, Lradiun
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '00');
g~tcoordo(<.:cntre.x, centr·e.y, tr·adiun
outtextxy (c. cord. x, coord. }', '0 1 •) ;
getcoordo(centn~.x. ccntre.y, t_r.Hiiull
outtextxylcoonl.x,coord.y, 10');
getcoordo(centr~ x, centrt~. 1l, t r.t<liuu
outte)(txy (coord. x, coon!.~··' 11

+ 10,100,

coordl;

20, 90, cooni);
t

1 0'

0,

coord);

1

1
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end;
end;

{ with g
( dotarget2

procedure dotarget3 (var g
var coord
pointtype;

screen record);

begin
with g do
begin
initview(screen.g);
cross(g.centre.x,g.centre.y);
setcolor(gratcolour);
{ draw target }
{ double thickness to eliminate bleed through
circle(g.centre.x,g.centre.y, g.tradius);
circle(g.centre.x,g.centre.y, g.tradius+l);

settextjustify(centertext,centertext);

getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y, g.tradius +10, 180, coord);
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '000');
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y, g.tradius +20, 135, coord);
outtextxy(coo;_·d.x,coord.y, '001');

getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y, g.tradius +20,90, coord) ;
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '010'};

getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y, g.tradius +20,45, coord) ;
outtextxy (coord. x, coord. y, '011'};
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y,
outtextxy (coord. x, coord. y, '1 00' J ;
getcoords (g.centre.x, g.centre.·/.
outtextxy (coord, x, coord, y, '1 01' J ;
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y,
outtextxy (coord, x, coord. y, '11 0') ;
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y,
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '111'1;
end;
{ ;dth g }
end; { dotarget3 }

g.tradius +10,0, coordJ;
g.tt·adius +20,315, coord);
g.tr.'l.dius +20,270, coord) ;
g.

t1·actiu~

+20,225, coordl;

procedure dotarget4 (var g
screenrecord) ;
var coarct
pointtype;
begin
with g do
begin
initview(ocreen.g);
croas(g.centrc.x,g.centre.yl;
setcolor (gratcolourl;
{ draw t •.uget }
{ double thickneoo to eliminate bleed through
circle (g. centre. x, g. cent 1·e. y, q. t r.1d iuo J;
circle(g.centre.x,g.centl·e.y, ~.traditJn•ll;
circle (g, cenln! .x, g. ct•nt rr•. y, q. t 1 .Hittw .: J;
oettextjuotifylcei\tt•rtrxt,ct•rJ~t·Itt·~t);

getcoonlnlq.centlr:·.x, q.o·nt n•.'/. <J.t 1-tditUJ
outtextxy(l'oonl.x,coord.;•. •oooo· J;
getcoonlu(q.ct•ntn·.x, q.ct•lltrr.;·. q.tl.tdlull
outtextxy(coor·ct.x,cootd.y, 'OOOI'J;
getcoordu (y. eent n·. x, IJ. crnt 1 •·. y, 'I t 1.HI! uu
outtextx;•tcootd.x,cnont.;·. ·oo.o• J;
gf'ttcoordu ('J. c~nt n·. :-:, q. crnt r ... ;·, IJ t 1 ,J,Il Uti
OU l t ~X t X'/ { C 00 I'd . X, ('""! ll y , ' 0 0 l I ' ~ ;

10, 100, coord) 1

:w.

1~7.

coordl:

::0'

I p,'

COOh1) ;

.::v,

I 1 ~,

f.'O.OJ"d)

j
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90, coord) ;
getcoords{g.centre.x, g.centre.y, g.tradius + 20,
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '0100');
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y, g.tradius ~ 20, 68, coord) ;
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '0101')';
'
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y, g.tradius + 20, 45, coord);
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '0110 1 ) ;
..
getcoords (g. centre. x, g. centre·. y,. ·g: tradiur:~,.- + 20, ' 22;'- coord) ;
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '0111·')_;_
-getcoords(g.centre.x, g.cenfz::e.y,'>g_.tradius +. 10,- .·a, coord);
outtextxy(coord.x-;coord.y,'lOOO')·_;
_-,getcoords'(g.centre.x, g.ce-ht.re.y,: g.trii~H~-s + ·20-; 338, 'Coord);
outtextxy{coord.x,coord.y,-ilOOi•J_;
__ c
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.cent're.y,"·-g.trachus + ~0, "315, _coord);
Outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '1010-')·; - ,:;- _
getcoords(g.centre.x, ·g.centre.y,- g.tradius_ +.. 2o,·- 293, coord);
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '1011');
,._
\'
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y, g.tradius·-+.;20, 270, _coord);
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '1100');
>'
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y, g·.tradius + 20,_ 248, '·coord);
outtextxy(coord.x, coord.y, '1101,');
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre ..y, g.t_radius + 20, 225, coord);
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '1110');
getcoords(g.centre.x, g ..centre.y_, g.tradius + 20, 202, coord);
outtextxy(coord;x,coord.y,'ll11');
end; { with g }
end; { dotarget4 }

procedure dograticule(var gr: screenrecord);
var xlimit, ylimit : integer;
begin
xlimit := getmaxx; { get screen limits }
ylimit := getmaxy;
setcolor(linecolour);
rectangle(O,O,xlimit, ylim.it);
{ set gratiCule }
rectangle(3,3,xlimit _.::'3~-ylimit- 3);
line(479,3,479,ylimit - 3);
with gr do
·
begin
setviewport(479,4,479,ylimit-3,clipon); {set text area}
getviewsettings(screen.t.port); _{ store.-text· area limits }
screen.t.fill := lightgray; ,_
---.:,
getviewsettings (screen.h.port) ;. '{-"stOre 'be'lp screen limits }
screen.h.fill := yellow;
setviewport(4,4,478,478, clipon);

---. {' giaphics _area }

getviewsettings (screen. g .port);
screen.g.fill :=white;

_store graphics area limits

getviewsettings(screen.i.port);
screen.i.fill :=blue;
end; { with gr }
end; { dograticule }

procedure initscreenrec(var g
begin

{ store data input- area limits }
.;.

screenrecord) ;

with g do
begin
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with screen.g do
begin
centre.x := (port.x2
centre.y := (port.y2
fill := gbackcolour;

.

end; { with }

tradius

:=

maxrun
step

:= IJlaxnms;
:= 1'
:= 1;

overlap

:=

shape

midradius;

','1

port. xl) d lV -,'2;
,,
port.yl) divi'.·2;
'J

{ default Settings
(I}

r(",-"

false;

numberbits :"' 2;

{ default_ two bit patterns }

expectedblue

:=

tradius

aveexpblue

:=

0;

totalbits

:=:: 0;

•

tradius; "\:::,.

bluerunarea := 0;
greenarea
:= 0;
bluerunnumber := 0;
bluerundensity := 0;
bluearea[minl
bluedensity[min]
bluedirection[min]
bluecount [min]

maxlongint;
maxlongint;
: = maxlongint;
:= 0'\axlongint;

:=
:=

dotime(timestr);
dodate(datestr};
end;
end; { initscreenrec }

procedure dohelp{t : view);
var temp : integer;
begin
{ print help data on screen }
settextjustify(lefttext,centertext);
with t do
begin
initview(t);
setcolor(labelcolour);
outtextxy(tcol1,trow, 'Help Screen');
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 3, 'Run :');
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 6, 'Index:');
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 9, 'Density : ');
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 12, 'Direction:');
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 15, 'COUNT');
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 17, 'MAX');
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 19, 'AVG');
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 21, 'MIN');
outtextxy(tcoll,trow • 34, 'Target(in Pixel.Sl •);
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 36, 'SIZE : ');
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 38, 'AREA : ');
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setcolor(textcolour);
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 4, 'Number of Runs');
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 7, 'Number of counts');
outtextxy{tcoll,trow * lO,'No. of Bluea'};

outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 13, 'Avg.-·'Direction'l;
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 16, 'total this run');
outtextxy(tcoll, trow

*

18, 'Max. of all runs')_;

outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 20, 'Avg. of all runs');
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 22, 'Mi'n. of' ail runs');
outtextxy(tcoll,-trow ··• 36,'
oUttextxy{tcoll,trow * 38,'

* -40; 1 KEY
outtextxy{tfrai1,trow_ * 44,'P
outtext.Xy(tcoll,ti:ow

outtextxy(t}po-ll,trow * 46,_'0
end; { wit\).?h }
{ return,t~ graphics window}

radius'};
pixels'};
),!

COMMANDS'};

Print') ;
r Quit');

end; { dohe.lp }

/ ..-

procedure doinput (var gr :, 1 screenrecord);
var pas,
temp,
code,
tsize,
truns : integer;
tstrl,
tstr2 : numstr;
tch : char;
templstr, 'f:
longblank. J: string [40];
inputstr : string[6);
overlap : boolean;
begin
{ change session parameters
settextjustify(lefttext,centertext);

·.;,
.JI

inputstr : = ' ';
with gr do
begin
initview(screen.i);
setcolor(labelcolour);
outtextxy{tcol1,trow, 'Data Input Screen');
tstrl := num2str(minradius);
tstr2 := num2str(maxradius};
outtextxy{tcoll,trow * 5, '<T>arget Radius Min. ' + tstrl
+ ' Max.' + tstr2);
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 6, 'Current Radius');
tstrl := num2str(gr.tradius);
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 6,tstr1);
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * B, 1 <0>verlap');
if gr.overlap then outtextxy(tcol2,trow * B, •yes')
else outtextxy(tco12,trow * B, •no');
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 10, 'Number of <R>uns -Min
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 11, 'Current Runs');
tstr1 := num2str(gr.maxrun);
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 11,tstr1);
tstr1

:=

1

Max : 32767');

num2str(gr.numberbits);
188
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outtextxy(tcoll,trow 11 13, 'Number of <B>its ');
outtextxy(tcol2,trow" 13,tstrl};
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 15, '<S>hape Default ');

if gr.shape = 1 then

outtextxy(tcoi2,trow

* 15, 'Square')

else outtextxy(tcol2,trow • 1.5, 'Circle•);

outtextxy(tcoll, trow * 22, 'Select-<?;. letter' _td change va.lues');

outtextxy(tcoll, trow *~ 23, 'Press return after e'i~tering eac-h va.lue 1 ) ;
'·'··

:;'!!,-:'-'•'
outtextxy (tcoll, trow . *'<, 25, 'EXIT this scre'en : left ari:"o111') ;

setcalor(textcolour);
while not keypressed do
begin
tch : = read key;

if tch
begin

= #O

then

tch : = readkey;
case tch of
'·begin
exit - left arrow }
'K'
pes := 25;
setcolor(blankcolour);
outtextxy (tcoli, trow' *~'pas, blank6str) ;
setcolor(changecolour);
outtextxy(tcoll 1 :trow * pas, 'EXIT');
break;
end;
end; { case }

end
.','
else { not escape character'' }
begin
case tch of
begin { change number of bits }
'B', 'b'
inc(gr.numberbits);
if gr.numberbits > 4 then gr.numberbits := 2;
setcolor(blankcolour);
outtextxy (tcol2 1 trow_.*' -1'3, .blank6str);
·' '·
setcolor (changecolour) --;
outtextxy (tcol2, troW ~ "'13 1 nu~2str {gr .numberbits));
end;
begin
{ select square 'or circle target }
setcolor (blankcolour-) ( · n ·
outtextxy (tcol2, trow * 15 1 blarik6str);
setcolor ( changecolour) ;
if gr. shape = 1 then c;begin
gr.shape := 2;
outtextxy(tcol2 1 trow * 15 1 'Circle');
'

•s' I ' s'

'

end

'T' I 't'

else
begin
\\
gr.shape := 1;
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 15, 'Square');
end;
end;
begin
{ change size of t~rget }
pas := 6;
setcolor(blankcolour);
outtextxy (tcol2 1 trow * pas 1 blank6str)_;
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setcolor(changecolour);
tsize : = getnum ( inputstr, poe, tcol2);
if tsize > maxradius then tsize := maxradius;
if tsize c 50 then ~size := 50;
setcolor (blankcolour) ;
outtextxy(tcal2, trow * pas, blank6str) ;;,
set color ( changecolour.) ;

outtextxy(tcol2,trow * pas, num2str(tsize));
gr.tradius :~ tsize;
gr .expectedblue := tsize :-*- tsize;
end;
begin

'0', 'o'

pas

'' -· ··
{_ use overlapp_in£(-sampleS '}
:= 8;

setcolor(blankcolour);
outtextxyjtcol2,tiow * pas, blanY.6str);
overlap : = nq·t- overlap·;_
setcolor (charigecoloui::") ; ·
if overlap then '
outteXtxy(tcol2,trow *pas, 'Yes')
else
''

outtextxy(t-col2,-tr?W- * .. pos;-•no•};
gr, overlap : =_ o":;.erlap r
~-~

end;
1

R1 ,

'r'

begin
{ -change nUmber of runs
pas := 11;'. ·
setcolor (bl'ankcol,Our)_;
outteX.txji"(tcol2,·tro0
pas, blank6str);
setcol6r(changecolour);

*

truns := get~um(fnputstr,pos,tcol2);
if truns > maxint then·- truns : = maxirit ;-c
gr. maxrun : = truns;
end;
·
1
'H' , h'
dohelp(screen.h);
end; { case }

0\

end,-_, {if tch }
setcolor(labelcolour);
end; { while not keypressed
tch := 'x';
end;
{ with i }
clearviewport;
end;
{ doinput }
procedure getbit(var f
var b
begin
read(f,b);

sintfil_e;
shortint);

:, c

end; { get bit }
sintfi.-le;
procedure putbit(var f
var b : shortintf;
begin
write(f,b);
end; { putbit }
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procedure density(var g : screenrecord);
var indexx, indexy : integer;
totall,

total2 : longint;
begin { count number of tracecolour and areacalour pixels }
total11;. := 0;
tota12. : 0;

=

setcolor(areacolour);
with g do
begin
for indexx

:=

(centre.x,;.- (tradius + 1))

to (centre.x +_ (tradius +· 1)) do
for indexy := {centre.y -· (t'radius + 1))
to (centre. y '+ (t-radiLis + 1)) dO
begin
,.
pixelcolor := getpixel(indexx,indexy);
case pixelcolor of re;
tracecolour ·' : begin
{ turn trace to green }
pUtpixel{indexx,indexy,areacolour);
inc (totall) ;·inc(total2};
areacolour

end;
b.egin

{ count total area }

inc{total2);

end;
end; { case }
end; { for }
.. bluecount [counter) : = bluerunnumber;
bluerunarea := totall;
greenarea := total2;
bluearea[counter]

:=

bluerunarea;

.----: ----<::-,

rt"

bluerundensity := (bluecount [counter] /bluearea [counter]);
bluedensity[counterJ := bluerundensity;
greenarea := (greenarea/targetarea) * 100;
doirec(bluecount,loop);
doirec{bluearea,loop);
dorrec(bluedensity,loop);
doirec{bluedirection,loop);

"~\
i:/

{store data in a record}

end; { with g }
end;

{ density }

procedure dorun2(var g
var oldcolour : word;
r2 : twoarray;
count
shortint;

screenrecord;l

longint);

begin
{ generate and plot pixels on target in 2 bits }
{ if files are used }
if g.usefile and ( (g.filechoice.flow = input)
or (g.filechoice;-:f'!ow = inout)) then
begin
getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile, r2[1J);
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getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile, r2[2]);
end

else
begin
for count : = 1- to,,?:, do
r2 [~aunt]

·, { intitial:i.ne array }
{ get random value }

:= rafld.om(2);
-\--

'1

'

'

if ·g.uset'il~ and (g,filechoice.flow =output)
tfA:..,
or- (_4:-'fil_echoice·. noW:= inoutl then

\\e~~~bf't {g~;fti~-Ch~-ice .ou~~-utfile, 'i:2 (1]) ;
(\ plltbi t (g, filechofce. outputfi ie-; r2 (2] ') ,-. _,
{ if }
·
·
' .
"

end;

, _ , :;

-'J

"-,

.,

'

_c-

setlcolor {traceii:::olodr)/;

while not restart do
begin
inc (1};

if r2(1]

=

0 then
case r2 [2] of
0 : begin

next.x

o·a }

{

current.x

~=

( up )
1·•

next. Y. : = current, y
1

"end;
begin
ne~t.x

next.y

..

end;

( 01 }
current.x + 1·•
current.y;

:=
:=

end;
caser2 [1] = 0

}

if r2 [1] = 1 'then
case r2 [2 J of

0 : begin

next.x

-\,
( 10 }
:=

current.x;

next. y : = _current. y

[ down }
_+

1 ;_

end;
1 ,. begin

{

11}

next.x := current.x
next.y := current.y;
end;
end; { case }

1·•

( left..}

{ write data to file }
'

if g.overlap then
begin
r2 [1] : = r2 [2] ; { swap }
if g.usefile and (g.filechoice.flow = input)
or (g.filechoice.flow = inout) then
getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile,r2[2])
else
r2 [2] := random(2);
if {g. filechoice. flow = output) or. (g. filechoice ._flow = inout)
then
putbit (g. filechoice. outputfile, r2 [2]') ·;·
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inc(g.totalbits)
{ i f overlap }

end;

if not g.overlap then
begin

if g.usefile and {g.filechoice.f.low

=

input)

or (g.filechoice.flow = inout) then

begin
getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile,r2(1]);
getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile,r2(2]);
end

else
begin
r2 (1]
r2 (2]

end;

:= random(2);
:= random (2);

( if )

if g.usefile and (g.filechoice.flow = output)
or (g.filechoice.flow = inout) then
begin
putbit(g.filechoice.outputfile,r2[1)};
putbit{g.filechoice.outputfile,r2[2]);
end; ( if )
inc(g.totalbits,2);
end;

pixelcolor

:=

getpixel(next.x,next.y);

if pixelcolor = gratcolour then
begin
if hit target rim }
restart := true;
end;
putpixel(next.x,next.y,tracecolour); { illuminate point}
current : = next;
ch

:=

'x';

end; { while not finish
g.bluerunnumber := 1;
cross(next.x,next.y);
end;

{ dorun2 }

intitialise array }
{ get random value }
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end;

i f g.usefile and (g.filechoice.flow =output)
or (g.f.Uechoice.flow = .i.nout) then

begin
putbi t (g. Eilechoice. output f i1 e, r3 [ 1) ) ;

putbit{g.filechoice.outputf.ile,r3 [2));
putbi t (g. f ilechoice. outputfile, r3 [ 3] ) ;

end; { i f }
setcolor(tracecolour);
while not restart do
begin
inc(l);

case r3[1] of

0 : begin
case r3 [2] of

0 : begin

case r3 [3} of
0
{ up 000 }
' begin
next.x := current.x
next.y := current. y
1;
end;
1
begin
{ up and right 001 }
next .x := current.x + 1·
'
1·
next.y := current. y
'
end;
end; { case r3 [3 J }
end;
begin
case r3 [3 J of
0
{ right 010 }
' begin
next .x := current.x + 1;
next.y := current.y;
end;
1
begin
{ right and down 011
next.x .- current.x + 1;
next.y := current.y + 1·
'
end;

1

end { case r3 [3]

}

end; { case r3 [2] }
end; {case r3 [2] }
end; { case r3[1] = 0 }
1

begin
case r3 [2] of
0

:

begin
case r3[3] of
0 : begin
{ down 100 }
next.x := current.x
next.y := current.y + 1;
end;
1
begin
{ down and left 101 }
next.x := current.x
1·
'
next.y := current.y + 1;
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end;
1

end;
( case r3 (3]

}

end;
begin
case r3 (3] of
0

1

'

begin
( left 110 }
1;
next. x := current. x
next. y :::: current.y;
end;
begin
( left and up 111 }
1·
next.x := current.x
'
next.y := current.y

-

1;

end;
end;

end { case r3 [3] }
{ case r3(2] = 1 }

end; {case r3[2)
end;

{ case r3 [1]

}

= 1 }

end; { case r3 }

if g.overlap then
begin
r3 [1]
r3 (2]

:= r3 [2];
:= r3 [3];

{ store previous values for next run }

if g.usefile and (g.filechoice.flow
or (g.filechoice.flow

=

=

input)
inout) then

getbit (g. filechoice .'inputfile, r3 [3] )
else
'·''
r3[3)

:= random(2);

if (g.filechoice.flow

= output)

or (g.filechoice.flow = inout}

then
putbit(g.filechoice.,outputfile,r3 [3J);

inc(g.totalbits);
end
{ get next value }
else { non-overlap }
begin
if g.usefile and (g.filechoice.flow = input)
or (g.filechoice.flow = inout) then
begin
getbi t (g, filechoice. input file, r3 [ 1] ) ;_
getbit (g, filechoice. iriputfile, r3 [2]} ;-·
getbit(g.filechoice.inPlltfile,r3[3]);
end
else
begin
for count := 1 to 3 do
{ refill array }
r3 [count) := random(2);
end;
if g.usefile and (g.filechoice.flow = output)
or (g.filechoice.flow = inout} then
begin
putbit(g.filechoice.outputfile,rJ [1]);
putbit(g.filechoice.outputfile,r3 [2));
putbit(g.filechoice.outputfile,r3{3]);
end;
inc(g.totalbits,3);
end;
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pixelcolor :

getpixel(next.x,next.y);

if pixelcolor
begin

=

restart

gratcolour then

true;

:~

end;
putpixel (next .x, next. y, tracecolour);
current := next;
ch
end;

~=

'x';

{ while not finish }

g.bluerunnumber := l;
cross (next. x, next. y) ;
end;

{ dorun3 }

procedure dorun4(var g
var oldcolour
word;
index,
count
r4

screenrecord;l

longint);

integer;
fourarray;

begin
if g. usefile and (g.filechoice.flow = input)
or (g. filechoiCe. flow = inout) then
begin

getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile, r4[1]);
getbit (g.filechoice.inputfile, r4 [2]);

getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile, r4[3]);
getbit{g.filechoice.inputfile, r4(4]);
end

else
b,egin
for count := 1 to 4 do
r4 (count] := random{2);
end;

intitialise array }
{ get random value }

if {g.filechoice.flow = output) or {g.filech~ice.flow = inout) then
begin
putbit{g.filechoice.outputfile,r4[1]);
putbit (g. filechoice .outputfile, r4 [2]) ;
\)
putbit(9'.filechoice.outputfile,r4 [3));
putbit{g.filechoice.outputfile,r4(4]);
end;

{ if }

setcolor{tracecolour);
while not restart do
begin
inc {1) ;
case r4[1] of

I/

0 : begin
case r4 [2] of
0 : begin
case r4 [3] of
0 : begin
case r4[4] of
0 : begin
next.x := current.x
next.y := current.y
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1

end;
' begin
next.x

!= current.;.: + J ;
2;
next. y := current.y
end;
( r4 [4] = J )

end;
end;
1

( case

r4 ( 4}

)

begin
case r4 [4] of
0

; '

'

: ~ !

1

begin
next.x := current.x + 2;
2;
next.y := current.y
end;
begin
next.x := current.x + 2;

next.y := current.y
{ r4(4] = 1 }
end; { case r4 [4]
end; ( r4 [3] = 1 )
end; { c,~se r4 [3) }
end;
{ r4\[2] = 0 )

1;

end;

1

r

begin

case r4 [3!] of

o : be'.i!#ri'
,,

\Case r4 [4] of
()_,\: begin

'-\
next.x
:))
next.y
J/
end·
I
'
_ 1·~: begin

:=
:=

current.x + 2;
current.y;

next.x

:=
:=

current.x + 2;

next.y

current.y + 1;

end;
{ r4 [4] ,
end; { case r4 (4]
end;
([
begin
~-.
case r4 [4) of

f}

1

1, )
1

0 : begin
next.x

:= curr'ent.x + 2;
+ 2;
next.y := current.y
"
end;

1

begin
next.x := current.x + 1;
next.y := current.y + 2;

end;
{ r4 I 4]
end; { case r4 [4]
end; { r4[3] = 1 )
end; { case r4 [3] }

"'··.\

1

= 1 )
}

\,\

end;
1 )
{ r4 [2]
end; { case r4 [2]
end;
0 )
{ r4 [1]
begin
case r4 [2] of
0
' begin
case r4 [3] of
0 : begin
case r4 [4] of
o : begin
next.x := current.x;
next.y := current.y + 2;
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end;
1

: beg.in

next.x
next.y
end;
end;

1

:=
:=

current.x
1·
'
current.y 1 2;

{ r4 14 I

{case r4[4)

1 )
}

end;
begin
case r4(4]

of

0 : begin

next.x
next·.y
1

:=
:=

current.x

:=

current.x
2;
current.y + 1;

2.

'
current.'/+ 2;

end;
begin

next.x
next.y
end;
end;

:=

{ r4 14 I

{ case r4 [4]

• 1 )
}

end; ( r4131 • 1 )
end; { case r4 (3) }
end;
{ r4 [21 • 0 )
begin
case r4 [3] of
0 : begin
case r4 [4] of

1

0 : begin

1

1

next.x .- current.x
next.y := current.y
end;
begin
next.x := current.x
next.y := current.y

'

2·

'

1;

end;
{ r4[41 • 1 )
end; { case r4 (4) }
end;
begin
case r4 [4] of

0 : begin
next.x
next.y
end;
1
begin
next.x

:=
:=

current.x
current.y

2;
2;

:=

next.y

:=

curr'ent.x
current.y

1·
'
2·

end;
( r4[4] • 1 )
end; { case r4 [4] }
end; ( r4[3] • 1 )
end; { case r4 [3] }

end;

2·

end;
{ r4[21
{ case r4 [2]

'

• 1)

end;
{ r4lll • 1 }
end; { case r4 [1]}

if g.overlap then
begin
r4 [1]
r4[2J

:=
:=

r4 [2]; { store previous values for next run }
r4{3};
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r4[3]

:- r4(4];

if g.usefile and (g.filechoice.flo"' =input)
o1·

(g.filechoice.flo~>t

=

inout)

then

get bit (g. f Llechoice. inputf i le, r4 [4 l l
else
r-l [4]

:: t".3ndom(2);

i f (g.f.ilechoice.flow =output)

c,.r (g.filechoice.flow"' inout)

then
putb.lt (g. f i lechoice. outputf ile, r4 [4]);
inc(g.totalbits);

end
{ get next value }
else { non-overlap }
begin
i f g.usefile and (g.filechoice.flow =input)

or (g.filechoice.flow = inout) then
begin
getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile,r4[1]);

getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile,r4 [2]);
getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile,r4[3]);
getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile,r4[4]);
end
else
begin

for count := 1 to 4 do
refill array }
r4 [count] .- random(2);
end;
if g.usefile and (g.filechoice.flow = output)
or (g.filechoice.flow = inout) then
begin
putbit(g.filechoice.outputfile,r4 [1]);
putbit(g.filechoice.outputfile,r4 (2]);
putbit(g.filechoice.outputfile,r4 (3]);
putbit(g.filechoice.outputfile,r4 [4]);
end;
inc(g.totalbits,4);
end;
pixelcolor

:=

getpixel(next.x,next.y);

if pixelcolor = gratcolour then
begin
restart := true;
end;
putpixel(next.x,next.y,tracecclour);
line{current.x,current.y, next.x,next.y);
current : = next;
ch

:=

'x';

end; { while not finish
g.bluerunnumber := 1;
cross(next.x,next.y);
end; { dorun4 }
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-Simulation
of

Te;·t~T-------·-·-···

program ttest;
{
A program to pet·form the T Test on random nequencea
test to T4
}
uses crt;
const fore = 2;
aft = B;
numtests = 4;
lowcolour
expcolour
highcolour
textcolour
backcolour

=
=
=
=
=

lightcyan;
white;
lightred;
yellow;
blue;

type

onearray
array [0 .. 1]
twoarray
= array[o .. 3]
threearray = array [O .. 7]
fourarray = array [0 .. 15]

of
of
of
of

longint; { no of Os and l'S }
longint;
longint;
longint;

testarray = array[1 .. numtests] of shortint;
devarray = array[l .. numtestsJ of real;
anyf ilename
string [40];

var
resultfilename

anyfilename;

outfile : text;
one
two

three
four
dev

tests

onearray;
twoarray;
threearray;
fourarray;

{ accumulators to store values in }

devarray;
testarray;

testmax,
count
longint;
value

integer;
real;

_____________________________________ }

{ zc

procedure continue;
begin
Write( 1 Press enter to continue
readln;
end; { continue }
procedure shuffle{var a
v

1

);

testarray;
integer) ;

var !count : integer;
begin
for lcount := 1 to 3 do
a [!count] := a [!count + 1];
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----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

a [4] : == v;
end; { shuffle }

proceduL-e docountl (var t

testarray;

var o

onearray);

procedure docount2fvar t

testarray;
twoarray) ;

begin
case t[l] of
0 : inc(o[O]);
1 : inc(o[l]);

end; { case }
end;

{ docountl }

var o

begin
case t [1] of
0 : case t [2] of
0 : inc{o[O]l;
1 : inc(o[l]);
end; { case }

1

case t[2] of
0

: inc(o[2));

1 : inc{o[3]);

en::l; { case }
end; { case }
end;

{ docount2 }

procedure docount3{var t
var o

testarray;
threearray) ;

begin
case t[l] of
0 : case t [2] of
0 : case t[3) of
0 : inc(o[O]);
1 : inc(o[l]);
end;
1
case t [3] of
o : inc(o[2]);
1 : inc(o(3]);
end;
end; { case t [2] }

1

case t[2] of
0 :case t[3] of
0 : inc(o[4]);
1 : inc(o[S]);
end;
1
case t {3] of
0 : inc (o [6]);
1 : inc(o[7));
end;
end; { case t [2] }
end; { end case t[l] }
end; { docount3 }
procedure docount4(var t
var o
begin

testarray;
fourarray) ;
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case t[l) of
0 :case t[:!] of
0 : ca!:le t [ 3] of
0 : case t[4] of
0 : inc(o[O));
1 : inc(o(l]);

1

1

end; { case }
case t[4] of
0 : inc(o[2)l;
1 : inc(o[3));
end; { case }

end;
case t[3]; 1 of
0 : case t [4) of
0 : inc(o[4));

1

1 : inc (o [5]);
end; { case }
case t [4] of
0 : inc(o[6]);
1

end;
1

inc (o [7)) ;

:

end; ·{ case '}
,

end; { case t 'riJ }
case t [2] of
0 : case t[3] of
0 : case t[4] of
0 : inc(o[8]);

1

1 : inc(o[9]);
end; { case }
case t (4] of
0 : inc(o[lO]);
1 : inc(o[ll]);

end; { case }
end;

1

case t [3] of
0 : case t[4] of
o : inc(o[l2));
1 : inc(o[13]);

1

end; { case }
case t[4] of
0 : inc(o[14]);
1 : inc (o [15]);

end; { case }

end;
end;

end;

{ case t [2]

end; { end case t [1]
{ docount4 }

procedure displayarray{t
var !count : integer;
begin
for lcount := 1 to 4 do
write(t[lcount]);
writeln;
end; { displayarray }

}

}

testarray);

procedure choosecolour(var r,h,l
begin
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"--c---"-

1f r:. h then textcolor(lowcolour):
if (r <=h) and (r>"' I) then textcolor(expcolour);
i f r < l then textcolor(highcolour);
end; { shoosecolour }
procedure doheade r ( l, e, h
real);
begin
textcolor {lowcolour) ;
write('Low ',l:fore:aft,
textcolor (expcolour) ;
write(' exp. ',e:fore:aft,'
textcolor(highcolour);
wri teln (' high ', h: fore: aft) ;
end; { doheader }

'J

i

');

procedure getresultl(o

onearray;
longint;
t
z
real;
var f : text ) ;'
var lresult, !expected, high,low : real;
begin
!expected := 1/2;
low := !expected - z;
high := !expected + z;
doheader(low,lexpected,high);
i:·

!result:= o[O]/t;
choosecolour{lresult,high,low);
write {' ' :12, 'Os : 1 , !result: fore: aft, '
writeln(f,lresult);

I)

j

!result := o[l)/t;
choosecolour (!result, high, low).;
writeln('
ls: ',lresult:fore:aft);
writeln(f,lresult);
textcolor(yellow);
end; { getresultl }
procedure getresult2(o
twoarray;
t
longint;
z
real;
var f : text);
var !result, !expected, low,high : real;
begin
!expected := 1/4;
low := !expected - z;
high := !expected + z;
doheader(low,lexpected,high);
!result := o[O)/t;
choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
write(' ':ll,'OOs: ',lresult:fore:aft,'
writeln(f,lresult);

');

!result := o[l]/t;
choosecolour(lresult,high, low); i(
writeln(' Ols : ',lresult:foreiaft);
writeln(f,lresult);
!result := o[2]/t;
choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
203
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write(' ':ll,'lOs:
writeln(f,lresult);

!result

:=

',lresult:fore:aft,'

');

o [3) /t;

choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
writeln('

lls : ',lresult:fore:aft);

writeln(f,lresult);
textcolor(yellow);
end; { getresult2 }
threearray;
t
longint;
z
real;
var f : text);

procedure getresult3(o

var !result, !expected, low,high : real;
begin
·!expected

:=

1/8;

low := !expected - z;
high := !expected + z;
doheader(low,lexpected,high);
!result

:=

o(O]/t;

choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
write{• 1 :10,'000s: •,lresult:fore:aft,'
writeln (f ,!result) ;
,
!result

:=

');

o[l]/t;

choosecolour{lresult,high,low);
writeln(' OOls: ',lresult:fore:aft);
writeln(f,lresult);
lresult := o[2]/t;
choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
write(' ':10, 1 010s: •,lresult:fore:aft,'
writeln(f,lresult);

');

!result := o(3]/t;
choosecolour{lresult,high,low);
writeln(' Olls : ',lresult:fore:aft);
writeln(f,lresult);
!result := o[4]/t;
choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
write(' 1 :10, 1 100s: ',lresult:fore:aft,•
writeln(f,lre8ult);

');

I·'
!result := o[S]/t;
choosecolour{lresult,high,low);
writeln{' lOla: ',lresult:fore:aft);
writeln(f,lresult);
!result := o(6]/t;
choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
write(' ':lO,'llOs: ',lresult:fore:aft,•
writeln(f,lresult);

');

!result := o[7]/t;
choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
writeln(' llls : ',lresult:fore:aft);
writeln(f,lresult);
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textcolor (yellow) ;
end; { getresult3 }

procedure getresult4(o
t
z

fourarray;
longint;
real:

var f : text):
var !result, lexpected,low,hlgh : real;

begin
!expected := 1/16;
low := !expected - z;
high := !expected+ z;
doheader (low, !expected, high},.

!result

:=

o[O]/t;

choosecolour {!result, high, low);
write(' ':9, '0000s: ',lresult:fore:aft,'

');

writeln(f,lresult);
!result := o(l)/t;
choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
writeln('OOOls : ',lresult:fore:aft};
writeln(f,lresul~);

!result := o[2]/t;
choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
write('

1

:9,'0010s: ',lresult:fore:aft,'

');

writeln (f ,!result);

!result := o(3]/t;
choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
writeln('OOlls : ',lresult:fore:aft);
writeln(f,lresult);
!result := o[4]/t;
choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
write(' ':9,'0100s: ',lresult:fore:aft,'
writeln(f,lresult);

');

!result := o[S)/t;
choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
writeln( 1 0101s: ',lresult:fore:aft);
writeln(f,lresult);
!result := o[6)/t;
choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
write(' ':9, 1 0110s: ',lresult:fore:aft,'
writeln(f,lresult);

1 );

!result := o[7]/t;
choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
writeln( 1 Ollls : ',!result: fore:aft);
writeln(f,lresult);
!result := o[B]/t;
choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
write(' 1 :9, '1000s : ',lresult:fore:aft,'
writeln(f,lresult);
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lresult :- o[9]/t;
choosecolou r ( 1 result, high, low) ;

writeln(.'1001s : ',lreault:fore:aft);
write.ln ( t:·,lresult);
!result := o[lO)/t;
choosecolour ( 1 result, high, low) ;
write(' ':9,'1010s: ',lresult:fore:aft,'

');

writeln(f,lresult);
!result := o[ll]/t;

choosecolour{lresult,high,low);
writeln('lOlls : ',lresult:fore:aft);
writeln(f, !result);

!result := o(l2]/t;

choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
write('

':9,'1100s:

',lresult:fore:aft,'

');

writeln(f,lresult);
!result := o[l3]/t;

choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
writeln('llOls:

',lresult:fore:aft);

writeln(f,lresult);
!result := o[l4]/t;

choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
write{' ':9,'1110s: ',lresult:fore:aft,'
writeln{f,lresult);

');

lresult := o[15]/t;
choosecolour(lresult,high,low);
writeln( '1111s : 1 , lresult: fore:aft);
writeln(f,lresult);
textcolor(yellow);
end; { getresult4 }
function getZ(z,p
n

real;
longint) : real;

var temp : real;
begin
temp := z * sqrt{P
getZ := temp;
end; { getZ }

* (1- p)/n);

procedure dodev{var a
z
n

devarray;
real;
longint);

var count : integer;
begin
for count := 1 to numtests do
case count of
1
a[count] := getz(Z,O.S,n);
2
a[count] := getz{Z,0.2S,n};
3
a[count] := getz{Z,0.125,n);
4
a[count] := getz(Z,0.0625,n);
end; { case }
end; { dodev }

{----------------------------------------------------}

begin
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textbackground (backcolour);
textcolor(textcolour);

clear Screen }

clrsct·,·

{ display header }

n·

writeln('
writeln;

':20, 'Simulation of Test-T for 4 Bits');

.,,

If

'''"'

·~-']~'I
'

\ ---

\\

write('What is the name of the File to store results in ?
readln(resultfilename);
//

if resultfileriame .: ''then
\'/

resultfilename

:=

I) i

'dummy.dta';

assign (outfi.l~, resultfilename) ;

rewrite(outfile);
-,\

write('What is the Standard Deviation value ?
readln{zc};

I)

j

write('What is the number of bits to be tested ?
readln(testmax);

I)

j

dodev(dev,zc,testmax);
randomize;

for count

:=

1 to 4 do

tests [count]

{ preload array }

:= random(2}';

perform tests }
for count := 1 to testmax do
begin
{
if count mod 1000 = 0 then write {' *');
} docount1{tests,one);
docount2{tests,two);
docount3{tests,three);
docount4(tests,four);
value := random(2);
{get next bit
shuffle(tests,value); { put next bit into test array }
end; { for count }
writeln;
write('Standard Deviation is 1 ,zc:fore:aft);
writeln(' Test maximum is ', testmax,' bits•);
getresultl (one, testmax, dev(1], out file);
getresult2(two, testmax, dev[2], outfile);
getresult3(three,testmax, dev(3], outfile);
getresult4(four, testmax, dev[4], outfJle);
close(outfile);
continue;
end. { ttest
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Simulation of Maurer's Theoretical Method
program Maurerl (Input, Output);
s bit bytes only
this program .is to take a file of data fcom a binacy tile and
perform statistical tests on the data.
performs tests on binary symmetric source using 8 bit non-oveclapping
pieces'-'·
}

uses
crt; -"canst
bits = 8;
Values = 256;

{ 2'bits )

type
tstfile
filename

= file

of byte;
string[255];

var
infile
out file

text;

inpath,
.inname
outpath

filename;
filename;

tstfil~\;,,

file length,
initsteps,
numsteps,
count
val

{ source of binary string }

'\

,;,

{ choice of file names

longint;
byte;

{ length of
{ length of
{ length of
{ counter }
{ value from

file in ·bytes }
initialising bytes
process bytes }
source }

avg log2 of numsteps terms }
{ sum of calculated values }

fTU,
sum : real;

array[O .. 255) of longint;

Table

J

{ time index of each char

boolean;
finish
ch : char;
{**********************************************************************}
procedure menu;
begin
clrscr;
writeln ( 1
TeDeum Text Statistical Program
writeln ( 1
8 bit Maurerl Randomness
Writeln; writeln;
{ menu }
end;

');
I) i

{*******************************************************************}
begin
clrscr;
menu;
finish

{ main }

:=

false;
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while not(finish) do
begin
write('What is the Input f.ile •.???
readln ( inname) ;

');

inpath := 'c:\tedeum\maurt'est\maurtst2\' + inname;
assign(infile, inpath);
reset (infile);

•·,filelength := filesize(infile)~'

initsteps
numsteps

:= trunc(filelength/10);
.- fi!elength
initsteps;

writeln(inpath) ;writeln;
outpath := 'c:\tedeum\maurtest\maurtst2\wttrump.res';
assign(outfile, outpath);
append(outfile);
for count

:= 0 to 255 do
table (count] : = 0;

{ clear the table }

writeln('Reading Initial Values'); writeln;
{ read initial values }
for count := 1 to initsteps do
begin
if count mod 1000 = 0 then write('*');
read(infile,val);
table [val] := count;
end;
writeln('Performing Test ') ;writeln;
for count := (initsteps + 1} to (initsteps + numsteps) do
begin
if count mod 1000 = 0 then write('*');
read(infile,val);
sum :; sum+ ln(count - table[val));
table [val] := count;
end;
writeln;writeln;
fTU := {sum/numsteps)/ln(2.0);
writeln( 'The Calculated Value For ',inpath,' is
writeln(outfile, inname,' ', fTU:3:7);
sum := o.O;
close (infile);
close {outfile);
write('Continue ? spacebar');
readln ( ch) ;
if ch <> chr(32) then finish := true;
end; { while not }
end.
{ main }
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Simulation of Startpoints
program siml;

a program to generate a set of random sequences f.rom the following
1.
a set of startpoints
2.
a set of selection sets of varying size
3.
a set of randomisers

the output sequences will be stored in a file for analysis
'\,
•\, .

note 1. all data will be short integers
increment steps to range 0-12?

author
date
version

:t~hich

•Nil)... limit the

david shaw
12aug98

1.0

initial design and implementation

)

{----------------------Declarations---------------------------}
uses

crt,
printer;

{ use screen character routines }
{ use output to printer }

canst errormessagel = •this option is not implemented.';

=

ranf ilename
opfilename
spfilename
ssfilename
outfilename

=
=

randomisersize

•0:\programs\simtest\';
'd:\programs\simteil:\output\';
'd: \programs\simt~'st\spfilel. tst 1 ;
'd:\programs\simtest\sset';
'd:\programs\simtest\out';

= 10000;

{ size of randomiser file }
{ number of randomiser files
{ number of startpoints }
{ number of selection sets }

noofrfiles
~ 10;
noofstartpoints
:;;,\, 10;
noofselectionsets = 10;
maxselectionsetsize
maxoutputsetsize

= 128;
= 128;

{ largest size of selection set

type

out array
outfile

= file

array(l .. maxoutputsetsize) of integer;
of outarray;

sintfile
spfile

= file
= file

of shortint;
of integer;

anyfilename

= string[40];

rfile
rfilename

sintfile;
anyfilename;

{ a file of 0 & 1 for printing
{ a file of 0 to 255 }

var
{ file of random bits }
{ name of random 'file in use }

{---------------------- functions ------------------------------}
function IntToStr(I: Longint): String;
{ convert any integer type to a string

var
s: string [11];

2!0
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-----------·

begin
Ste(I,

S);

lntToStr

:=

S;

end;

{-----"---------------- procedures -----------------------------}
procedure createrandomi5ers;
var count,
countl
val

integer;
shortint;

lfname

anyfilename;

lf

sintfile;

{
{
{
{

loop variable )
value to be Btored in file )
name of file )
short integer file )

begin
for count := 0 to noofrfiles-1 do
begin
{ create file name }
lfname := ranfilename + 'rmsr'+ inttostr{count) + '.tst';
{ create file }
writeln('Creating

',lfname);

assign(lf,lfnamel;
rewrite (lf);
{ fill with random data }
writeln('Filling : ',lfname);
randomize;
{ initialize the randomiser function }
for countl := 1 to randomisersize do
begin
val := random(2);
write(lf,val);
end; { for countl }
{ close file }
wri teln ( 'Closing
close (lf);

', lfname);

end; { for count }
end;

{ create randomisers }

procedure createstartpoints;
var count
integer;
{
val
integer;
{
lfname
anyfilename; {
lf
spfile;
{

loop variable }
start point }
name of file }
integer file }

begin
{ create file name
lfname ~= spfilename;
( create file }
writeln(•Creating
assign(lf,lfname);
rewrite (!f);

', lfname);

{ fill with random data }
writeln(•Filling : ',lfname);
randomize;
{ initialize the randomiser function }
for count := 1 to noofstartpoints do
begin
val := random(255);
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write(lf,val);
end; { for countl
{ close file }
writeln ( 'C.losing
close (lf);

', lfname);

end; { createstartpoints }
·,:,
procedure createselectionsets;
var count,
{ number of selection sets needed
countl,
{ size of each selection set }
setsize, { number of integers in selection set }
val
{ set value }
integer;
lfname
any filename;
spfile;
lf
begin
for count := 0 to noofselectionsets-1 do
begin
{ •::reate file name }
lfname := ssfilename + inttostr(count) + '.tst';
{ create file }
writeln('Creating
assign(lf,lfname);
rewrite (lf);

',lfname);

{ fill with random data }
writeln ('Filling
', lfname};
{ initialize the randomiser function }
randomize;
setsize := random(255); { generate size of selection set
for countl := 1 to setsize do
begin
val := random(maxselectionsetsize);
write(lf,val);
end; { for countl
{ close file }
writeln {'Closing
close (lf) ;

', lfname) ;

end; { for count }
end; { createselectionsets }
procedure createoutputfile;
var
randomisers,
startpoints,
selections
integer;
rfname,
spname,
ssname,
opname
rf

spf,ssf

anyfilename;
sintfile;
spfile;
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opf

: outfi le;

begin
{ select ri'tndomiser
for randomisers := 0 to noofrfj les-1 do
begin
rfname := ranfilename + 'rmsr't jnttostr(randornjser.s)
assign(rf, rEname);
reset {rf);
writeln(rfnamel;
{ select randomiser file }

-t

' •

tst';
:~

{ generate a sequence }
ssname := ssfilename + inttostr(selections) + '.tst';
assign(ssf,ssname);
reset (ssf);
writeln('

',ssname);

for selections
begin

:=

0 to noofselectionsets-1 do

{ select selection set }

{ generate outputfilename}
opname := opfilename + inttostr(randomisers) +
inttostr(selections) + '.out';
{ create outputfile }
wri teln ('

' , opname) ;

assign(opf, opname);
rewrite (opfl ;
{ generate outputsequences

{ select bits using startpoint and selection set }
{ for each startpoint use selectionset to generate
128 bits and store as a string in the output file
{ get start point then with randomiser move to start
point and select bit }
{ get selection set value and move to next bit and select bit }
{ ensure if index is greater than file size to return to
beginning. }
{ close outputfile }
close (opf);
end; { for selections }
close(ssf);
close(rf);
end; { for randomisers }
end; { createoutputfile }
{----------------------main program---------------------------}
begin { siml }
clrscr;
{ create files and open for writing
{ create randomiser files
{ createrandomisers; }

}

{ create file of startpoints }
{ createstartpoints;}
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{ create files of selection sets
{ createselectionsets; }

{ create files of outputsequences from each randomiaer and
selection set with the startpoints provided }
createoutputfile;
{ close files

end. { siml }
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Ordering Paradigm
program order;
{

a program to test the ordering paradigm on random aequenceo.

uses crt;

canst

noofbits

type
arrayline

{message,key,encryption);

= array[arrayline,l .. noofbits]

anyarray
intfile

=

50;

=

of integer;

file of integer;

filename= string[40];
var
test : anyarray;
infilename
infile

filename;
intfile;

knumo,
knuml,
enumo,
enuml,

{ number of o•s
{ number of l's
{ number of o•s
{ number of l's
{ match between
longint;

MEmatch,
bitstested

in key }

in key }
in encryption }
in encryption }
message bit and encrypted bit }

kpO,
kpl,
epo,
epl,

psame

: real;

{-------------------------------------------------------}
procedure displayarray(var a : anyarray) ;
var count
integer;
begin
writeln;
for count := 1 to noofbits do
write(a[message,countJ);
writeln;
for count :~ 1 to noofbits do
write{a[key,count]);
writeln;
for count :~ 1 to noofbits do
write(a[encryption,countJ);
writeln;
end;
procedure getmessage(var a

anyarray ) ;

var count : integer;
begin
randomize;
for count := 1 to noofbits do
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begin
a[message,count)

:= random(2);

a [key, count)
:= 0;
a (encryption, count)

.- 0;

end; { for }

end; { getmessage
procedure getencryption{var inf
var
a
var nO,

intfile;
anyarray;

nl,
eO,

el,
bt

longint);

var i, count : integer;

begin
if not eof{inf) then
begin
gotoxy(75,3); write('

2 ');

for count := 1 to noofbits do
begin
read(inf,a(key,count]);
inc (btl;
{ increment key counts
if a[key,count) = 1 then inc(nl) else inc(nO);
{ perform encryption }
if a[message,count] = a[key,count] then a[encryption,count]
else a [encryption, count] :: 1;
if a[encryption,count] = 1 then inc(el) else inc(eO);

:= 0

end;
gotoxy(75,3); write(•U•);

end; { while }

end; { getencryption }
procedure testarray(var a
var mem
var count, num : integer;
Begin
num

:=

anyarray;
longintl ;

0;

for count ;= 1 to noofbits do
begin
if a[message,count] = a[encryption,count] then inc(num);
end; { for }

mem := mem + num;
end; { testarraY }
{------------------------------~-----------------------}

begin
textcolor(yellow);
textbackground(blue);
clrscr;
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writeln('

':25, •ordering paradigm program ');

writeln;
write('What is the:name of the input EiJ.e
readln (infilename);
writeln;
gotoxy{74, 2) ;write ( 1 Ef»');
gOtOXy(74 1 ) ) ;Write( I a 01 ) j

: ');

gotoxy(74,4) ;write(,'Eh~·);

assign(infile,infilename);
reset ( infile) ;

{ generate a test sequence
getmessage(test);

Mematch :== 0; bitstested := 0;
knumo := O;
knuml := O;
enumo := O;
enuml := 0;
while not eof(infile)do
begin
getencryption(infile,test, knumO,knuml, enumO,enuml, bitstested);

testarray(test,MEmatch);
end; { while }
psame := MEmatch/bitstested
kpO := knumO/bitstested;
kpl := knuml/bitstested;
epO := enumO/bitstested;
epl := enuml/bitstested;

writeln;
writeln;
writeln('The
writeln;
writeln('
writeln ('Key
writeln( 'Key
writeln;
writeln {'
writeln( 'Enc
writeln ( 'Enc
writeln;

number of bits tested

1

,bitstested);

Key Stream ' l ;
P{O) :::: ',kP0:4:6);
P(l) = ',kpl:4:6);
EncrYPtion');
P(O) :::: ',eP0:4:6);
P{l) = ',epl:4:6);

writeln('The number of matches between Message and encrYPtion
', MEmatch);
writeln;
writeln( 'Proportion of matches bet\'leen Message and Encryption
',psame:4:6 );
close {infile);
write(•press enter to continue•);
readln;
end. { order }
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9.17.

Enumeration of all Samples
l~andom

QCrcent

sum select

50.00 1%

2
3
3
2
2
2
2
I

75.00%
75.00%
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%
25.00%
25.00%
75.00%
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%

25.00%
75.00%
75.00%
50.00%
50.00%
100.00%
75.00%
75.00%
75.00%
75.00%
50.00%

75.00%
50.00%
50.00%

50.00%
50.00%
25.00%
75.00%
75.00%

50.00%
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%
25.00%
25.00%

75.00%
50.00%
50.00%

50.00%
50.00%
25.00%
50.00%

25.00%
25.00%
25.00%
25.00%
0.00%

50.00%
50.00%

I

3
2
2
2
2
I
3
3
2
2
4
3
3
3
3
2
3
2
2
2
2
I
3
3
2
2
2
2
I
I
3
2
2
2
2
I
2
1
I
I
I
0
2
2
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4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

0

I

Number
0
I
0
0
I
I
I

I

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0

1
I
I

1
1

I
I

I
I
I

1
1

I

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

I

0
0
0

0
0
0
0

I

I
I
I
I
I

1
0

I
I
I

0
I

1

1
0
0
0

I
I

0
0
0
0

0
0
0

I
I
I
I

I
I

1
1

I
I

0

1

0
0
0

1

1
0
0

I
I

I

1

I

1
1
1
1

I

1

I

I
I

I
I
I

1
0
0

0
0
0

I
I

1

0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

I
I
I

I

I

1

1
1
1

0
0
0
0

0
0
0

I
I

0
0
0

I

I
I
I

I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I

0
0
0

0
0
0

I
I

I
I
I

0
I
I

218
11112/99
I

Development of a Model for Smart Card Based Access Control in Multi-User, MultiResource, Multi-Level Access Systems
25.00%
25.00%
75.00%
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%

average

25.00%
75.00%
75.00%
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%
25.00%
25.00%

50.00%

50.00%

I
I
3

2
2
2
2
I
3
3
2
2
2
2
I
I
2

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

4
4
4

4
4
4
4

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0

1
I

1
I

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

I

total= 70
The list above indicates all the possible combinations of four bits taken from the random
eight bit sequence. The average of each sequence is calculated and the average value of
the average is equal to the average of the random sequence or population.
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Figure 9·1 Traces of Ten Single Bit Runs

9.18.

Data Visualisation Results

In figure 9.1 , each row is 401 elements long, that is, 200 elements either side of
a central element. The trace for 10 consecutive runs are plotted. The vertical
dimension is scaled and each trace is offset vertically to display all the traces with
minimum interference between them.
It is noted that six of the traces continue to a termination and favour one side
almost to the exclusion of the other. Three of these traces terminate on the negaive
side and three on the positive side.
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This trace is the instantaneous average of the previous ten traces scaled to fit. It
can be seen that the area under the trace tends to be larger to the left of the central axis
indicating a preference for O's.
The location and number of peaks may be used to characterise the output of a
generator.
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Determining a Basic Sequence

The implementation of the test relies on progressively choosing overlapping
sequences of a particular length and counting the number of 'ones' in the sequence.
To identify the length of a rotated sequence means being able to determine the number
of bits per sequence is the same.
For example, using a sequence t-{' and the number of blocks, k = 2 * n
note: matching numbers that are n values apart are a possible basic sequence size.
t-{'

= 1ll-11101000-00011101-00111010-01110100-11010001-101

n = 6, k = 12
111111, 111110, 111101, 111010, 110100, 101000,
010000, 100000,000000, 000001,000011, 000111
bit count per sub-sequence
6,5,5,4,3,2,
1,l,O,l,2,3 no matches at interval of6

n=7
1111110, 1111101, 1111010, 1110100, 1101000, 1010000, 0100000,
1000000, 0000001,0000011,0000111,0001110,0011101,0111010
6,6,5,4,J,2,1,
l,l,2,3,J,4,4
3 matches at interval 7, generate each 7 bit block and count the bits
until there is a difference then stop.
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1111110 1000000
1111101 0000001
11110!0 0000011
1110100 0000111
1101000 0001110
1010000 0011101
0100000 0111010

1110100
1101001
1010011
0100111

1110100 1110100 1101000
1101001 1101001 10/0001
1010011 1010011 0100011
0100111 01001101000110
1001110 1001110 1001101 0001101
0011101 00/1101 001/010 001 /OJ
0111010 0111010 0110100 OJ 101

1101
101
01
1=

=
=
=

6,1
6,1

5,2

4,3
3,3,4
=
=

2,4
1,4

n=S

11111101, 11111010, 11110100, 11101000, 11010000, 10100000, 01000000,
10000001,
00000011, 00000111, 00001ll0, 00011101, 00111010, 01110100, 11101001,
11010011

7,6,5,1,3,2,1,2,
2,3,3,1,4,4,5,5 4 matches at interval 8 then try each 8 bit sequence.
1111110100000011101001110/00/110/00110/0001/01
11111010 00000111 01001110 10011/0/ 00110100 01/01
11110100 00001110 10011101 00111010 01101000 I /01
11101000 0001110100111010 0111010011010001 101 =
11010000 00111010 011/010011/01001 1010001101
10100000 01110100 11/0100/ 11010011 010001/0 I
01000000 11101001 110/001/ 10/0011010001101
10000001 11010011 101001110/0011010001/01

7,2,
6,3,
5,3,

44444
3,4,

.

21,45,

'

-·<"

/" ----

'/

'{,','

2,5,···t'j'l

\i

i

The Basic Sequence length is apparently 8 as the value 4 is repeated for each blOck in
the sequence. It is also shown that the partial block size at the beginning is thr~:e bits.

n=9
111111010, 111110100, 111101000, 111010000, 110100000, 101000000,010000001,
100000011,000000111,
000001110,000011101, 000111010,001110100,011101001, 111010011,
110100111, 101001110, 111111010
7,6,5,1,3,2,2,3,3,
3,4,4,1,5,6,6,5,7

4 matches at interval9 then try each 9 bit sequence

111111010 000001110
111110100 000011101
111101000 000111010
111010000 001110100
110100000 011101001
101000000 111010011
010000001 110100111
100000011 101001110
000000111 010011101

100111010 011101001 101000110 1
0011/0100 111010011 010001101
011101001110100110 10001101 =
111010011 101001101 0001/01
110100111 010011010 001101
101001110 100110100 01101
01001110100110/0001101
100111010 011010001 101
001110100 110100011 01
=

=
=

7,3
6,4

5,4
=
=
=
=
=

4,4,5

3,5
2,6
2,6
3,5

3,5

n = 10

1111110100, 1111101000, 1111010000, 1110100000, 1101000000, 1010000001,
0100000011, 1000000111,0000001110,0000011101,0000111010,
0001110100, 0011101001, 0111010011, 1110100111, 1101001110, 1010011101,
0100111010, 1001110100, 0011101001
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7,6,~,4,3,3,3,4,3,4,

4,4,.§,6,7,6,6,5,5,5,

5 matches at interval 10 then try each 10 bit sequence

-.:::

,_-_,
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9.20.
Re•ource:
Product:
Supplier:

External and Ancillary Systems
Equipment ID and Automatic Mileage
AT5770 Odometcrjldcntification Tag
Amtcch Systems Corp .

l~cporting

Am tech now offers fleets an automatic identification tag with the added
capability to 9.21.company notes include the ability to prognostically react to the
maintenance needs of a fleet, as well as to accurately monitor and control fuel costs.
Contact: Amtech, (972) 733-G600, Fax: (972) 733-6699.

Resource:
Product:
Supplier:

Total Connectivity Solution
Cadec 4000Plus
Cadec Systems

The Cadec 4000Plus information system combines several newly released
products from Cadec into one "value package" designed to improve virtually every aspect
of information management \Vi thin a fleet operation. The system can be configured to fit
a broad range of specific customer needs.
At the heart of the 4000Plus package is Cadec's Data Bridge technolog_y.
DataBridge, the company explains, is a communications gateway designed to costeffectively link the engine, its subsystems, the driver and vehicle through an on board
computer to the company's home office and its remote locations. Products such as
RouteMessenger and RemoteOffice can be used with the DataBridge technology. A
number of methods for transferring data also are possible, and cellular and PCMCIA
technologies, as well as ATA J 1587 I 1708 datalink and sensor processing capabilities,
are also featured.
Another key element of the Cadec 4000 Plus is OfficeEnabler, which offers a
range of advanced information management and decision support tools. In addition to
core analysis capabilities for performance, productivity and regulatory compliance,
OfficeEnabler features RouteOnBoard, VehicleVision electronic tachograph and Cadec's
new StepAhead program series.
New sensor and datalink capabilities of the system, Cadec reports, also add
dimension to the "connectivity gateway." The 4000Plus's sensor capability, for example,
allows for on/off status determination and monitors specific information, such as
refrigeration, power take-off and dual speed on the rear axles. The Cadec 4000Plus also
reads and monitors the datalink for critical information regarding engine performance,
including the odometer and tachometer, Fleet managers can use tlie information about
vehicle and driver performance to maximize the overall efficiency of their operation.

Contact: Cadec Systems, (800) 25Cadec in the U.S., (800) Cadec20 in Canada, Fax:
(603) 623-0604,
URL:
E-mail:

ReMurce:
Product:

Supplier:

http: I /www.cadecsystems.com:8080
lnfo(fi;cadecsystems.com

Refrigeration Performance Monitoring
Data Management System
Thermo King Corporation
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Fleets arc assisted in monitoring and controlling wrgo temperature Hnd trailer
humidity conditions with Thermo King's Data Management System (DMS). The
microprocessor-based information gathering and storage device cHn be added to
practically any refrigerated trailer or truck for more efficient ami profitable temperature
management, the company says. Another benefit is reduced maintenance and operating
costs, since a review of the data from DMS can point out inefficiencies or trends that
can be corrected before major problems occur.
OMS provides fleets managers with a range of information by monitoring,
recording and displaying temperature readings for up to six sensors, including return
and discharge air. It also monitors and records six operating functions, including heat,
cool, defrost, high speed, low speed and Cycle Sentry, and it is equipped to monitor and
record up to four additional conditions, such as door openings. The result, Thermo King
states, is a complete record of the trip, from start to finish.
Desired operating conditions can be programmed in DMS via a keypad on the
device or with a personal computer. An alarm system alerts the driver should an out-ofrange condition develop during the trip. OMS accumulates data at pre-selected
intervals, which can range from every two minutes to every four hours. Since data is
maintained in a non-volatile memory that requires no power supply, stored information
cannot be erased or lost.

An internal battery with a life of up to ten years, the company adds, keeps the
internal clock working even if the refrigeration unit is shut down. A plug-in port allows
data retrieval whenever desired. Data can be output to a hand-held printer or personal
computer.
Contact: Thermo King Corp., (612) 926-3754, Fax: (612) 926-0943.
Resource:
Product:
Supplier:

Yard Management
Yard*Man I
Message Xpress

Installing a radio frequency identification (RFI D) system to monitor fleet assets in
yards or terminals is simplified with Yard*Man I, a fully integrated hardware, software
and monthly fleet activity reporting service. The hardware consists of an RFID tag reader
and tags which can be detected by a single reader at distances up to 1,400 ft. Tags are
attached to a truck or trailer, and readers are placed in yards to be monitored. The PCbased software runs on a Windows 3.X operating system. Fleet managers can access
historical and real-time fleet activity instantly via PC and a modem. Any number of
locations can be monitored at the same time using just one PC.
According to the company, Yard*Man I saves fleets time by automatically
performing yard inventories. In addition to simply showing whether a particular asset is
in one of the monitored facilities, the software enables daily yard activity reports to be
produced so fleet managers can track just-in-time performance, reconcile driver logs,
schedule and track maintenance operations and track leased asset utilization. The
reporting setvice included with Yard*Man I provides two, complete yard management
reports per day on all asset activity. Real-time yard inventory inquiries are available at
an additional cost.
Contact: Message Xpress, (8001 637-7248, Fax: (800) 270-2823.
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Reeource:
Product:
Supplier:

Vehicle Tracking
MicroTmckcr
American Technologies

The MicroTracker rCmote vehicle-locating system combines a Global Positioning
System receiver, radio transceiver and HF modem all in one compact unit. According to
the company, it is an inexpensive, reliable and accurate tracking module. Vehicles,
trailers and intcrmodal containers in which the device is installed, ATI advises, can be
instantly located anywhere in North America. When combined with the company's
LOGITRAK mobile satellite communications software, MicroTracker offers real-time
communications and vehicle tracking from a local internet connection to the

dispatcher's computer.
Contact: American Technologies, (414) 922-7030, Fax: (414) 922-7011,
E-mail: amtech(i!landnct.com ..

Re1ource:
Product:
Supplier:

Rear Vision System
Surround Sight
Clarion

Rear vision cameras and in-cab monitors designed to match a fleet's individual
needs are available from Clarion. The camera lineup features a waterproofing system
with an internal 0-Ring seal to protect the connection. A special rain gutter and
recessed lens, the company states, prevents water from interfering with the
transmission of a crystal-clear picture. Included on the CC-830050 model is an
automatic motorized lens cover and built-in heater which prevent the camera from
fogging up and keep it operational in foul weather. All cameras feature a die cast
aluminum housing, which makes them resistant to shock and vibration, and a 1/3-inch
CCD imager that provides clear views even in low lighting conditions.
Clarion monitors feature a shock-resistant casing anr 1 _;!are-resistant picture
tube that provides 400+ lines of resolution for greater clarity.~~ n1ght dimmer feature
enables easy night time viewing. Every system, the company notes, io:: capable of multizone monitoring. Additional camera switchers can be used with any mnnitor to hook up
multiple cameras. The CJ-770F model, however, includes a built-in two·camera
switcher for use with rear and right view cameras. This model also features electronic
on-screen AcuSight markers to help drivers judge backing distances more accurately.
All Clarion monitors can be adapted for RightSight usage, which automatically turns
cameras on when a driver shifts into reverse or activates the right turn signaL
Contact: Clarion, (310) 327-9100, Fax: (310) 327-1999.

Re1ource:
Product:
Suppller:

Accident Prevention
Blind-Sight
Collision Avoidance Systems, Inc

Comprised of intelligent sensors that are installed in various locations, the
Blind-Sight collision avoidance system can be equated to electronic eyes watching the
front, back and sides of a vehicle. Mounted in the truck cab is the command module, a
microprocessor-based unit that computes all the sensor information and alerts the
driver audibly and visually when objects are detected in a blind spot.
When a vehicle is first started, Blind-Sight performs a self-check to verify that all
sensors and on-board computer systems are working properly. At the same time, it
checks to see if any objects are in the driver's blind spot in front of the truck. On the
road, right-side sensors are activated whenever the driver engages the right turn !'lignaI.
The Blind-Sight backup system is activated when a driver shifts into reverse. On the
dashboard, the command module features an imbedded outline of a truck \\.'ith indicator
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lights that correspond to sensors located on the side of the tractor and trailer, as well as
on the rear of the trailer. When un object is sensed, the location of the object is
displayed as well as the distance in feet and inches. Optional driver's side coverage is
also available and is activated hy engaging the vehicle's four-way flasher.
Also offered with Blind-Sight is an Intelligent Mirror System that consists of
driver's and passenger side mirrors that arc mounted on standard mirror brackets.
Information relating to obstacles in the blind spots to the rear and sides of the truck is
displayed in these mirrors with large numbers and warning lights.
Contact:Collision Avoidance Systems, (800) 780-9062, Fax: (770) 475-8322.

Resource:
Product:
Supplier:

Accident Prevention
Echovision
Armatron International

To eliminate the risk for accidents associated with lane changes, merging and
backing maneuvers, the company offers an obstacle detection system featuring
automatic activation and intuitive audible and visual warnings. Echovision's rear
system alerts the driver with a low pitched interrupted tone when an obstacle is
detected at about 10ft from the truck. The tone increases in frequency as the vehicle
gets closer to the object, changing to a high-pitched continuous tone at approximately 4
ft. Sensors mounted to the right side of the truck monitor the blind area on this side of
the vehicle, sending a signal to the small box with warning light that is mounted on the
right side of the cab where it can be seen when the driver looks at his right-hand mirror.
If the right turn signal is on while an object is in the driver's blind spot, Echovision will
also sound an alarm.
To minimize distractions to the driver, Echovision features a Smart Program that
enables it to distinguish between true blind side obstacles and false warnings, such as
from road-side objects, guard rails, Jersey barriers, trees and signs. The system also
incorporates a continuous self-test for the electronics and actual transmission and
reception of the sensors to ensure that the entire system is operational. If any part of
the system malfunctions, the system fault light will warn the driver. A short series of
tones occur as the system is turned on to verify the audio warning components are
functioning properly.
Contact:Armatron International, (617) 321-2300; Fax: (617) 321-2309,

Resource:
Product:
Supplier:

Trailer Identification
Tai!Tag
Navigate International

With TailTag fleets can obtain the same information about the location and
status of trailers as they do for tractors. Details about the coupling or uncoupling of a
trailer are also provided. The information can be relayed to a fleet's home base or
registered in the tractor. The product does not use radio frequency communication.
TailTag is easily installed on the tractor, using existing electrical wiring and requiring no
special skills or tools. The system supports all relevant proposed and existing alphanumerical formats for trailer identification.
Contact:Navigato International, Denmark, +45 9751 3788, Fax: +45 9751 4050
E-mail:NATOFVM@po.ia.dk
Web page: http: //www.datashopper.dk/-finth /navigato.html.

Re.aurce:
Product:
Supplier:

Vehicle Tracking
MIRAS 1100
SPS Technologies
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The MIRAS 1100 vehicle remote control and tracking device uses 220M Hz twoway radio technology for voice capability as well as data transmission. This technology,
the company explains, replaces the cellular dependency of the originnl MIHAS (Mobile
Interactive Remote Activated Solutions) unit, saving the end user 40%, or more on
monthly operating costs. The unit features fully interactive tracking and remote control
capabilities to allow nccts to track vehicles and take remote control of many vehicle
operating variables such as turning a vehicle on and off. MmAS uses GPS technology to
track vehicles within 10 meters and transmit the data back to a ncct's in~house PC.
Zoom in and out features provided with the street level, detailed map allow users
to track vehicles along their route on a computer screen. The system also enables fleets
to monitor a vehicle's engine functions, speed, cargo temperature and security systems
on the office PC, and it helps drivers in need of directions find their next destination.
Interactive capabilities include being able to change a cargo's thermostat from the office
or instantly re~route a vehicle.
Contact:SPS Technologies, (800) 320-1186, Fax: (954) 677-9132.

Reaource:
Product:
Supplier:

Accident Prevention
Safety Alert
Cobra Electronics Corporation

Installed on emergency response, construction or public utility vehicles, Safety
Alert is designed to improve highway safety by automatically transmitting warning
signals to the radar detectors of motorists \Vithin a %~mile radius of the emergency or
potentially hazardous road situation. The Cobra Safety Alert transmitter, the company
explains, sends out several distinctive signals depending on the situation- one set of
signals for a stationary road hazard versus another set for a moving emergency vehicle,
for example. The safety signals, Cobra notes, can be picked up by all radar detectors
currently on the market.
In addition, ~intelligent" receivers that display warning messages on special LCD
screens or by using LED patterns also are available from Cobm. Safety Alert is FCC
approved. It is currently in use in 30 U.S. states.
Contact:Geltzer & Company, (212) 575-1976, Fax: (212) 245-2145.

Reaource:
Product:
Supplier:

On-Board Electronic Scale
Dynaload
Dynacraft

The Dynaload on-board scale is designed to help fleets maximize loads for
greater profitability, while eliminating lost revenues from overweight fines and
commercial scale fees. According to the company, Dynaload can determine gross,
payload and axle group weights on all tractor-trailers equipped with air suspensions.
For axle groups not equipped with air suspensions, the Dynaload system can be
supplied with load-cell sensors.
On air-equipped vehicles, the system uses pneumatic sensors to detect minute
changes in air pressure, Dynacraft notes, and is accurate to within 1%. A sensor
connected to the air suspension leveling valve relays analog data to a solid-state
transmitter mounted on the frame rail. The transmitter converts the signal to digital and
relays the data directly to Dynaload's microprocessor-based meter in the truck's cab.
Just one sensor/transmitter per axle is required, according to the company. Installation
takes between three and four hours. Dynaload can be ordered on new Kenworth and
Peterbilt tractors. It is also available through Kenworth and Peterbilt dealers for
instaJlation in the aftermarket on any truck make.
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Contact:Dynacraft, (800) 532-6550, Fax: (206) 351-3041; or contact a nearby Ken worth
or Petcrbilt dealer.

Resource:
Product:
Supplier:

Obstacle Detection
SCAN System

Electronic Controls Company (ECCO)

SCAN is an ultrasonic sensory device designed to assist drivers in safely
changing lanes, backing up or docking. Comprising the system are three primary
components- the smart sensor, the driver alert module and the main power harness.
According to the company, SCAN's smart sensors feature state-of-the-art transducers
which detect vehicles or objects near the truck's perimeter. The software interprets the
signal received and transmits the data along a single wire to a display module mounted
inside the cab. The module visibly and audibly alerts drivers to obstacles within SCAN's
detection zone,
Ultrasonic transducers, ECCO states, provide broad detection-area coverage and
are capable of withstanding harsh environmental elements. For trouble-free operation,
the company adds, the smart sensors perform self-diagnostics and report any
malfunctions. They are also designed to monitor ambient temperatures and will activate
a heating element to prevent buildup of ice and snow during winter use.
Contact:Electronic Controls Company, (800) 635-5900, Fax: (208) 376-3410.

Resource:
Product:
Supplier:

Ergonomic Dashboard
Driver's Cabin
Argo Instruments

In cooperation with VDO Kienzle- developer of the Integrated Driver Information
System in use on motor coaches in Europe- Argo Instruments introduces a driver's
cabin designed for improved efficiency and safety of transit bus and motor coach
operations in North America. The ergonomic cockpit, the company says, includes a
computerized, integrated driver instrument panel which serves as the central
information hub. With the exception of the speedometer and prescribed warning lights,
all other vital display functions are included on one easily readable LCD monitor. Preprogrammed controls allow information to be prioritized and presented according to its
importance to the operator.
The driver's cabin dashboard also is designed to adjust with the steering wheel,
making it easily adaptable to the needs of different drivers. In addition to improved
visibility and less information clutter in the cockpit, the company notes, another benefit
of the dashboard's design is less physical stress on drivers, including reduced incidence
of back strain, Additional features and options that are being designed for the future,
Argo reports, include real-time links to fleet headquarters and trip monitoring
capabilities.

Contact:Argo Instruments, (540) 665-0200, Fax: (540) 662-2127.

Resource:
Product:
Supplier:

Data Collection
XATA Distribution Information System
XATA Corporation

Four basic components comprise the XATA Distribution Information System
that, according to the company, can help improve fleet productivity. The Driver
Computer is the vehicle on-board system, with touch-screen computer, which interacts
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with the driver to electronically capture and communicate vehicle operating data. The
Data Station is located at trip origins and destinations, such as warehouses, terminals
and distribution centers. It is used to download dispatch data to and collect trip
information from the Driver Keys.
Each electronic Driver Key carries a driver's individuai!D number and Jog
records. It is used to exchange dispatch and trip data between the Driver Computer and
Data Station. The fourth component, the Fleet Management System {FMS), is PC
software designed to help fleet managers evaluate and report trip details. The FMS
collects information from Data Sta~tions and sends route dispatch information to the
Driver Computer via the Data Stations.
Contact: XATA Corp., (612) 894-3680, Fax: (6121894-2463.

Resource:
Product:
Supplier:

Dispatching
PEN*KEY 6000 Series
Norand Corporation

Using mobile computing technology, Norand's PEN*KEY 6000 Series of products
are designed to help fleets improve delivery planning and information management, as
well as increase dock and driver productivity. Fleets can choose between the 22-ounce
6100 computer or the full-screen 6600 unit, depending on the extent of functions and
price of system they desire. The complete dispatch system includes P&D route planning,
graphics maps with driver instructions, strip and load manifests, customer calls for
pickup, linehaul planning, dock planning, real-time delivery reporting, signature
capture and driver production management.
An accurate cross-docking system, Norand adds, eliminates misloads and
improves efficiency through an optional bar-code scanner, on-line re-weigh program,
automatic trailer door closing, visual load diagram, and other features. Wireless
communications to printers via an optionallrDA (infrared link) are also possible. Both
units are small and easily carried from the truck to docks or delivery sites, the company
notes, and can also be worn on a belt for even greater portability.
Contact: Norand Corp., (800) 4-PENKEY, Fax: (319) 369-3453.

Re•ource:
Product:

Supplier:

Satellite Communications
Enhanced Display Unit for OmniTRACS
Qualcomm

An enhanced display unit for the OmniTRACS satellite mobile communications
system is available from Qualcomm. Used to send and receive text messages, the unit is
mounted in the truck's cab and features a user-friendly keyboard and display screen.
The enhanced display unit is compatible with the OmniTRACS Mobile Communications
Terminal (MCT) as well as a new OmniTRACS on-board recor-der, which is planned for
release later this year.
A smart card reader/writer feature, the company notes, will allow drivers to store
and retrieve data on small plastic cards when used with the on-board recorder. The
display operates over a wide temperature range and is vibration and shock protected. It
features a IS-line by 40-character screen that permits both text and high definition
graphics.
Contact: Qualcomm, Inc., (619) 658-2000, Fax: (619) 658-1578.
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Resource:
Product:
Supplier:

Collision Warning
Forewarn Side Detection System
Delco Electronics Corp

The Forewarn Side Detection System (SDS) is an advanced safety system for
Class 6 through 8 vehicles designed to warn drivers of vehicles moving in the blind area
along the right side of their tractor and trailer. SDS, the company explains, uses
microwave radar technology to detect moving objects and targct~discrimination software
to minimize false alarms from stationary objects sensed in its path.
The sensor, mounted on the tractor to the rear of the right-hand door, monitors
approximately an 8-ft zone. Whenever a moving object is detected in the zone, Delco
advises, the unit sets off a visual alert via a flashing light located on the outside sidemirrors of the vehicle. An audible warning, triggered by a lane change signal, alerts
drivers to moving objects i n the blind spot zone. According to the manufacturer, testing
of the Forewarn system has proven it reliable even in harsh weather conditions.
Contact: Delco Electronics Corp., (31 7) 451-5700, Fax: (317) 451-5426.

Resource: Data Transmission
Product: Radio Frequency Identification System
Supplier: Amtech Systems Corp.
Using Amtech's radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, fleets can
automate many operations easily and securely, the company says. RFID facilitates
collecting, tracking and reporting data for maintenance and other fleet management
areas. Hands-free and paperless data communications applications for the automatic
vehicle and equipment identification system include gate control access, yard inventory,
fuel terminal authorization, automatic weigh-in-motion scales, preventive maintenance
monitoring and intermodal equipment tracking.

Contact: Amtech, (214)733-6600, Fax: (214)733-6699.
Resource:
Product:
Supplier:

Interactive Fleet Management
RoadTrac
RoadTrac, Ltd

According to the company, RoadTrac integrates Global Positioning Satellite
tracking technology, proprietary mapping software and state-of-the-art digital cellular
communications to provide fleets with accurate vehicle locating combined with a truly
interactive voice, data and vehicle security management tool. RoadTrac features a
display screen for easy viewing of all critical data, including vehicle latitude, longitude
and heading; vehicle speed; street address; vehicle ID, license number, make and model;
and alarm status and security mode. In-vehicle security sensors and enabling device
options, the company says, are designed to provide instant response to "real-time"
conditions.
Programmable command functions include: Lock/Unlock Cargo Doors, Enable
Flashers/Disable Engine, Audio or Video Monitoring, Voice Recognition, Operator
Panic/Distress Mode, and PC and Fax Connectivity. Other features include on-screen
routing, bi-directional text messaging, interactive Key Cards, computer aided dispatch,
mapping overlays of vehicles and custom report generation, including state fuel tax
reporting.

Contact: RoadTrac Ltd., (800)661-4971, Fax: (770)446-3897.
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Reaource:
Product:
Supplier:

On-Board Recorder with GPS
DataTraxjGPS
l~ockwcll Transportation gJcctronics

The Rockwell DataTraxjGPS combines functions of the 1'ripmastcr on-board
recorder with a built-in Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver. DataTraxjGPS, the
manufacturer reports, can act as a stand-alone recorder of vehicle data or be used with
a variety of input and display devices, including alphanumeric wired and portable
keypads, pen-based computers and touch-screen units. The system uses GPS to add the
date, time and vehicle position to traditional OBC data. According to the company, a key
feature is the ability to accomplish hands-free recording of state line crossings and
accurate mileage tracking by jurisdiction for fuel tax reporting. Fleets can also
incorporate DataTra"X/ GPS data with popular route analysis and planning software.

Contact: Rockwell Transportation Electronics, (BOO) 997-2595, Fax: (515) 24 7-2812.
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